☢ test - Í

motion to suppress; implied consent warning for over-21 drivers properly advised defendant that her “privilege to drive,” not her North Carolina license, would be suspended upon refusal. Distinguishing cases where officer advised out-of-state driver that their license would be suspended, e.g., Kitchens v. State, 258 Ga.App. 411, 412–415(1), 574 S.E.2d 451 (2002); State v. Peirce, 257 Ga.App. 623, 625–627(1), 571 S.E.2d 826 (2002). Accord, State v. Gaggini , 321 Ga.App. 31, 740 S.E.2d 845 (March 28, 2013). McHugh v. State, 285 Ga.App. 131, 645 S.E.2d 619 (April 17, 2007). Before reading implied consent warning to defendant, who had an out-of-state license, “ the officer stated that what he was about to read ‘deals with your license to drive and your privilege to drive in Georgia, okay?’” “McHugh asserts that the officer improperly advised him that his out-of-state driver’s license would be suspended if he refused to take the state-administered breath test. We disagree. … The state is correct that the officer’s initial statement was nothing more than an ‘attention-grabbing preface,’ and, as such, did not constitute a substantive change that altered the meaning of the Implied Consent Notice thereafter recited to McHugh. See generally State v. McGraw, 237 Ga.App. 345, 346-347(2) (514 S.E.2d 34) (1999); Harrison v. State, 235 Ga.App. 78, 79-80 (508 S.E.2d 459) (1998).” Distinguishing “ Kitchens [ v. State, 258 Ga.App. 411, 412 (574 S.E.2d 451) (2002)] (officer informed Alabama license holder that if she refused the test, ‘you’re automatically charged with DUI and your license [is] going to be suspended’); Peirce [(September 27, 2002), below] (officer informed Texas license holder that if he refused the test, ‘he would lose his driver’s license’); [ State v. Renfroe, 216 Ga.App. 709, 710 (455 S.E.2d 383) (1995)] (officer informed Florida license holder that if he refused the test, his ‘license may be suspended for a minimum period of one year’) (punctuation and emphasis omitted); [ State v. Coleman, 216 Ga.App. 598, 599 (455 S.E.2d 604) (1995)] (officer informed North Carolina license holder that if he refused the test, ‘you will lose your privilege to operate a motor vehicle from six to twelve months’); Deckard [ v. State, 210 Ga.App. 421 (436 S.E.2d 536) (1993)] (officer informed Tennessee license holder that if he refused the test, ‘your driver’s license will be suspended for six months’).” State v. Peirce, 257 Ga.App. 623, 571 S.E.2d 826 (September 27, 2002). Intox results properly suppressed where officer, after reading implied consent notice correctly, told driver with Texas license that his license (as opposed to his privilege to drive in Georgia) would be suspended if he failed or refused state test. The fact that defendant was a Georgia resident was immaterial. “The information given to Peirce contained substantial misleading, inaccurate information and confused him as to his implied consent rights.” Follows Deckard v. State , 210 Ga.App. 421, 436 S.E.2d 536 (1993). 19. NOTICE – READING/ RE-READING/ CHANGES/ ERRORS State v. Fedrick, 329 Ga.App. 75, 763 S.E.2d 739 (September 16, 2014). Interlocutory appeal in DUI prosecution; trial court erred by granting motion to suppress results of implied consent testing. Insertion of additional words didn’t change meaning of implied consent notice: “After first submitting to the required state tests, you are entitled to additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purposes of determining [or on second reading, “for the purpose”] at your own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing.” “OCGA § 40–5– 67.1(b) provides that the applicable implied consent notice ‘need not be read exactly so long as the substance of the notice remains unchanged.’ Thus, the legislature has allowed for human error in the reading of the notice, such as the inclusion of additional wording, so long as the substance of the notice was not affected. … As we find that the inclusion of the additional wording did not alter the substance of the notice, the trial court erred when it granted Fedrick's motion to suppress.” Wallace v. State, 325 Ga.App. 142, 751 S.E.2d 887 (November 22, 2013). DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred in denying motion to suppress results of State breath test. Consent was improperly obtained by incorrect answer to defendant’s question about effect of refusal. After reading implied consent notice, defendant first refused, then asked officer, “‘well, if I say yes or no, that can be used against me[?]’ The deputy replied, ‘yes or no cannot be used against you.’ Wallace then said ‘yes,’ and submitted to the breath test.” “That information was incorrect, and it altered the substance of the notice—indeed, a refusal can be used against a person. … We cannot say that the error was harmless, because Wallace submitted to the breath test immediately after he was misinformed about the consequences of a refusal.” Sauls v. State, 293 Ga. 165, 744 S.E.2d 735 (June 17, 2013). Reversing 315 Ga.App. 98, 728 S.E.2d 241 (2012); trial court properly granted motion to suppress implied consent refusal based on omission of material part of implied consent warning. Officer failed to advise driver that “your refusal to submit to the required testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial.” Court of Appeals correctly held that the omission wasn’t a violation of due process, based on South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564–566(III) (103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748) (1983), and Chancellor v. State, 284 Ga. 66, 67(1) (663 S.E.2d 203) (2008); as stated in Neville, the right to refuse implied consent testing is “not a right of constitutional dimension,” but rather is “a matter of grace bestowed by the … legislature.” But regardless of the due