☢ test - Í

Maddox v. State, 266 Ga.App. 838, 598 S.E.2d 105 (April 7, 2004). When defendant requested independent test, but did not know where to get one, trooper took her to local fire station, with her consent. EMT drew her blood and sealed the vial, offering it to defendant; when she also didn’t know where to get it tested, trooper offered to send it to State Crime Lab for her; she agreed. Held, trooper did not deny defendant her right to an independent test. “‘The officer advised [Maddox] of her right to an independent test by a person of her own choosing, as OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(3) required him to do. She chose an independent test but did not specify any choice of personnel. In the absence of such a choice, the officer’s action in taking [Maddox] to the nearest [facility] ... [was] reasonable. This is not a case in which the officer denied a suspect’s reasonable request to be taken to a chosen facility because departmental policy was to allow tests at only one, or a few, specific facilities; the officer never denied [Maddox] the facility [or the personnel] of her choice.’ (Citation omitted.) McDaniel v. State, 218 Ga.App. 555, 462 S.E.2d 446 (1995). Accordingly, there is no evidence that Maddox was denied any of the rights to which she was entitled under OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(2).” See also Caldwell v. State , 202 Ga.App. 729, 415 S.E.2d 653 (1992) (defendant’s right to independent test was accommodated where he sought and obtained second breath test on same machine). “‘It is the responsibility of the arrestee, not the officer, to designate the specifics of [any] individual testing and the officer must be apprised by the arrestee of those specifics before the officer has a duty to facilitate the arrestee’s election. [Cits.]’ State v. Willis , 184 Ga.App. 639, 641(2), 362 S.E.2d 444 (1987).”). Cole v. State, 263 Ga.App. 222, 587 S.E.2d 314 (September 16, 2003). Officer took Defendant to local hospital for independent blood test, but hospital lab was closed due to holiday. “The officer testified that he was aware of no other place that would be open to test the blood at that time; however, he also testified that there were two other facilities in the county and that he made no attempt to contact these two other facilities to determine whether they were in fact closed ” (emphasis added). Held, trial court should have granted motion to suppress; the failure to obtain an independent test (note, just obtaining a blood sample is not enough) was not justified. “Once Cole invoked his right to an independent test, the officer had a duty to make reasonable efforts to accommodate that request. We cannot find the officer’s efforts here reasonable. Although we recognize the potential difficulty in locating a testing facility on a holiday evening, the officer did not explore any alternative testing measures.” Distinguishes Hulsinger v. State , 221 Ga.App. 274, 470 S.E.2d 809 (1996), where test was admissible although officer knew nowhere to get sample tested, but offered to send sample to crime lab. Accord, Koontz v. State , 274 Ga.App. 248, 617 S.E.2d 207 (July 8, 2005) (officer took defendant to ATM for cash, and to hospital for sample, but made no effort to help him get sample tested; state test should have been suppressed as a result). Johnson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 633, 583 S.E.2d 489 (June 12, 2003). After reading implied consent, officer “then asked whether Johnson would submit to a state-administered breath test…, he responded, ‘I’ll take a urine test.’ Officer advised defendant she wanted him to take a breath test; he consented. “While on the scene, Johnson later asked [officer], ‘When can I take my chemical test?’” After state breath test, however, defendant “did not request an independent test and none was performed.” Held, state test results should have been suppressed. “[T]hese statements reasonably could be construed to be an expression of a desire for an independent urine test.” Distinguished in State v. Gillaspy , 270 Ga.App. 111, 605 S.E.2d 835 (October 19, 2004) (Statement “I’ll take a blood test,” was clearly, in context, a response to officer’s request for a state-administered test, not a request for an independent test); Mathis v. State , 298 Ga.App. 817, 681 S.E.2d 179 (June 18, 2009) (trial court could find that defendant’s question during reading of implied consent, “could I get a blood test?” was, in context, an attempt to designate the State test, not a request for an independent test, where defendant never mentioned an independent test otherwise.). State v. Anderson, 258 Ga.App. 127, 572 S.E.2d 758 (October 22, 2002). Officer’s unilateral determination that defendant did not have enough money to pay for independent blood test, without more, was insufficient to show he reasonably accommodated defendant’s request for independent test. Officer gave defendant no opportunity to call and make arrangements. Ladow v. State, 256 Ga.App. 726, 569 S.E.2d 572 (July 11, 2002). On de novo review of facts following bench trial, Court of Appeals holds that trial court erred in finding that defendant did not request independent test. As officer finished reading first sentence of implied consent warning, defendant said “I want a blood test.” Officer finished reading warning, specifying that the state test would be a blood test. Defendant took the state blood test, never again mentioning an independent test, and none was given. Held, defendant’s words were sufficient to invoke her right to independent testing. Contrary to state’s argument, officer could not reasonably have believed defendant was attempting to designate the type of state-administered test to be used, as that choice belongs to the officer, not the defendant. As the implied consent