☢ test - Í

replaced in [the] near future.’ … The record did not state whether the machine was damaged, was malfunctioning, was in need of upgrading, refurbishing, or scheduled service, or was simply being replaced by a newer machine.” Thus, evidence did not support court’s finding that machine was ‘malfunctioning,’ and test results should have been admitted, to be weighed by ultimate fact finder. State v. Naik, 259 Ga.App. 603, 577 S.E.2d 812 (January 29, 2003). “Whether the chemical test complied with OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A) was a legal question for the trial court to decide. We hold that it is sufficient for an operator to testify to the facts upon which a trial court can base a conclusion that the chemical test complied with OCGA § 40-6- 392(a)(1)(A). It is not necessary that the operator additionally testify to his opinion that the test was ‘performed according to methods approved by the Division of Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.’” Grant of motion to suppress reversed. Ramey v. State, 257 Ga.App. 648, 572 S.E.2d 662 (September 27, 2002). State has no obligation to preserve a “control sample” of defendant’s urine for later DNA testing so that defendant can challenge identity of the sample. Harrell v. State, 257 Ga.App. 177, 570 S.E.2d 607 (August 23, 2002). Evidence of state crime lab analysis of defendant’s urine sample was admissible despite lack of evidence of transportation of sample or preservation in sealed police refrigerator. Misspelling of defendant’s name on outside of container does not require exclusion. “[W]hen a urine sample is routinely handled and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the urine tested was other than that taken from the defendant, the evidence of tests on such urine is admissible.” “The State need not negative every possibility of tampering, and need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the evidence. When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.” State v. Allen, 256 Ga.App. 798, 570 S.E.2d 34 (July 29, 2002). OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5) “does not require that an alcohol concentration test be administered within three hours of the accident allegedly caused by drunken driving; ‘[i]t need be established only that [the defendant’s] alcohol concentration [exceeded the legal limit] during the three hour period after he ceased driving or exercising actual physical control of the vehicle.’... [I]t is possible, through the use of expert testimony, to establish a defendant’s alcohol concentration for the relevant time period even though the test was administered more than three hours later.” Evans v. State, 253 Ga.App. 71, 558 S.E.2d 51 (December 14, 2001). Defendant, who on the date of arrest refused blood- alcohol testing, sought admission of expert witness testimony regarding the “Widmark formula”, which re-estimates a defendant’s blood alcohol content in an attempt to negate the statutory inferences that arise under OCGA § 40-6-392(b). Held, trial court correctly refused admission of the expert’s testimony concerning blood alcohol concentration because when chemical analysis of bodily substances is refused, the statutorily-permitted inferences that arise from such chemical testing are irrelevant, and there is nothing for the defense to rebut by the “Widmark formula.” Muir v. State, 248 Ga.App. 49, 545 S.E.2d 176 (February 14, 2001). At trial, the defendant used as a defense (by way of an expert witness), that women score higher than men on the Intox 5000 machine because it is calibrated to a man’s physiological factors. Held, the trial court erred in charging that a chemical analysis of a person’s blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance shall be considered valid if the analysis was performed according to approved methods . This charge nullified the defendant’s defense because it mandated that the jury find valid the test results showing that her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. Distinguishes Johnson v. State , 231 Ga.App. 215, 498 S.E.2d 778 (1998), where following charge was approved: “I charge you that breath alcohol measuring equipment approved by the State Crime Lab is considered accurate if properly operated.” Sillman v. State, 247 Ga.App. 681, 545 S.E.2d 85 (January 24, 2001). The defendant demanded a jury for his charge of DUI, and requested from the State copies of any custodial statements and scientific reports. When the case was called for trial, the defendant asserted that he had not received the State’s response to his discovery request until the preceding day. The defendant on appeal objects, stating that because he did not receive a copy of the breath test results at least ten days before trial, the trial court erred in admitting it into evidence. The officer who administered the breath test testified that he gave the defendant a copy of the test printout at the time of his arrest and advised him to keep it just in case he decided to hire a lawyer. Held, as defendant has already been provided with a copy of the test results, he was not harmed by any failure by the State to provide the same pursuant to discovery.