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§ 40-6-392(f) was not testimonial and was admissible,” citing Crawford, affirming Rackoff (October 5, 2005), below. Accord, Neal v. State , 281 Ga.App. 261, 635 S.E.2d 864 (August 24, 2006); Stadnisky v. State , 285 Ga.App. 33, 645 S.E.2d 545 (March 8, 2007); Phillips v. State , 289 Ga.App. 281, 656 S.E.2d 905 (January 24, 2008). Braswell v. State, 281 Ga.App. 500, 636 S.E.2d 689 (September 7, 2006). Accords with Rackoff (October 5, 2005) that admission of intoxilyzer inspection certificates without testimony of the certifying technician does not violate defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford . “Moreover, the submission of an inspection certificate is not the only method by which the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000 may be proved. In Gidey v. State, 228 Ga.App. 250 (491 S.E.2d 406) (1997), we held that ‘substantial statutory compliance with OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A) can be established by circumstantial evidence arising from the testimony of the trained and certified individual who operated the machine and performed the test.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 252(1). Here, the officer who administered the test to Braswell testified that he had been trained by the GBI in the use of the Intoxilyzer 5000 and received a certificate of training which was admitted without objection. He had conducted tests on the machine both before and after the date of Braswell’s test, and it appeared to be functioning properly when he tested Braswell. It had no parts missing that he could see and appeared to be in good working order. The machine went through a battery of self-diagnostic tests and revealed no problems. Nothing at all was unusual or irregular about this machine at the time of Braswell’s test. The officer followed the prescribed process in administering the test to Braswell. In addition, he conducted two tests of Braswell’s breath, and both tests returned almost identical results, ‘which is some evidence the machine was producing consistent test results.’ State v. Rackoff, 264 Ga.App. 506, 508 (591 S.E.2d 379) (2003). The officer’s testimony provided sufficient grounds for admission of the Intoxilyzer 5000 results independent of the inspection certificates. Gidey, supra, 228 Ga.App. at 252(1).” Stewart v. State, 280 Ga.App. 366, 634 S.E.2d 141 (July 10, 2006). Intoxilyzer results were properly admissible despite defendant’s claims that state testing procedures are inadequate. 1. Defendant “has failed to establish that an additional requirement that the Intoxilyzer machine be able to download and print prior results was necessary to establish that the results are admissible under OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A). Rather, we find that Stewart’s arguments with regard to the configuration of the Intoxilyzer machines in Georgia go to the weight of the Intozilyzer evidence, and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the Intoxilyzer 5000 test results on this ground.” 2. As to defendant’s assertion “that the State failed to produce test cards for certain of the required tests during the certification process or a printout showing the ability of the machine to recall the last test that was administered and to print a new card ”: “‘Rather than requiring exact compliance with GBI rules, [this Court has] upheld the admission of [breath] test results when the State has shown substantial compliance with the rules. Any deviation from such rule goes to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Jarriel v. State, 255 Ga.App. 305, 308 (565 S.E.2d 521) (2002). See also State v. Palmaka, 266 Ga.App. 595, 597 (597 S.E.2d 630) (2004); Scara v. State, 259 Ga.App. at 513; Berkow v. State, 243 Ga.App. 698, 701 (534 S.E.2d 433) (2000). Accordingly, we find that the Intoxilyzer evidence was properly admitted at trial and Stewart has failed to establish that he was deprived of due process based upon the introduction of this evidence.” Accord, Padidham v. State , 291 Ga. 99, 728 S.E.2d 175 (May 7, 2012) (delay in providing test results to defendant, in deviation from standard training manual procedures, goes to weight, not admissibility of results). Rackoff v. State, 275 Ga.App. 737, 621 S.E.2d 841 (October 5, 2005). Intoxilyzer inspection certificates are admissible as business records without the testimony of the technician who prepared them ; the Supreme Court decision so holding, Brown v. State , 268 Ga. 76, 485 S.E.2d 486 (1997), remains good law despite Crawford v. Washington . “In Brown, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a certificate of inspection is simply a record made in the regular course of business. Brown, 268 Ga. at 78. See also Jackson v. State, 233 Ga.App. 568, 570(2) (504 S.E.2d 505) (1998). The Court also concluded (i) that the certificates’ primary purpose was to ensure the testing machines’ accuracy, (ii) that the certificates were factual statements and not opinions, (iii) that the certificates were not prepared in response to litigation against any particular individual, and (iv) that ‘the witness against the defendant, the source of the crucial and incriminating evidence, is not the analyst, but the machine itself.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) 268 Ga. at 79. Considering Brown’s conclusion that the certificates prepared under OCGA § 40-6-392(f) are records which are routinely maintained and promulgated and which are not made in anticipation of prosecution against any particular defendant, see id. at 80, we hold that the inspection certificate at issue here was not ‘testimonial’ hearsay under Crawford. It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the certificate. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (with respect to nontestimonial hearsay, it is consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the states flexibility in their development of hearsay law).” Accord, Braswell v. State , 281 Ga.App. 500, 636 S.E.2d 689 (September 7, 2006); Phillips v. State , 289 Ga.App. 281, 656 S.E.2d 905 (January 24, 2008). Affirmed, Rackoff v. State , 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (November 20, 2006), see above.