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process issue, OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b) requires that the implied consent notice “be read in its entirety but need not be read exactly so long as the substance of the notice remains unchanged.” “Certainly, not every omission or misstatement in the implied consent notice given to the driver is of such potential significance so that the notice cannot be found to be substantively accurate. … However, the General Assembly has determined that drivers should be made aware of the potentially most serious consequence of refusal of testing, i.e., that such evidence can be used against the driver at a subsequent criminal prosecution in which the driver’s liberty is at stake. Therefore, the complete omission of this consequence of the refusal of testing renders the implied consent notice insufficiently accurate so as to permit the involved driver to make an informed decision about whether to submit to testing.” Jones v. State, 319 Ga.App. 520, 737 S.E.2d 318 (January 15, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress results of state breath test. Arresting officer read implied consent notice and requested blood test; defendant agreed. Second officer, however, took defendant to jail and had him blow into intox machine, which he did without objecting. Second officer didn’t re-read implied consent notice. Failure to request breath test at time implied consent warning was read didn’t require suppression. Based on Collins (March 21, 2008), below (results admissible though trooper read warning without designating a test – allowing defendant to choose). Miller v. State, 317 Ga.App. 504, 731 S.E.2d 393 (August 29, 2012). DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress breath test. After conducting field sobriety evaluations, officer said to defendant, “‘[A]s long as you continue to be cool or whatever and be cooperative, … I’ll make the process go by real quick.’ The officer then placed Miller under arrest. The officer and Miller engaged in a conversation about the alco-sensor test, having someone pick-up Miller's vehicle, how to sit comfortably in the back of the patrol car while wearing handcuffs, and whether Miller wanted the officer to perform a radar accuracy test. The officer then read Miller the implied consent notice and asked whether Miller would submit to a State-administered breath test.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, officer’s statement quoted above didn’t coerce consent to State-administered test. “The officer did not in fact mention the State-administered breath test until several minutes after he made the statement about being cool and cooperative. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the trial court's conclusion that the officer's statement did not render Miller incapable of making an informed decision about whether to submit to the breath test.” Distinguishing State v. Rowell , 296 Ga.App. 238, 239, 682 S.E.2d 343 (2009), where officer persuaded defendant to rescind refusal by saying, “if you blow under the legal limit I can let you go home to your son, and everything will be fine.” Economos v. State, 298 Ga.App. 561, 680 S.E.2d 591 (June 25, 2009). Officer’s statements were not misleading: 1. “[T]he officer's statement that to keep his license Economos must submit to the state-administered test is what, in substance, the statutory notice says as well.” 2. Officer’s statement before giving defendant alco-sensor test that “you’re going to be dadgum close,” “was made concerning the alco-sensor test, the result of which Economos knew before submitting to the breath test,” and thus was not coercive with regard to the intox test. Collins v. State, 290 Ga.App. 418, 659 S.E.2d 818 (March 21, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress results of implied consent testing where trooper failed to designate test, instead allowing defendant to choose. “‘The determinative issue with the implied consent notice is whether the notice given was substantively accurate so as to permit the driver to make an informed decision about whether to consent to testing.’ State v. Chun, 265 Ga.App. 530, 531 (594 S.E.2d 732) (2004).” “[W]e fail to see how the trooper’s failure to designate the test to be taken changed the substance or meaning of the warning in the Implied Consent Notice. Collins was under notice that the state administered test chemical tests would be of his ‘blood, breath, urine or other bodily substances.’ The notice given was sufficiently accurate to permit Collins to make an informed decision about whether to consent to testing.” Accord, Nagata v. State , 319 Ga.App. 513, 736 S.E.2d 474 (January 7, 2013) (no suppression where officer asked defendant if he would submit to “test of your blood, breath, urine or other body substances?”); Jones (January 15, 2013), above. Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 352, 646 S.E.2d 323 (May 10, 2007). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove content of implied consent warning although card tendered at trial was not the same one from which the officer read upon defendant’s arrest. Anderton v. State, 283 Ga.App. 493, 642 S.E.2d 137 (February 7, 2007). Officer’s statement was not misleading: “Here, after Anderton answered ‘I will take a blood test’ to the officer’s request for his consent to a breath test, the officer stated that a blood test was not the option presented by the officer.” Court of Appeals finds this was clearly a reference to the state-administered test, not an independent test. “As the officer’s following statement was true and