☢ test - Í

Mueller v. State, 257 Ga.App. 830, 572 S.E.2d 627 (August 30, 2002). Arresting officer “concluded the implied consent warning by asking Mueller whether he would submit to State-administered chemical ‘tests’ of his ‘breath and blood’ under the implied consent law. Mueller argues that because [officer] requested both a breath and blood test, both tests had to be administered. This argument is directly contradicted by OCGA § 40-5-67.1(a), which provides that ‘the requesting law enforcement officer shall designate which test or tests shall be administered initially and may subsequently require a test or tests of any substances not initially tested.’ Under the implied consent warning, the arresting officer's decision to have the State administer only a breath test could not have misled Mueller into believing that he could not request an independent blood test from qualified personnel of his own choosing.” The trial court properly admitted the state breath test results. State v. Heredia, 252 Ga.App. 89, 555 S.E.2d 91 (October 4, 2001). Defendant’s right to an independent test was not compromised simply because the officer re-read the implied consent warning five minutes after its first reading and changed the test designation from breath to urine and blood based on newly discovered evidence. Reversal of trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. Additionally, the Court reiterated prior holdings that OCGA § 40-13- 30 and OCGA § 17-4-23(a) authorize police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions. State v. Coe, 243 Ga.App. 232, 533 S.E.2d 104 (March 29, 2000). Whole court decision. Suppression of results of defendant’s urine test reversed. Request for second implied consent test need not be accompanied by Miranda warnings, even after arrest, and request can be made after first test completed. “There was certainly no statutory requirement that the requesting officer designate all tests to be requested before the initial test is taken.” Overrules State v. Warmack , 230 Ga.App. 157, 495 S.E.2d 632 (1998). Davis v. State, 237 Ga.App. 817, 517 S.E.2d 87 (April 29, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion in limine; officer was not authorized to obtain a third breath test after first two tests gave invalid results with variations of more than 0.020 grams. (Note, a “test” consists of two sequential breath samples.) “OCGA § 40-6- 392(a)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part as follows: ‘No more than two sequential series of a total of two adequate breath samples each shall be requested by the state.’ … The trial court denied Davis’ motion to exclude the results of the breath test by finding that the first two tests, which were outside the parameters, did not produce adequate breath samples. This ruling was erroneous. The statute plainly defines an adequate breath sample as ‘a breath sample sufficient to cause the breath-testing instrument to produce a printed alcohol concentration analysis.’ In this case it is undisputed that both the first and second tests administered to Davis produced printed alcohol concentration analyses.” Nothing would appear to prohibit the officer in this situation from seeking a blood or urine test. 16. NOTICE – ACCURACY OF STATUTORY NOTICE See also subsection NOTICE – OUT-OF- STATE LICENSES, below State v. Oyeniyi, 335 Ga.App. 575, 782 S.E.2d 476 (February 4, 2016). Interlocutory appeal in DUI prosecution; trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress, thereby excluding implied consent test results. Contrary to defendant’s argument, implied consent warning for drivers over 21 years old is not “inaccurate, misleading, and [does not] overstate[ ] the penalty for refusing to submit to the State-administered test.” Defendant challenges the warning’s statement that upon refusal, the driver’s license “ will be suspended for a minimum period of one year ,” (emphasis added), arguing that “a minimum one-year suspension is not a certainty,” depending on potential administrative and judicial review. “[T]he statute provides for a one-year suspension for a refusal. The fact that this suspension may be subject to administrative or judicial review does not mean that the implied consent notice is misleading or overstates the consequence for such refusal. The legislative intent behind the refusal provision of the implied consent notice is to inform drivers ‘of the potentially most serious consequence of refusal of testing,’ Sauls [ v. State, 293 Ga. 165, 168, 744 S.E.2d 735 (2013)], and the one-year suspension is one such consequence. We can find no authority for the proposition that, in addition to the notice of the one-year suspension, a suspect must also be advised of all conceivable outcomes or possible factors that may affect that one-year suspension.” “Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that the right to refuse to submit to state-administered chemical testing for alcohol or drugs is not a right of constitutional magnitude, but is one created by legislative enactment, and that due process rights are not implicated when the statutory implied consent notice does not inform the driver of all possible outcomes of such a refusal. See Sauls v. State, 293 Ga. 165, 167, 744 S.E.2d 735 (2013). Thus, in regard to the sufficiency of the implied consent notice, “[t]he determinative issue ... is whether the notice [that was] given was substantively accurate so as to permit [Oyeniyi] to make an informed decision about whether to consent to testing.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) [ State v. Barnard, 321 Ga.App. 20, 23(1), 740 S.E.2d 837 (2013)]. Accord, In re: R.M. (August 2, 2010), below.