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state-administered breath test under the implied consent law. Rather, the court held that ‘[Brookbank’s] conduct demonstrated a good faith willingness to take a chemical test that was mingled with confusion over who designated the test.’ Reasoning that the deputy ‘could have clarified [Brookbank’s] confusion with a simple explanation that [he] could have his blood tested only if he first submitted to a breath test,’ the trial court concluded that Brookbank had not refused the test.” Held, defendant’s response amounted to a refusal, regardless of whether he was confused; officer’s repeated reading of the implied consent warning, emphasizing the difference between the state test and the independent test, was not misleading. “‘ The law does not require the arresting officer to ensure that the driver understands the implied consent notice .’ (Citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Furcal-Peguero [ v. State, 255 Ga.App. 729, 733 (566 S.E.2d 320) (2002)]; State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 479(1)(b) (502 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (‘[T]he officer was under no duty to give further warnings or instructions after the implied consent warning was given properly at the time of arrest.’) (citations omitted, emphasis in original). See also [ State v. Tosar, 180 Ga.App. 885, 888 (350 S.E.2d 811) (1986).] In this case, it is not disputed that the officer’s delivery of the implied consent notice was substantially accurate and timely delivered to Brookbank. Irrespective of whether Brookbank’s refusal resulted from confusion, it was in fact a refusal to take the state-administered breath test in light of the officer’s proper administration of the implied consent warning. [ footnote: Of course, Brookbank will be free to argue to the trier of fact that his refusal was based on his confusion, not a consciousness of guilt. See Hernandez v. State, 238 Ga.App. 796, 798-799(2) (520 S.E.2d 698) (1999). ] Thus, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of Brookbank’s refusal.” Anderton v. State, 283 Ga.App. 493, 642 S.E.2d 137 (February 7, 2007). Officer’s statement was not misleading: “Here, after Anderton answered ‘I will take a blood test’ to the officer’s request for his consent to a breath test, the officer stated that a blood test was not the option presented by the officer.” Court of Appeals finds this was clearly a reference to the state-administered test, not an independent test. “As the officer’s following statement was true and came in the context of an exchange regarding the method of state-administered testing, the officer’s statement did not premise Anderton’s consent on a [sic] incorrect information or false implication. Compare State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 479(1)(c) (502 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (ruling that an officer’s statement that he would suspend defendant’s license if she refused breath test was not misleading because the officer initiates suspension proceedings and provides the evidence of refusal) with State v. Terry, 236 Ga.App. 248, 250-251 (511 S.E.2d 608) (1999) (upholding the grant of a motion in limine because officer’s statement that the defendant had to ‘bond out’ before she would be able to obtain an independent chemical test misstated the law and was misleading, and because substantial other misleading information compounded the defendant’s confusion). Instead, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the officer’s statement was merely a clarification of his designation that the state-administered test would be a breath test. Accordingly, we hold that the circumstances here did not render Anderton unable to make an informed choice about whether to submit to the breath test.” McGinn v. State, 268 Ga.App. 450, 602 S.E.2d 209 (July 9, 2004). Underage DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred by denying motion to suppress implied consent results. Prior to DUI arrest or reading of implied consent warning, young driver told officer that “he knew somewhat of the law and that he wanted to have a blood test.” Later, after arrest, the officer read implied consente warning and requested a state breath test, to which McGinn agreed. “While Officer Raykovics was entering identifying information into the intoxilyzer, McGinn again brought up securing a blood test; the officer testified that McGinn ‘wanted to know if a blood test conducted last week by an employer could be used, and I advised him that could not be used, and then he mentioned if—when he returned back to Atlanta if he could have a blood test done at that time if that could be used, and I advised him that could not be used.’” Held, this request was sufficient to invoke McGinn’s right to an independent test; “it was incumbent upon Officer Raykovics to at least inquire about McGinn’s prior unambiguous request and to make an effort to accommodate such request by suggesting reasonable alternatives, as opposed to simply negating McGinn’s naive proposals.” Fact that initial request came before arrest and reading of implied consent is “immaterial”: what is required is that the record show that an officer was ‘on notice’ that the accused presumably knew of his right to an additional test because he told the officer at the outset that he was aware of his rights and that he wanted a blood test. Ladow v. State, 256 Ga.App. 726, 728–729, 569 S.E.2d 572 (2002); Johnson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 633, 637(2), 583 S.E.2d 489 (2003). Implied consent warnings are informational, and if an accused already possesses that information and has requested an independent test, the giving of the warnings themselves cannot become the stumbling block to fulfilling the otherwise unambiguous request.” Distinguished, Brooks v. State , 285 Ga.App. 624, 647 S.E.2d 328 (May 31, 2007) (Trial court could determine that defendant’s questions about a blood test were not a request for an independent test, in context); Farmer (February 10, 2016), above (defendant mentioned urine test, but declined independent test when trooper asked if she was requesting one). Johnson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 633, 583 S.E.2d 489 (June 12, 2003). After reading implied consent, officer “then asked whether Johnson would submit to a state-administered breath test…, he responded, ‘I’ll take a urine test.’ Officer advised