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0.02.” Jury could find this impeached the witness’s credibility. Distinguishes Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Assoc. , 275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 431 (2002) (an expert’s own practice is irrelevant to a medical malpractice case; issue, rather, is standard of care employed in the medical profession generally). Viau v. State, 260 Ga.App. 96, 579 S.E.2d 52 (February 21, 2003). Trial court did not err in excluding expert’s (Citron’s) testimony that Intoxilyzer would be off if the subject’s body temperature was high, since there was no evidence of what defendant’s body temperature was on night in question. There was circumstantial evidence that it was hot that night, and defendant had gone swimming, two factors which expert testified could elevate body temperature, but “there was no proffer from the expert that either of the two cited circumstances had caused Viau’s temperature to remain elevated at the time she was tested. ... [A]ny link between the proffered testimony and machine malfunction is highly tenuous and ... the possibility of harmful error requires sheer speculation.” Young v. State, 275 Ga. 309, 565 S.E.2d 814 (July 3, 2002). Fact that the recorded times on the internal clocks of the Intoxilyzer 5000 do not match with the times in the arresting officer’s incident report or with the dispatch time does not mean that the machine was not in proper working order at the time of the tests and that the results of the test must be excluded. “Such evidence would relate to the weight rather than the admissibility of breathalyzer results.” Mimms v. State, 254 Ga.App. 483, 562 S.E.2d 754 (March 13, 2002). “The decision whether to admit or exclude expert testimony ‘lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’” That discretion was not manifestly abused when court excluded defendant’s proffer of an ophthalmologist as “an expert on alcohol-consumption physiology and on drug interactions.” Expert’s qualifications: his medical school training and a class he took on the Intoxilyzer 5000. In this case, there was no Intoxilyzer test and no evidence of the amount of alcohol in defendant’s system. “Further, because [the expert] was not [defendant]’s prescribing physician, the trial court found that he was not competent to testify as to the purposes for which [her prescription medications] were prescribed, because he would be relying on hearsay.” Haynes v. State, 244 Ga.App. 79, 534 S.E.2d 807 (May 18, 2000). Trial court erred in giving this charge to the jury: “I charge you the mere fact that the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine has some margin of error or may give an erroneous result under certain circumstances does not diminish the evidentiary value of the test results.” While this is a correct statement of law, it is up to the jury to decide what evidentiary value to give any particular evidence. The language employed by a judge of a reviewing court in discussing a case, or in giving reasons for a decision[,] is not always appropriate for use by a trial judge in charging a jury. Error was harmless, however, because the court twice correctly charged the jury, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Margin of error in Intoxilyzer goes to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. Lanier v. State, 237 Ga.App. 875, 517 S.E.2d 106 (May 4, 1999). 1. “[I]t was not error to admit the [intox] results without testimony that it meant .136 grams of alcohol concentration in Lanier’s blood.” Defendant contended that evidence of the numerical results, without explaining what the numbers represented, gave the jury no basis for determining that the defendant was less safe to drive; however, evidence of the implied consent warning, which refers to ‘alcohol concentration,” makes it “clear what the Intoximeter 5000 was testing and what the numerical results meant. ‘[J]urors are entitled to use their own common sense as intelligent human beings on many questions.’ Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga.App. 745, 746(1), 195 S.E.2d 184 (1972).” 2. Evidence was sufficient to establish that intox machine was working properly. “Contrary to Lanier’s enumeration, the State introduced a certificate of inspection performed before Lanier’s test and after Lanier’s test showing that the machine was working properly. In addition, Trooper Gunnin testified that the instrument was operating properly at the time he performed the test on Lanier. Contrary to Lanier’s argument, an inspection directly before and after each defendant’s test is not required. Cf. Rowell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 397, 398- 399(1)(b), 494 S.E.2d 5 (1997).” 15. MULTIPLE STATE TESTS State v. Brantley, 263 Ga.App. 209, 587 S.E.2d 383 (September 12, 2003). Trial court erred in suppressing intox results based on officer’s concluding implied consent test with the question: “‘Will you submit to the state administered chemical test of your blood or breath under the implied consent law?’” Defendant did consent. “Nothing in the statutory scheme relating to chemical testing or implied consent states that an officer who obtains consent for more than one chemical test is required to administer all of the tests for which consent was obtained. As long as a defendant’s right to an independent chemical test is clear, an officer may obtain consent for more than one chemical test and then elect which consented-to ‘test or tests’ will be administered” (emphasis in original).