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came in the context of an exchange regarding the method of state-administered testing, the officer’s statement did not premise Anderton’s consent on a [sic] incorrect information or false implication. Compare State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 479(1)(c) (502 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (ruling that an officer’s statement that he would suspend defendant’s license if she refused breath test was not misleading because the officer initiates suspension proceedings and provides the evidence of refusal) with State v. Terry, 236 Ga.App. 248, 250-251 (511 S.E.2d 608) (1999) (upholding the grant of a motion in limine because officer’s statement that the defendant had to ‘bond out’ before she would be able to obtain an independent chemical test misstated the law and was misleading, and because substantial other misleading information compounded the defendant’s confusion). Instead, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the officer’s statement was merely a clarification of his designation that the state-administered test would be a breath test. Accordingly, we hold that the circumstances here did not render Anderton unable to make an informed choice about whether to submit to the breath test.” Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 762, 598 S.E.2d 373 (April 5, 2004). Results of implied consent testing should be suppressed where consent was obtained by threat to seize blood and urine samples involuntarily by search warrant if defendant did not consent. “By threatening Collier with forcible testing, the police here misled Collier about the consequences of refusing to consent to the requested tests. Where police mislead an accused about his implied consent rights, any consent based upon the misrepresentation is invalid. Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 292(VI) (587 S.E.2d 605) (2003). All results of those tests should therefore be excluded. Id.; see State v. Terry, 236 Ga.App. 248, 251 (511 S.E.2d 608) (1999).” A ffirmed, 279 Ga. 316, 612 S.E.2d 281 (April 26, 2005) (State does not have the right to seek a search warrant to compel a person to submit blood and urine samples for drug testing when that person has invoked his right under the implied consent law to refuse such testing.). OCGA § 40-5-67.1 amended effective July 1, 2006 by Ga. L 2006, Act 545, by adding new subsection (d.1): “Nothing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state or the United States.” State v. Chun, 265 Ga.App. 530, 594 S.E.2d 732 (February 11, 2004). After reading implied consent, officer correctly answered defendant’s questions about circumstances in which her license might get suspended as a result of taking or not taking the breath test. Trial court granted motion in limine, however, finding that officer’s answer, “‘although technically correct, suggested that [Chun’s] license would be suspended whether or not she chose to take the chemical test.’” Held, trial court erred in granting motion in limine ; “the court’s suggestion that the officer should have also told her that her license would not be suspended if she was not convicted is simply an alternative – but equivalent – version of the officer’s statements, and is certainly not any clearer or less misleading” (emphasis in original). Walczak v. State, 259 Ga.App. 140, 575 S.E.2d 906 (January 9, 2003). Officer asked defendant for blood sample based on serious injury accident, but defendant refused to submit. Officer later told defendant she wanted blood and urine samples “on suspicion of DUI” and re-read implied consent. Defendant then consented to testing. Held, defendant was not misled about basis of request – defendant knew “he was under suspicion of DUI.” Distinguishes Pilkenton v. State , 254 Ga.App. 127, 561 S.E.2d 462 (2002). Kitchens v. State, 258 Ga.App. 411, 574 S.E.2d 451 (November 18, 2002). Although notice was properly read, officer’s erroneous explanations required suppression of results. Officer told driver that “if the results indicate ten or more” her license may be suspended, which Court of Appeals took to mean 10 grams, not 0.10 grams. Also, officer erroneously told out-of-state driver that if she refused, “your license [is] going to be suspended.” Distinguished, Travis v. State , 314 Ga.App. 280, 724 S.E.2d 15 (February 22, 2012) (suppression not required where officer’s slip of the tongue to underage driver was immediately corrected: “The videotape recording specifically shows the trooper stating the legal limit as ‘0.082 [one second pause] 0.02 grams or more.’ The trooper explained that he had meant to say 0.02 grams or more, and was merely trying to correct himself after making the mistake of saying 0.08 grams.”); Fedrick (September 16, 2014), above (insertion of words which didn’t change meaning of notice shouldn’t have resulted in suppression). Colon v. State, 256 Ga.App. 505, 568 S.E.2d 811 (July 12, 2002). Officer’s omission of the words “under the implied consent law” at the end of the implied consent warning did not materially “change the substance of the meaning of the warning.” Satterfield v. State, 252 Ga.App. 525, 556 S.E.2d 568 (November 20, 2001). Officer’s statement that refusal of state test would “automatically” suspend driver’s license, and that refusal “would” (instead of “shall”) be offered into evidence