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In re: R.M., 305 Ga.App. 483, 699 S.E.2d 811 (August 2, 2010). Juvenile court erroneously granted juvenile’s motion to suppress breath test results, finding that implied consent warning for under-21 drivers was “inaccurate and misleading and therefore did not allow him to make an informed decision to consent to the state-administered chemical test.” Trooper “read R.M. the statutory notice for suspects under 21, found at OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(1). In pertinent part, this notice tells the underage suspect that ‘[i]f you submit to testing and the results indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.02 grams or more, your Georgia driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state may be suspended for a minimum period of one year. ’” Juvenile court concluded that this was erroneous, because an underage driver with a blood alcohol content of less than 0.08 grams, like defendant, may apply for reinstatement of his license after six months. “The driver's eligibility to apply for possible reinstatement before the end of the suspension period, however, does not change the fact that the license is suspended for at least 12 months. We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that OCGA § 40-5-57.1 actually authorized a penalty of only six months' suspension. … We conclude that the statutory implied consent notice for suspects under 21 provided in OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(1) is ‘substantively accurate’ when it states that a blood alcohol concentration of 0.02 grams or more will result in a suspension of the driver's license ‘for a minimum period of one year’ ; and that the trial court's conclusion that the statutory notice overstated the actual penalty was in error.” Accord, Oyeniyi (February 4, 2016), above. Monas v. State, 270 Ga.App. 50, 606 S.E.2d 80 (October 12, 2004). “Monas contends that her refusal to submit to a state- administered breath test should have been suppressed because she did not understand her implied consent rights. It is undisputed, however, that [officer] correctly read Monas’s rights to her. ‘[Monas] does not contend that the implied consent warning the officer read to [her] was not correct, but rather, that it was misleading. The proper implied consent warning as enacted by the legislature was read to [Monas] without error. This enumeration, therefore, must fail.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hobbs v. State, 260 Ga.App. 115, 117(2) (579 S.E.2d 50) (2003).” Accord, State v. Stewart , 286 Ga.App. 542, 649 S.E.2d 525 (June 20, 2007) (same facts); Lee v. State , 324 Ga.App. 28, 749 S.E.2d 32 (September 26, 2013) (failure to understand based on language barrier was no barrier to admission of refusal). Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605, 533 S.E.2d 92 (July 10, 2000). DUI convictions affirmed; implied consent notice isn’t unconstitutional because it doesn’t warn driver that test results can be used against him in court. 1. “[Defendants] argue that the notice is incomplete, misleading and coercive because suspects are warned that a refusal to submit to testing may be used against them at trial, but are not told that test results may be used against them at trial. It is clear that the Georgia Constitution does not protect citizens from compelled blood testing or from the use of the results of compelled blood testing at trial. Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433 (1), 330 S.E.2d 588 (1985). Nor is compelling a defendant to submit to breath testing unconstitutional under Georgia law. Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990) (‘[T]he use of a substance naturally excreted by the human body does not violate a defendant's right against self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution.’). The right to refuse to submit to state administered testing is not a constitutional right, but one created by the legislature. Id. The choice provided by the statute at question is not coercive because it is not ‘so painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs’ that no real choice exists. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). Nor do we conclude that the statute is so misleading or incomplete that no real choice exists. This is not a case where the legislature has ‘subtly coerced [a defendant] into choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice.’ Id. at 563, 103 S.Ct. 916; Wessels v. State, 169 Ga.App. 246(1), 312 S.E.2d 361 (1983). The Georgia Constitution allows the state to compel blood and breath testing without warning that the results may be used against a defendant at trial. Allen, supra; Green, supra. ‘Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood- alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice.’ Neville, supra. As we stated in Allen, ‘The legislature grants the right and determines its nature. By limiting the right in its creation, the legislature has not negated the right.’ Allen, supra.” 2. “[Defendants] also argue that the legislature's inclusion of a warning in the implied consent notices given to boaters suspected of boating under the influence of alcohol pursuant to OCGA § 52–7–12.5 that test results may be used against suspects at trial shows that the legislature recognized that not including such a warning would violate due process. OCGA § 52–7–12.5 is similar to OCGA § 40–5–67.1, except for inclusion of the additional warning, and was enacted after OCGA § 40–5–67.1. However, there is no evidence that the legislature added the language to OCGA § 52– 7–12.5 because it perceived a potential violation of due process. Thus, the trial courts did not err in upholding the constitutionality of the statute on that ground.” Becker v. State, 240 Ga.App. 267, 523 S.E.2d 98 (October 6, 1999). In commercial driver’s prosecution for DUI and vehicular homicide, trial court erred in suppressing results of State-administered blood and urine tests, based on wording of implied consent notice for commercial drivers. “The implied consent notices that [Officer] Rehberg read to Becker