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Therefore, Count 1 of the indictment was fatally defective and would have been dismissed if Everhart’s counsel had filed a general demurrer.” Kimbrough v. State, A15A1738, ___ Ga.App. ___, 785 S.E.2d 54, 2016 WL 1138791 (March 24, 2016). Interlocutory appeal; trial court properly denied demurrers to indictment charging RICO and drug offenses. “‘An indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer.’ State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260(2) (759 S.E.2d 500) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, count one of the indictment substantially tracks the language of OCGA § 16–14–4(b), which provides that, ‘It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.’ Count one was thus sufficient to withstand the defendants’ general demurrers. Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 260(2).” Jones v. State, 332 Ga.App. 449, 773 S.E.2d 408 (June 9, 2015). DUI and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s challenge to the accusation was waived by failure to file a timely demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment. “Jones contends that Count 1 of the accusation fails to charge him with any offense under Georgia law. … A claim that a charging instrument fails to charge the defendant with any offense under Georgia law can be raised in a general demurrer[fn] or a motion in arrest of judgment.[fn] Coleman v. State, 318 Ga.App. 478, 479(1), 735 S.E.2d 788 (2012). The record shows that Jones did not file a general demurrer before trial or a motion in arrest of judgment within the term of court in which judgment was entered. ‘The failure to file a general or special demurrer, or a timely motion in arrest of judgment, waives any claim that could have been raised in a general or special demurrer.’ Coleman v. State, 318 Ga.App. at 479(1), 735 S.E.2d 788.” Thomas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. 1. Defendant couldn’t challenge return of indictment after trial. “‘A demurrer to the indictment, motion to quash or plea in abatement must be entered before trial.’ Sheffield v. State, 235 Ga. 507(1) (220 S.E.2d 265) (1975) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Peppers v. Balkcom, 218 Ga. 749, 751(2)(b) (130 S.E.2d 709) (1963) (contention that indictment was not returned in open court waived when not challenged before trial). Thomas therefore waived this alleged error by going to trial under the indictment without raising the objection that the indictment was not returned in open court. Sheffield, 235 Ga. at 507(1).” 2. Trial court properly denied plea in abatement; contrary to defendant’s argument, record didn’t show that indictment was issued without any evidence being presented. “‘Generally, with regard to the efficacy of an indictment, no inquiry into the sufficiency or legality of the evidence is indulged. Under appropriate circumstances, however, an indictment will be quashed where it is returned on wholly illegal evidence.’ Williams v. State, 244 Ga.App. 26, 27(1) (535 S.E.2d 8) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted); Whitehead v. State, 126 Ga.App. 570(2) (191 S.E.2d 336) (1972) (defendant has burden to show that indictment was returned ‘wholly’ upon illegal evidence). Here, although Thomas points to two unsigned statements [in the District Attorney’s file], he has not shown that these statements were the only evidence presented to the grand jury or that the three witnesses identified in the indictment did not provide sworn testimony at the grand jury proceedings. A plea in abatement on this topic fails when the defendant fails to show that the indictment was returned solely based on unsworn statements. See Lennard v. State, 104 Ga. 546(1) (30 SE 780) (1898) (although defendant alleged that improper oath was given to a grand jury witness, the legal oath may have been given to some other witness or witnesses, and therefore defendant's plea in abatement was properly denied). Moreover, there is no transcript of the grand jury proceedings themselves, and ‘[g]rand jury proceedings are confidential’ such that Thomas ‘was not entitled to a transcript of those proceedings.’ Ruffin v. State, 283 Ga. 87, 88(5) (656 S.E.2d 140) (2008) (citation omitted). Thomas has not shown reversible error.” Abney v. State, 327 Ga.App. 551, 759 S.E.2d 618 (June 11, 2014). Convictions for obscene Internet contact with a child affirmed; no error where trial court reserved ruling on demurrer as to one count until after jury’s verdict, then granting the demurrer. “According to Abney, the trial court, by waiting until sentencing to grant the general demurrer on count 1, caused the jury to have to discuss that count and thus ‘tainted’ its deliberations on the remaining two proper counts. Again, we are unpersuaded. We have held that a trial court may reserve ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal until after the jury returns its verdict and is dispersed, see State v. Seignious, 197 Ga.App. 766, 767 (399 S.E.2d 559) (1990), and we discern no reason why the same rule should not apply to a general demurrer. Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in its decision to reserve ruling on the demurrer, the burden is on Abney to show harm as well as error. See Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 78(8)(a) (694 S.E.2d 316) (2010). At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Abney conceded that evidence pertaining to count 1 of the indictment would have been admissible at trial as part of the res gestae, even if the trial court had quashed that count before trial. Because the jury would have heard the same evidence irrespective of when the trial court ruled on the general demurrer, Abney cannot show harm and thus has failed to