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Kall v. State, 257 Ga.App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 520 (September 20, 2002). Accusation charged defendant with “simple battery by ‘contact of an insulting and provoking nature.’” After close of evidence at trial, court, over objection, allowed state to amend accusation to allege “simple battery by ‘contact of an insulting or provoking nature.’” Held, trial court may allow accusation to be amended after commencement of trial only if “the amendment is not material or prejudicial to the defense.” Changing “and” to “or” was not a material change; even with the word “and,” the state was not required to prove that the contact was both insulting and provoking. “It has long been established that a defendant may be accused of methods of committing a crime in the conjunctive, as is originally the case here, but the jury may be properly charged with these methods in the disjunctive. ... As the accusation was originally formed, the State was allowed to show Kall committed the crime of simple battery by proving a touch of either an insulting or provoking nature. The change in accusation did not alter that burden of proof.” Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 871, 528 S.E.2d 312 (January 19, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; 1. typographical correction of accusation (changing “she” to “he”) didn’t require that defendant be re-arraigned. “[T]he amended accusation did not set forth a new or different charge but simply corrected a typographical error in the original accusation. In Anderson v. State, 211 Ga.App. 2, 3(2), 438 S.E.2d 376 (1993), we questioned whether ‘correction of what was clearly a typographical error [in an accusation] rises to the level of an amendment.’ Id. However, we noted that ‘even if it could be considered an amendment, such a change would be authorized. “‘Prior to trial, the prosecuting attorney may amend the accusation to allege or to change the allegations regarding any offense arising out of the same conduct of the defendant which gave rise to any offense alleged or attempted to be alleged in the original accusation.’”’ Id., quoting Tarver v. State, 198 Ga.App. 634, 635, 402 S.E.2d 365 (1991). Vanorsdall cites no authority for the proposition that the mere correction of a typographical error in an accusation requires the State to arraign a defendant a second time before proceeding to trial or entitles a defendant to reassert, on the day of trial, a previously waived demand for jury trial. See Hansen v. State, 222 Ga.App. 537, 539(3), 474 S.E.2d 735 (1996) (defendant who allows attorney to waive right to jury trial cannot revoke waiver in such manner as to delay trial). See Anderson, supra; see also Melton v. State, 174 Ga.App. 461(1), 330 S.E.2d 398 (1985) (upholding amendment to accusation made after jury selection). Indeed, we have previously held that an accusation may be amended to correct a typographical error in the middle of trial. See Hansen v. State, 222 Ga.App. 537, 539(3), 474 S.E.2d 735 (1996) (defendant who allows attorney to waive right to jury trial cannot revoke waiver in such a manner as to delay trial).” Accord, Barghi v. State , 334 Ga.App. 409, 779 S.E.2d 373 (October 14, 2015) (altering “drive or have physical control of a moving vehicle” to “drive a moving vehicle”). 2. “The entry of a ‘nol pros’ on the original accusation can be regarded only as superfluous since it had been superseded by the amended accusation.” Smith v. State, 239 Ga.App. 515, 521 S.E.2d 450 (August 3, 1999). “‘It is not true that a prosecution must proceed upon the uniform traffic citation form that has initially been issued or that the prosecuting attorney has no authority to file a subsequent formal accusation. The State is not prohibited from issuing a subsequent accusation. The subsequent issuance of a formal accusation did not amend the uniform traffic citation, as contended by defendant. Rather, such accusation superseded any uniform traffic citation as the charging instrument.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ellerbee v. State, 215 Ga.App. 102, 104(3), 449 S.E.2d 874 (1994). And under OCGA § 17-7-71(a), an accusation need not be supported by an affidavit if the defendant has been previously arrested ‘in conjunction with the transaction charged in the accusation,’ which was the case here. [fn] See Blankenship v. State, 208 Ga.App. 710, 711, 431 S.E.2d 481 (1993).” C. DEMURRER 1. GENERAL DEMURRERS New case! Everhart v. State, A16A0652, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3064872 (May 25, 2016). Child cruelty conviction reversed; counsel was ineffective for failing to file general demurrer to indictment. Charge that defendant failed to provide necessary sustenance to child by not obtaining medical care after injury failed to state an offense under the law. “ Everhart argues that timely medical care does not qualify as ‘necessary sustenance’ under the statute. In this respect, he is correct. See Howell v. State , 180 Ga. App. 749, 751-52 (3) (350 S.E.2d 473) (1986).” “Necessary sustenance” refers to food and nourishment, not medical care. “‘The denial of necessary and appropriate medical care for a child under 18 years of age can constitute cruelty to a child when it causes the child “cruel or excessive physical or mental pain,” under OCGA § 16-5-70(b) but it does not constitute a denial of “sustenance”.’ Id. at 751-52 (3). In order for the State to have charged Everhart sufficiently with cruelty to children in the first degree for the failure to seek timely medical care following the severe beating of the victim, the State needed to allege that the failure maliciously caused the child ‘ cruel or excessive physical or mental pain .’ OCGA § 16-5-70(b) (emphasis added); see also Howell , 180 Ga. App. at 751-52 (3); Williams v. State , 285 Ga. App. 628, 629 (1) (647 S.E.2d 324) (2007). The State’s indictment omitted these essential elements of the crime and therefore failed to charge Everhart with any crime at all.