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set forth in OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(3). At the suppression hearing, Becker argued that Rehberg's failure to warn him about possible suspension of his private driving privileges violated a provision of the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act, OCGA § 40-5-153(c). That Code section states that a commercial driver who is asked to submit to chemical testing must be warned ‘that a refusal to submit to the test will result in that person's being disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year under Code Section 40-5-151 and from operating a private motor vehicle as provided in Code Section 40-5-67.1.’ [fn] OCGA § 40-5-153(c). The trial court agreed with Becker, finding that the notices did not comply with § 40-5-153(c) and that this lack of compliance was an additional basis for suppressing the results of the chemical tests. We reject this analysis,” as defendant consented to the test with this warning alone – the additional warning about consequences of refusal became inoperative, and its omission was “harmless. After hearing that refusal to consent to chemical testing could be used against him in court and would result in suspension of his commercial driver's license for one year, Becker agreed to take the tests. For him, those consequences alone were apparently severe enough to justify consenting. Being told that refusal to consent would result in an additional harsh consequence- suspension of personal driving privileges – could only have tipped the balance further in favor of consenting. The omission was therefore immaterial.” No evidence here that officer intentionally misled defendant. Query: different result if defendant had refused? Seems likely.See also Meyer v. State , 224 Ga.App. 183, 480 S.E.2d 234 (1997) (holding that out-of-state driver who holds a commercial license, but who is driving a non-commercial vehicle when stopped, only has to be read non-commercial implied consent warning). 6. CONSTITUTIONALITY New case! State v. Flores-Gallegos, A16A0339, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2726842 (May 11, 2016). In DUI prosecution, trial court used improper standard in granting motion to suppress implied consent breath test. Trial court found that defendant’s limited English allowed him to understand and follow requests for field sobriety evaluations, but not the State’s implied consent warning. Thus, “taking into account the totality of the circumstances and the entirety of the transactions between the defendant and law enforcement personnel, the [trial] Court finds that the State showed no more than that the defendant acquiesced to the officers’ claims of lawful authority. Thus, under Williams v. State, [296 Ga. 817 (771 S.E.2d 373) (2015)], the Court is constrained to find that the defendant did not give actual, knowing and voluntary consent to the administration for the State’s breath test.” Court of Appeals vacates and remands with direction because “‘knowing consent’ is not required under our law. The State must show only that the accused acted ‘freely and voluntarily’ in giving ‘actual consent.’ Williams, supra, 296 Ga. at 821–822. While the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances in concluding that Flores–Gallegos acquiesced to the breath test, as Williams instructs, it did so by employing an improper standard. Id. at 822.” Kendrick v. State, 335 Ga.App. 766, 782 S.E.2d 842 (February 23, 2016). Interlocutory appeal in DUI prosecution; trial court properly denied motion to suppress results of State breath test, finding that defendant consented both for implied consent and Fourth Amendment purposes. 1. “[T]he trial court found that ‘under a totality of the circumstances,’ Kendrick voluntarily consented to giving a breath sample. The trial court credited testimony by officers that Kendrick, in the trial court’s words, ‘appeared coherent, her language and speech patterns were normal, ... she appeared to understand what was going on[,]’ and did not otherwise appear confused. The trial court also viewed the video of the arrest, including where the officer read Kendrick the implied consent notice, and noted that Kendrick exhibited ‘no slurred speech, no odd behavior,’ ‘rational and good communication skills with the officers[,]’ no ‘extreme intoxication[,]’ and that the officer did not point any weapon at Kendrick or use force, threats, or promises, which the court said was consistent with witness testimony. Similarly, there was no testimony that any force or threats were used in the testing room.” “In this case, the evidence does not show that the officers ‘used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the consent.’ Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga.App. 43, 47(2), 663 S.E.2d 396 (2008)]. Both the officer and Kendrick conducted themselves calmly. Nor does Kendrick argue that youth, lack of education, or low intelligence somehow negated the voluntariness of her consent. Rather, the crux of her argument appears to be that she felt coerced into giving consent because she was not informed of her constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures and because the language of the implied consent notice, when read to her while she was arrested and in handcuffs, made her feel as though she did not have a choice but to acquiesce . 3 The Supreme Court of the United States and other courts have rejected invitations to create a duty to inform suspects of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and we will not depart from their well-worn path. See Schneckloth [ v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231(II)(B), 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)] (such a suggestion ‘has been almost universally repudiated by both federal and state courts, and we think, rightly so’) (footnotes and citations omitted). Moreover, in analyzing other challenges regarding implied consent, we have found circumstances under which officers merely inform a suspect of ‘the permissible range of sanctions that the state may ultimately be authorized to impose’ under the implied consent statute, as appears to have been done here, not to constitute coercion. See Gutierrez v.