☢ test - Í

Robinson v. State, 293 Ga.App. 477, 667 S.E.2d 647 (September 2, 2008). Defendant couldn’t use appeal of his DUI conviction to challenge constitutionality of suspension of his commercial driver’s license. “Appeal of a license revocation is governed by OCGA § 40-5-66, which, with certain exceptions, requires an appeal to the superior court. See, e.g., Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 (658 S.E.2d 592) (2008).” Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259, 658 S.E.2d 592 (March 10, 2008). Superior court properly upheld constitutionality of implied consent statute; implied consent notice does not violate due process “because it did not make [defendant] aware of the actual consequences of his refusal to submit to the chemical testing.” “[A]s long as the arresting officer informs the driver that the driver could lose his driver’s license for refusing to submit to chemical testing, due process does not require the arresting officer to inform the driver of all the consequences of refusing to submit to chemical testing.” Based on South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748) (1983) (no denial of due process in implied consent notice where “the implied consent notice as given did not ‘implicitly assure a suspect that no consequence other than those mentioned will occur.’”). Accord, Chancellor v. State , 284 Ga. 66, 663 S.E.2d 203 (June 30, 2008) (same defendant’s criminal appeal). Cornwell v. State, 283 Ga. 247, 657 S.E.2d 195 (January 28, 2008). “Cornwell argues that application of the implied consent statute (OCGA § 40-5-55) is unconstitutional, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the statute allowed for the warrantless compelled testing of Cornwell’s bodily fluids based on the existence of probable cause, but without proof of the existence of exigent circumstances. However, because a driver is deemed to have consented to tests of his bodily substances when probable cause exists to arrest him for an alleged violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, the existence of exigent circumstances is wholly irrelevant. See Meiklejohn v. State, 281 Ga.App. 712, 715 (637 S.E.2d 712) (2006). Indeed, where, as here, Cornwell has been arrested based on probable cause and the State has complied with the statutory implied consent requirements, Cornwell ‘cannot complain that testing done by the State for the presence of alcohol and drugs violated [his] rights under the Georgia Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.’ Id. Therefore, the motion to suppress was properly denied. Id. ” Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (October 6, 2003). Trooper took blood samples from both drivers in serious-injury accident because he thought law required him to; he had no suspicion that defendant committed any violation. Held, trial court should have suppressed test results. “[T]o the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions.” Purpose of statute is primarily the gathering of evidence for criminal prosecution; hence, no “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment applies, distinguishing this case from Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association , 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ( railway employees can be blood tested after accidents due to government’s interest in regulating their behavior) and Adams v. State , 269 Ga. 405, 498 S.E.2d 268 (1998) (state has special need to test some criminals for HIV to protect crime victims). Young v. State, 275 Ga. 309, 565 S.E.2d 814 (July 3, 2002). “Criminal defendants are ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of equal protection ‘only if they are charged with the same crime or crimes.’” Thus, DUI defendants are not similarly situated with defendants charged with hunting under the influence or boating under the influence. Differences in those implied consent warnings (warning that test results can be used against them at trial) therefore do not amount to a violation of equal protection. Madden v. State, 252 Ga.App. 164, 555 S.E.2d 832 (October 25, 2001). OCGA § 40-6-392(f)’s provision for self- authentication of properly prepared and executed certificates of inspection for approved breath-testing instruments does not violate a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation, citing Brown v. State , 268 Ga. 76, 77, 485 S.E.2d 486 (1997). Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605, 533 S.E.2d 92 (July 10, 2000). DUI convictions affirmed; implied consent notice isn’t unconstitutional because it doesn’t warn driver that test results can be used against him in court. 1. “[Defendants] argue that the notice is incomplete, misleading and coercive because suspects are warned that a refusal to submit to testing may be used against them at trial, but are not told that test results may be used against them at trial. It is clear that the Georgia Constitution does not protect citizens from compelled blood testing or from the use of the results of compelled blood testing at trial. Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433 (1), 330 S.E.2d 588 (1985). Nor is compelling a defendant to submit to breath testing unconstitutional under Georgia law. Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990) (‘[T]he use of a