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State, 228 Ga.App. 458, 460(2), 491 S.E.2d 898 (1997) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Nor does the fact that Kendrick was in handcuffs negate her ability to give consent. See Silverio v. State, 306 Ga.App. 438, 446(3), 702 S.E.2d 717 (2010).” 2. Rejects defendant’s argument that in ““ Williams v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court clearly ruled that in order for a compelled search of a person’s bodily substances to comply with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the state must show more than just mere consent under Georgia’s Implied Consent Statute.” This is not a correct characterization of Williams. … [W]e do not read Williams ’s rejection of a per se rule of consent under the implied consent statute as authorizing us to replace it with its opposite—that is, a per se rule that the State must always show more than consent under the implied consent statute. Rather, we take the Supreme Court at its word when it instructed trial courts to review the totality of the circumstances in determining consent. An affirmative response to the question posed by the implied consent language may be sufficient for a trial court to find actual consent, absent reason to believe the response was involuntary. Here, Kendrick gave an affirmative answer to the question posed by the implied consent language, which is necessarily part of the circumstances to be considered by the trial court. She did not attempt to change that answer during the time that elapsed before testing. [Cit.]. She did not appear so impaired that she was unable to understand what she was being asked, [FN5: We express no opinion as to what significance greater impairment might have had for this question. ] she did not express any objection to the test, and the officer did not force her to take the test. [Cits.] During the hearing on her motion to suppress, although Kendrick testified that she thought the breath test was mandatory, she also said that her decision to submit to testing was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to keep her license, a recognition of the actual choice she had. See, e.g., State v. Modlin, 291 Neb. 660, 674–675, 867 N.W.2d 609 (2015) (noting that although the legal consequences of an administrative license revocation make refusal of a chemical test a difficult choice to make, ‘the difficulty of such choice does not render consent involuntary’ ). On this record, and considering all of the facts before us, and affording appropriate deference to the trial court that heard the testimony first-hand, we affirm. [FN6: We do not approve the trial court’s language in granting the order based in any part on finding a license to be a ‘privilege’ rather than a ‘right.’ ‘[R]elevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a “right” or a “privilege.”’ State v. Callaway, 236 Ga. 613, 614(1), 225 S.E.2d 230 (1976). ] ” 3. Assumes, based on Williams , that “a breath test is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (March 27, 2015). DUI and related convictions remanded for consideration of defendant’s claim that “Georgia's implied consent statute, OCGA § 40–5–55,[fn] is unconstitutional as applied in his case because consent obtained solely under the statute does not amount to voluntary consent for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the related provision of the State Constitution.” Only evidence of consent to testing here was defendant’s “yes” when asked to submit to blood and urine tests following reading of the implied consent notice. “There was no other conversation about consent for the testing, i.e., the officer did not ask Williams ‘if [Williams] was willing to freely and voluntarily give a test.’ The officer ‘read [Williams] the implied consent and that was pretty much the end of it.’ It ‘was an ordinary DUI,’ there ‘were no exigent circumstances,’ and no search warrant was obtained.” “The state court denied Williams's motion to suppress his blood test,[fn] expressly rejecting the ‘reasoning’ that statutory implied consent implicated Fourth Amendment concerns, and the contention that the statutory consent, in and of itself, was not a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a search warrant.” Contrary to trial court’s ruling, an intrusion on the body implicates the Fourth Amendment, and as with any other search, when challenged the State must show that the intrusion was made pursuant to a valid warrant, or was justified by exigent circumstances, or was done by consent. “[I]n Cooper v. State, [277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003)], this Court plainly distinguished compliance with the implied consent statute from the constitutional question of whether a suspect gave actual consent for the state-administered testing. We emphasized such remaining question in regard to the validity of the consent, confirming that ‘[w]hen relying on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden of proving that the accused acted freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.’ Cooper v. State, supra at 291(VI), 587 S.E.2d 605, citing, inter alia, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).[fn] And, it can certainly be argued that the need for the State to demonstrate actual consent for the purpose of exception to the warrant requirement and its constitutional implications is reinforced by the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in [ Missouri v. McNeely , 11-1425, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 2013 WL 1628934 (April 17, 2013)] . ” Citing post-McNeely decisions from other states holding that “mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant.” “In considering Williams's motion to suppress, the state court failed to address whether Williams gave actual consent to the procuring and testing of his blood, which would require the determination of the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances.” Accord, Davis v. State , 332 Ga.App. 488, 773 S.E.2d 442 (June 12, 2015).