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officers advise drivers of the implied consent rights in their native language would impose severe administrative costs in that officers would have to be equipped to issue warnings in any and every language spoken by drivers in this State or would have to have access to an interpreter to issue the warnings. The logistics of such a requirement would be extremely problematic in a society as pluralistic and diverse as the United States. Third, the requirement urged by Rodriguez-that an interpreter be made available to read a non-English-speaking driver his rights-could lead to delay in obtaining the driver's blood-alcohol level, which dissipates over time, and thus would interfere with one of the purposes of the implied consent law. [Cit.] In sum, these considerations are sufficient to provide a rational basis for requiring the implied consent warnings to be read only in English.” 3. No due process violation based on failure to ‘meaningfully advise’ non-English speakers of their implied consent rights. “Implied consent warnings … are a matter of legislative grace, and due process does not require that the warnings be given in a language that the driver understands.” Furcal-Peguero v. State, 255 Ga.App. 729, 566 S.E.2d 320 (May 21, 2002). Implied consent warning need be read only in English even to non-English speaking shortstops, regardless of their actual date of birth, and regardless of availability of telephonic translation service. Accord, Lee v. State , 324 Ga.App. 28, 749 S.E.2d 32 (September 26, 2013). Yates v. State, 248 Ga.App. 35, 545 S.E.2d 169 (February 12, 2001). The defendant was pulled over for crossing the center line. The defendant was deaf. Upon pulling over, the defendant informed the officer that he could read lips and produced his license and registration. The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant, and the defendant’s eyes were red and he was unsteady on his feet. When questioned by the officer, the defendant admitted that he had a couple of drinks. He agreed to an alco-sensor test and tested positive for alcohol but refused to go along with the field sobriety tests. The officer arrested the defendant and read him the implied consent notice. The defendant replied numerous times that he did not understand and that he wanted his personal interpreter. The officer failed to comply with his requests. Held, the failure of the arresting officer to adequately warn the motorist of his right under OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(4) to independent chemical testing will render the test inadmissible, and will justify the refusal to submit to a state-administered test, rendering such refusal inadmissible. OCGA § 24-9-103 imposes additional obligations when an officer takes a hearing impaired person into custody. The officer is required to immediately request a qualified interpreter from the Department of Human Resources. If an interpreter is unavailable within one hour, the interrogation is to proceed in writing. Here, the officer did not try to obtain a qualified interpreter, nor did he communicate with the defendant in writing after requesting an interpreter and waiting an hour for one to be provided. Therefore, the conviction should be reversed. Hernandez v. State, 238 Ga.App. 796, 520 S.E.2d 698 (June 30, 1999). 1. At defendant’s DUI trial, trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior DUI arrests to impeach defendant’s claim that he didn’t understand the implied consent warning. The arrests “established that he had been given his implied consent warnings on these two prior occasions, because such tests may be administered only after the accused has been given the warnings. OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b); Long v. State, 185 Ga.App. 277, 278(1), 363 S.E.2d 807 (1987). The trial court was authorized to find that Hernandez opened the door to being questioned on this subject, that the fact that he had submitted to chemical tests after having been given the warnings twice before increased the likelihood that he understood the warnings on this occasion, and that the probative value of the elicited testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We find no abuse of discretion. There is no merit in Hernandez's complaint that certified copies of his DUI convictions should have been admitted. This amounts to a best evidence objection, which was not raised at trial and was therefore waived. Moret v. State, 246 Ga. 5, 6(3), 268 S.E.2d 635 (1980). Moreover, the State was seeking to impeach Hernandez with evidence concerning the circumstances of his arrest, not his criminal conviction. Therefore, the State was not required to prove the conviction, by introducing a certified copy or otherwise. See Wadsworth v. State, 209 Ga.App. 333, 334(5), 433 S.E.2d 419 (1993); compare Hood v. State, 179 Ga.App. 387, 389(1), 346 S.E.2d 867 (1986). 2. Trial court properly charged jury on implied consent refusal, and declined defendant’s request to charge the jury “that a Spanish-speaking individual is the same as unconscious and therefore incapable of withdrawing his consent by refusing to submit to a State- administered test.” Evidence showed that defendant spoke some English. Dicta : State v. Tosar, 180 Ga.App. 885, 350 S.E.2d 811 (1986) held that a non-English speaker is analogous to an unconscious person but not that they are unable to withdraw consent. Rather, the Court in Tosar found that “ the inability of [a non-English speaking individual] to communicate with the investigating officer results in the State-administered test being admissible under OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(3), which provides that the justifiable failure or inability to obtain an additional test shall not preclude admission of the State-administered test . We also declined the defendant's suggestion that we compel the State to print the implied consent rights in languages other than English.” 18. NOTICE – OUT-OF-STATE LICENSES State v. Barnard, 321 Ga.App. 20, 740 S.E.2d 837 (March 28, 2013). In DUI prosecution, trial court erred in granting