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Crime Lab protocol, prior to court order that it be preserved. Right to independent test is waived if not exercised at time of arrest; OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(3) can’t be used to demand independent test of GBI Crime Lab samples months later. “ Thompson admitted below that OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(3), which specifically concerns independent tests, did not apply, presumably because her request came months after she waived any right she had to such a test. Thompson also asserted below that OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4) granted her the right to an independent test of her blood sample, but she has abandoned this argument on appeal, perhaps because that portion of the statute concerns only a state-administered test. See, e.g. Birdsall v. State, 254 Ga.App. 555, 558, 562 S.E.2d 841 (2002) (OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(4) ‘specifies no deadline for requesting “full information,” no timetable for supplying the information, and no penalty for the state’s failure to produce it’). Further, and although OCGA § 40–6–392(a)(3) authorized Thompson to obtain an independent test of her blood sample, neither that nor any other statute granted her that right in perpetuity. On the contrary, ‘the facts show that [Thompson] was afforded the opportunity to obtain an independent test of [her] blood, and that is all that is required’ by the statute. [ State v. Griffin, 204 Ga.App. 459, 461(2), 419 S.E.2d 528 (1992)] (emphasis in original).” Failure to obtain independent test of blood sample thus wasn’t prejudice for purposes of constitutional speedy trial analysis. Avery v. State, 311 Ga.App. 595, 716 S.E.2d 729 (September 7, 2011). DUI and related convictions affirmed; youthful defendant’s plea, “[g]ive me some more like tests, please,” in context, was clearly a request for more field sobriety evaluations, not an independent breath or blood test. “In this case, the circumstances show that Avery's primary goal was to get the officer to release him to his father when he arrived instead of arresting him. While that goal could have been accomplished if the Deputy agreed to let him take more field sobriety tests and release him if he passed those tests, that immediate goal would not have been accomplished by taking additional chemical tests because that would have required that Avery remain in custody. Moreover, the request was made for more ‘tests’ plural, not an additional ‘test.’ And, as the superior court noted, his request was for the Deputy to give him more tests, not for an independent test. Further, Avery had just mentioned the field sobriety tests, which he believed did not indicate impairment. And Avery clearly was not focused on any potential tests conducted after he left the scene, as he appeared confused about the state- administered test he was going to take at the jail. Based on these circumstances, we agree that Avery's statement that he wanted ‘more tests’ cannot reasonably be construed as a request for an independent chemical test of his own choosing, and the results of the state-administered test were properly admitted at trial.” Waterman v. State, 299 Ga.App. 630, 683 S.E.2d 164 (August 7, 2009). Trial court properly determined that defendant’s request to blow again into the roadside alco-sensor was not a request for an independent test. Brooks v. State, 285 Ga.App. 624, 647 S.E.2d 328 (May 31, 2007). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress implied consent results. “The officer placed Brooks under arrest and told Brooks he was being charged with DUI. Brooks immediately exclaimed, ‘No, please, can I get a blood test?’ The officer then made his first attempt to read Brooks the implied consent notice. He was unable to successfully read the entire notice because Brooks constantly interrupted, attempting to convince the officer that he was not driving under the influence.” After officer was able to read the entire implied consent notice and requested a breath test, defendant asked several questions, finally acknowledging that he understood it, then asked ““Do I have to take a Breathalyzer? I’d prefer to take a blood test or urine test.” Defendant agreed to take the breath test. At the jail, the officer asked if Brooks wanted an independent test, but Brooks answered, “No, it’s useless now.” Held, in context, defendant did not request an independent test. “Here, Brooks asked the question, ‘Do I have to take a Breathalyzer or a blood alcohol content?’ The officer replied that they were the same thing. Brooks argues that he is clearly distinguishing between a blood test and a Breathalyzer test. However, in light of the surrounding circumstances, even if Brooks did question whether he had to take a test of his blood or a test of his breath, the question was in response to the officer’s repeated questions of whether Brooks would submit to a state-administered chemical test of his breath. This indicates that Brooks was referring to the type of test the state was going to administer . Furthermore, Brooks’ request to either take a urine test or a blood test in place of the Breathalyzer was followed by a response by the officer that it was not for Brooks to choose the type of test the state requests. Brooks claimed he understood. Under the circumstances, it seems clear, and the trial court found, that Brooks was not requesting an independent blood test at his own expense and personal choosing, but for the officer to designate either a state-administered blood or urine test in place of the breath test.” State v. Brookbank, 283 Ga.App. 814, 642 S.E.2d 885 (March 1, 2007). Trial court erred in granting motion to suppress defendant’s refusal to take state-administered test; defendant’s insistence on a blood test instead of the breath test requested by the officer was clearly a refusal, in context, regardless of whether defendant was confused, or why. “[T]he trial court granted Brookbank’s motion holding that Brookbank’s actions did not amount to a refusal to take the