☢ test - Í

Cunrod v. State, 241 Ga.App. 743, 526 S.E.2d 900 (December 14, 1999). Microscopic, thin layer chromatography, and Duquenois-Levine tests for identification of marijuana have been recognized in such substantial number of courts that state was not required to introduce evidence showing that scientific principles and techniques underlying such tests were valid and reliable. Brandon v. State, 236 Ga.App. 203, 511 S.E.2d 573 (February 3, 1999). “ Brandon argues that the trial court erred in allowing the operating officer to testify that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was working properly because the machine did not provide a printout verifying its self-diagnostic test. He maintains that such testimony was sheer speculation. The officer testified that just prior to running the test on Brandon, the Intoxilyzer 5000 ran a diagnostic test on itself. He stated the machine was designed to shut down if anything was wrong and it performed properly during Brandon’s tests. He also testified that he was trained to run the machine and he followed the methods and procedures taught by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation Division of Forensic Sciences. His permit to operate the machine was read into evidence. This is sufficient to refute Brandon’s contention that the evidence used to establish that the machine was working properly was speculative. Gidey [ v. State, 228 Ga.App. 250, 251-252(1), 491 S.E.2d 406 (1997)]; see Bankers Health &c. Ins. Co. v. Fryhofer, 114 Ga.App. 107, 110(1), 150 S.E.2d 365 (1966).” 5. COMMERCIAL DRIVERS Tunali v. State , 311 Ga.App. 844, 717 S.E.2d 341 (October 4, 2011). In prosecution for driving a commercial vehicle with a detectable presence of alcohol and related offense, trial court properly denied motion to suppress; officer was not required to read implied consent warning prior to administering roadside alco-sensor test “designed to test for the presence of alcohol. That result, the presence vel non of alcohol, was the only evidence tendered at the hearing, and no blood alcohol concentration was at issue. OCGA § 40–5–153(c) applies to commercial drivers and requires that an implied consent warning be given to drivers of commercial vehicles when an officer administers a test to determine the person's ‘alcohol concentration or the presence of other drugs. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, as this Court has held when analyzing the admissibility of testing of noncommercial drivers under OCGA § 40–6–392, which is explicitly referenced in OCGA § 40–5–153(a), the implied consent warning requirement does not apply to alco-sensor tests, which merely detect the presence, not concentration, of alcohol. See Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571(2), 436 S.E.2d 475 (1993) (no requirement to give implied consent warning for alco-sensor test); Turrentine v. State, 176 Ga.App. 145, 146(1), 335 S.E.2d 630 (1985) (same). This is consistent with the plain meaning of the phrase ‘alcohol concentration or the presence of other drugs.’ [fn]” Robinson v. State, 293 Ga.App. 477, 667 S.E.2d 647 (September 2, 2008). Defendant couldn’t use appeal of his DUI conviction to challenge constitutionality of suspension of his commercial driver’s license. “Appeal of a license revocation is governed by OCGA § 40-5-66, which, with certain exceptions, requires an appeal to the superior court. See, e.g., Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 (658 S.E.2d 592) (2008).” Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259, 658 S.E.2d 592 (March 10, 2008). 1. Superior court properly upheld constitutionality of implied consent statute; implied consent notice does not violate due process “because it did not make [defendant] aware of the actual consequences of his refusal to submit to the chemical testing.” Here, driver contends he was denied due process because he wasn’t told that his implied consent refusal, coupled with his prior DUI conviction, would result in a lifetime CDL suspension. “[A]s long as the arresting officer informs the driver that the driver could lose his driver’s license for refusing to submit to chemical testing, due process does not require the arresting officer to inform the driver of all the consequences of refusing to submit to chemical testing.” Based on South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748) (1983) (no denial of due process in implied consent notice where “the implied consent notice as given did not ‘implicitly assure a suspect that no consequence other than those mentioned will occur.’”). 2. Driver holding CDL, but driving non-commercial vehicle, was properly read implied consent notice for drivers of non-commercial vehicles; re-affirming holding of Meyer v. State, 224 Ga.App. 183 (480 S.E.2d 234) (1997). Becker v. State, 240 Ga.App. 267, 523 S.E.2d 98 (October 6, 1999). In commercial driver’s prosecution for DUI and vehicular homicide, trial court erred in suppressing results of State-administered blood and urine tests, based on wording of implied consent notice for commercial drivers. “The implied consent notices that [Officer] Rehberg read to Becker repeated almost verbatim the language of OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(3), which sets forth the required notice for commercial drivers. These notices advised Becker that if he refused the testing, he would be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a minimum of one year. The notices did not advise Becker that refusal to submit to the tests could also disqualify him from operating a private motor vehicle, as such language is not included in the statutory notice