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4. CHEMICAL TESTS, GENERALLY State v. Padgett, 329 Ga.App. 747, 766 S.E.2d 143 (November 18, 2014). In DUI prosecution, trial court properly suppressed results of blood test taken and analyzed at hospital at officer’s request pursuant to implied consent. Hospital test in these circumstances constituted a state test, and “the State conceded that the hospital's analysis of Padgett's blood sample did not comply with the requirements of OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(1)(A).” “Here, it is undisputed that the blood analysis at issue was performed at the request of a law enforcement officer for the purpose of a DUI investigation pursuant to consent gained after an implied consent warning. Thus, the test was State-administered for purposes of OCGA § 40–6–392(a), and the State had the burden of showing that it met the statutory requirements, which it concedes it could not do.” Results were not made admissible when the State later obtained a search warrant for the hospital records; “the presence of a warrant did not cure the improper testing procedure that occurred in this case.” Meiklejohn v. State, 281 Ga.App. 712, 637 S.E.2d 117 (October 2, 2006). Defendant’s blood sample was sent to Georgia Crime Lab for testing for alcohol. “The sample came back negative for alcohol but positive for cocaine. It was stipulated that the officer did not specifically request that Meiklejohn’s blood be tested for drugs, but that the crime lab had a policy of doing additional testing for drugs or other substances when a DUI sample indicates .08 or less concentration for alcohol.” No error admitting sample, although officer did not request testing for substances other than alcohol. “Meiklejohn … argues that the officer advised him only that he was under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, and not for a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6), and that therefore he never consented to the testing of his blood for the presence of drugs. In a related enumeration, Meiklejohn argues that because the officer mislead him, albeit unintentionally, into believing he was being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and not drugs, he was deprived of making an informed choice of his right to refuse testing. However, as stated above, the officer clearly advised Meiklejohn that the test was being conducted to determine if he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Nothing in OCGA § 40-5-55 or OCGA § 40-6-392 requires the officer to notify the defendant that he is accused of violating a specific provision of OCGA § 40-6-391 at the time of the arrest. Indeed, until the testing is performed, the state may not know the exact nature of the violation. Moreover, we have previously held that suppression was not warranted although the defendant and the State signed a form at the hospital indicating that defendant’s blood and urine were being tested only for the presence of alcohol, as long as the suspect was properly advised under the implied consent notice before giving her consent to testing. State v. Lewis, 233 Ga.App. 390, 391-392(1) (504 S.E.2d 242) (1998).” Stapleton v. State, 279 Ga.App. 296, 630 S.E.2d 769 (April 13, 2006). Sufficient foundation for test results was presented: “Here, the arresting officer testified that he was trained and certified to operate the Intoxilyzer 500 [sic], and the trial court admitted the machine’s inspection certificates. The officer testified further that the machine passed its own diagnostic test, appeared to be in good working order, and did not appear to have any parts missing. This evidence was sufficient to establish a foundation for the admission of the breath test results. See Scara v. State, 259 Ga.App. 510, 512- 513(1) (577 S.E.2d 796) (2003); Gidey v. State, 228 Ga.App. 250, 251-252(1) (491 S.E.2d 406) (1997).” Whittaker v. State, 279 Ga.App. 148, 630 S.E.2d 560 (April 12, 2006). 1. State may prove that intox tests were given in accordance with “approved methods” under OCGA §§ 40-6-392(a)(1)(A) and 27-3-7(d)(1) “by means of the oral testimony of the individual who conducted the test. Scara v. State, 259 Ga.App. 510, 512 (577 S.E.2d 796) (2003). Moreover, ‘[t]he admissibility of a breath test does not depend on exact compliance with the DFS regulations. Test results are admissible if the State shows substantial compliance with those rules .’ Dougherty v. State, 259 Ga.App. 618, 620(1)(b) (578 S.E.2d 256) (2003). Here again, officers testified that they performed all required tests on the machines and that they prepared the instruments in accordance with their training. This evidence was sufficient to show substantial compliance with DFS procedures. Id. at 620(1)(b).” 2. No merit to defendants’ argument “that since the machines register a series of increasing blood alcohol concentration readings as a person continues to blow into the machine, a final result is not an average reading, and that the failure to present an entire series of readings to the factfinder denied them due process of law.” “The record in these cases included expert testimony that as a person continues to blow into the Intoxilyzer, the breath alcohol content tends to approach that of arterial blood, but will at no time exceed the person’s blood alcohol level. … [T]he defendants’ arguments go to the weight of the evidence, which was for the trial court to determine. Bagwell v. State, 248 Ga.App. 806, 809 (547 S.E.2d 377) (2001).” State v. Rackoff, 264 Ga.App. 506, 591 S.E.2d 379 (November 14, 2003). Trial court erroneously excluded Intoxilyzer results merely because machine was taken out of service five days later. Officer testified that machine was in good working order at time of defendant’s tests; was properly certified; and ran two self-diagnostic tests. There was no evidence as to why machine was taken out of service, other than a record that said it “was to ‘be repaired or