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defendant she wanted him to take a breath test; he consented. “While on the scene, Johnson later asked [officer], ‘When can I take my chemical test?’” After state breath test, however, defendant “did not request an independent test and none was performed.” Held, state test results should have been suppressed. “[T]hese statements reasonably could be construed to be an expression of a desire for an independent urine test.” Distinguished in State v. Gillaspy , 270 Ga.App. 111, 605 S.E.2d 835 (October 19, 2004) (Statement “I’ll take a blood test,” was clearly, in context, a response to officer’s request for a state-administered test, not a request for an independent test). Ladow v. State, 256 Ga.App. 726, 569 S.E.2d 572 (July 11, 2002). On de novo review of facts following bench trial, Court of Appeals holds that trial court erred in finding that defendant did not request independent test. As officer finished reading first sentence of implied consent warning, defendant said “I want a blood test.” Officer finished reading warning, specifying that the state test would be a blood test. Defendant took the state blood test, never again mentioning an independent test, and none was given. Held, defendant’s words were sufficient to invoke her right to independent testing. Contrary to state’s argument, officer could not reasonably have believed defendant was attempting to designate the type of state-administered test to be used, as that choice belongs to the officer, not the defendant. As the implied consent warning does not specify “to the accused any requirements for requesting that test – linguistically, temporally, or otherwise… [a]n accused’s right to have an additional, independent chemical test or tests administered is invoked by some statement that reasonably could be construed, in light of the circumstances, to be an expression of a desire for such test.” See also Johnson (June 12, 2003), above; Distinguished in State v. Gillaspy , 270 Ga.App. 111, 605 S.E.2d 835 (October 19, 2004) (Statement “I’ll take a blood test,” was clearly, in context, a response to officer’s request for a state-administered test, not a request for an independent test); Anderton v. State , 283 Ga.App. 493, 642 S.E.2d 137 (February 7, 2007) (same as Gillaspy ); Brooks v. State , 285 Ga.App. 624, 647 S.E.2d 328 (May 31, 2007) (Trial court could determine that defendant’s questions about a blood test were not a request for an independent test, in context); Fowler v. State , 294 Ga.App. 864, 670 S.E.2d 448 (November 4, 2008) (request for breath test instead of officer’s designated blood test was not a request for independent test). Nawrocki v. State , 235 Ga.App. 416, 510 S.E.2d 301 (November 20, 1998). DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress State test results. “ Upon his affirmative request, Nawrocki should have been permitted to obtain a second, State-administered breath test. … OCGA §§ 40-6-392(a)(3) and 40-5-67.1(b)(2) entitle a DUI suspect to have an ‘additional’ test-not necessarily an independent test-of his ‘blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances at [his] own expense and from qualified personnel of [his] own choosing.’ OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(2). [fn] Consequently, under the plain language of the statutes, a DUI defendant at his own expense may affirmatively choose to have the State's qualified testing officer perform an additional breath test. Since, as a practical matter, State law enforcement agencies appear to be the primary locations at which breath test machines are readily available, a timely second breath test may be conducted on a law enforcement agency's machine.” 13. INTOXILYZER CERTIFICATES/PERMITS Ritter v. State, 306 Ga.App. 689, 703 S.E.2d 8 (September 16, 2010). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; intoxilyzer inspection certificates were properly admitted. “Ritter cites Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), for the proposition that the documents were not admissible because they were prepared solely for the purpose of prosecution, but that case does not warrant a different result here. In Melendez-Diaz, the issue was whether certificates of analysis that showed the results of forensic analysis performed on controlled substances were testimonial in nature and thus inadmissible unless the analysts themselves testified at trial. Id. at 2530-2531(I). The Court held that the admission of the certificates without the analysts' testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2532(II). Melendez-Diaz explained that ‘[d]ocuments kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. But that is not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.’ (Citation omitted.) Id. at 2538(III)(D). In the instant case, the certificates at issue do not fall within the class of documents prohibited by Melendez-Diaz because they are not generated for the prosecution of a particular defendant. Accordingly, the documents at issue were properly admitted.” Accord, Jacobson v. State , 306 Ga.App. 815, 703 S.E.2d 376 (November 16, 2010). Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 352, 646 S.E.2d 323 (May 10, 2007). Intox results were properly admissible despite fact that “the machine was ‘taken out of service’ several weeks after [defendant’s] test.” “Any argument regarding the subsequent removal or repair of the Intoxilyzer related ‘to the weight to which the jury should afford the breath alcohol test results,’ not the admissibility of those results,” citing Rackoff (November 20, 2006), below. Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (November 20, 2006). “[A]n inspection certificate prepared under OCGA