☢ test - Í

test where officer took defendant to one hospital where defendant didn’t specify any other. Defendant contended he wanted, and specified, a different hospital, but trial court could find from conflicting evidence that he didn’t, and that officer provided reasonable accommodation. “The officer acknowledged that there was some discussion about testing at Kennestone Hospital, but stated that Kennestone was not a viable option. He explained that Kennestone personnel had recently refused to administer an independent test to another of his arrestees and that he had been advised by the hospital staff that Kennestone and the other Wellstar-affiliated hospitals were no longer performing independent tests on persons who were not being admitted to the hospitals for medical reasons. [fn] The officer did not recall discussing any other hospitals with Whittle, but noted that he had taken arrestees on previous occasions to Grady, Cobb General, Atlanta Medical Center, and Northside Hospital and the staff at those hospitals also refused to perform independent tests. The arresting officer also stated that the Windy Hill facility was not open at night. Whittle failed to provide any evidence to refute the officer’s testimony, or to otherwise show that his requested hospitals were available for testing at that time. The conflicting testimony of Whittle and the officer presented a credibility issue for the trial court to resolve.” Smith v. State, 277 Ga.App. 81, 625 S.E.2d 497 (December 19, 2005). Trooper was justified in refusing defendant’s request to be taken over 40 miles away for blood test when made after trooper had already left sheriff’s office and had been called to scene of accident with injuries; “the location requested by Smith was over 40 miles away and outside the trooper’s territory; and there was no evidence that Smith had made arrangements for a test by his personal physician [at 10:30 on Saturday night]. In so holding, we reiterate that ‘[t]here is no bright line defining at what point distance to the requested facility renders the suspect’s request unreasonable or when the time factor becomes too onerous,’” quoting Lenhardt (January 7, 2005), below. McArthur v. State, 276 Ga.App. 872, 625 S.E.2d 68 (December 2, 2005). “ The law does not require that an officer making a DUI arrest ask the accused if he wishes to have an independent chemical test after the officer has read the implied consent notice informing him of this option. It is incumbent on the person who is charged with DUI to request or arrange for his own test at this point, after he submits to the state test. Thus the trial court did not err in denying McArthur’s motion to suppress on this ground. See State v. Payne, 236 Ga.App. 338, 339-340 (512 S.E.2d 292) (1999) (reversing suppression of breath test even when officer read version of notice suggesting that only one alternative test was available).” Lenhardt v. State, 271 Ga.App. 453, 610 S.E.2d 86 (January 7, 2005). DUI conviction affirmed; no failure of reasonable accommodation. “The factors the trial court may consider in resolving this issue include the following: (1) availability of or access to funds to pay for the requested test; (2) a protracted delay in the giving of the test if the officer complies with the accused’s requests; (3) availability of police time and other resources; (4) location of the requested facilities; and (5) opportunity and ability of accused to make arrangements personally for the testing. Hendrix v. State, 254 Ga.App. 807, 808 (564 S.E.2d 1) (2001).” “The location of the hospital in a different jurisdiction is merely one factor to be considered. [Cit.] Here, Lenhardt presented evidence that the requested facility was 28.8 miles away, while [local hospital] was only 15.9 miles away. To accommodate Lenhardt’s request, the officer would have been required to drive 57 miles round trip, rather than 30 miles round trip. There is no bright line defining at what point the distance to the requested facility renders the suspect’s request unreasonable or when the time factor becomes too onerous. [Cit.] Here, however, the trial court concluded that the officer acted reasonably in refusing to drive Lenhardt to downtown Atlanta [from Coweta County]. Given that significant time and distance would have been involved in driving Lenhardt to Atlanta, and that Lenhardt acquiesced in the choices given him by the officer, there is some evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling. [Cit.] As there is evidence supporting the ruling of the trial court, it will not be reversed.” Accord, Smith v. State , 277 Ga.App. 81, 625 S.E.2d 497 (December 19, 2005) (see above); Luckey v. State , 313 Ga.App. 502, 722 S.E.2d 114 (January 11, 2012). McGinn v. State, 268 Ga.App. 450, 602 S.E.2d 209 (July 9, 2004). Defendant’s request for a blood test, made before arrest or reading of implied consent warning, was sufficient to invoke right to private test; state test results should have been suppressed. Distinguished, Farmer (February 11, 2016), above. Sheehan v. State, 267 Ga.App. 152, 598 S.E.2d 873 (April 21, 2004). Hospital worker would not accept defendant’s check to pay for blood test in the middle of the night, but at motion to suppress hearing, an employee of the hospital’s business office testified that the hospital usually does accept checks. Witness acknowledged, however, that the person on duty at the time may not have been familiar with that policy, and no cashier may have been on duty. Held, trial court correctly ruled that it’s not the officer’s job to question hospital employees about their payment policies, and officer thus did not obstruct defendant’s ability to obtain independent test.