☢ test - Í

against him at trial did not misstate the law or require suppression of test results. Accord, Economos (June 25, 2009), above (officer’s statement, “to keep your license, you have to take the state-administered test,” was accurate). State v. Heredia, 252 Ga.App. 89, 555 S.E.2d 91 (October 4, 2001). Defendant’s right to an independent test was not compromised simply because the officer re-read the implied consent warning five minutes after its first reading and changed the test designation from breath to urine and blood based on newly discovered evidence. Reversal of trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. Additionally, the Court reiterated prior holdings that OCGA § 40-13- 30 and OCGA § 17-4-23(a) authorize police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions. State v. Coe, 243 Ga.App. 232, 533 S.E.2d 104 (March 29, 2000). Unanimous whole court decision. Suppression of results of defendant’s urine test reversed. Request for second implied consent test need not be accompanied by Miranda warnings, even after arrest, and request can be made after first test completed. “There was certainly no statutory requirement that the requesting officer designate all tests to be requested before the initial test is taken.” (Emphasis in original.) Disapproves contrary language in State v. Warmack , 230 Ga.App. 157, 495 S.E.2d 632 (1998). Cullingham v. State, 242 Ga.App. 499, 529 S.E.2d 199 (February 2, 2000). DUI convictions affirmed; evidence was sufficient to establish reading of implied consent notice. “Cullingham contends that the officer's testimony that he read the implied consent warning as required by OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b) is insufficient to show that the officer in fact informed him of these rights. Miller v. State, 238 Ga.App. 61, 516 S.E.2d 838 (1999), explained that an officer's conclusory statement that he read a warning contained on a card was not enough evidence for the State to meet its burden of proving compliance with OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b). Id. at 62, 516 S.E.2d 838. In that case, the deputy did not testify as to what rights he described to the defendant or as to the content of the card from which he read the warning. Id. But here the arresting officer testified that (1) he read the Georgia implied consent law from 1997; (2) he read the notice for suspects over 21; and (3) he read it twice because Cullingham appeared not to understand. The officer even recited a portion of the warning given at trial. This testimony and the specifying of a portion of the warning are sufficient to prove compliance with the implied consent notice requirements. Compare id.; see Walker v. State, 204 Ga.App. 559, 562(4), 420 S.E.2d 17 (1992). Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga.App. 777, 527 S.E.2d 628 (January 11, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed. Defendant was involved in accident in which the police believed he was drinking and driving. When the officer read implied consent, the officer mistakenly referred to the limit as .010 instead of .10. Held, citing Maurer (September 24, 1999), below, an understatement of the legal limit would naturally induce the person to whom the warning was given to withdraw his consent to testing whereas he otherwise might not. Conversely, the person might be led to submit to testing if the legal limit were overstated. Because the defendant did not withdraw his consent, any understatement of the legal limit did not change the substance of the notice in any way harmful to him. Therefore, the mistake did not render the test results inadmissible. Maurer v. State, 240 Ga.App. 145, 525 S.E.2d 104 (September 24, 1999). Officer mis-read implied consent and stated 0.01 instead of 0.10. Court held that the officer “understated” the legal limit which would naturally induce the person to whom the warning was given to withdraw his consent to testing whereas he otherwise might not. Therefore, understating the legal limit did not change the substance of the notice in any harmful way. See also Garland v. State , 256 Ga.App. 313, 568 S.E.2d 540 (July 2, 2002) (holding that where arresting officer erroneously informed defendant that the legal blood alcohol limit in Georgia was .08 grams and that defendant was “just above the legal limit,” but the officer then informed defendant of the correct legal limit of .10 grams by reading the implied consent warning, there was no error as the understatement of the legal limit did not change the substance of the notice so as to harm defendant). Accord, Yarbrough v. State , 241 Ga.App. 777, 527 S.E.2d 628 (January 11, 2000). Eberly v. State, 240 Ga.App. 221, 522 S.E.2d 294 (September 9, 1999). Conviction of DUI as less safe driver affirmed; court properly admitted defendant’s refusal to submit to state-administered testing, since officer’s reading of implied consent rights, in which he mistakenly stated that defendant could obtain one rather than multiple chemical tests, substantially complied with OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b). Miller v. State, 238 Ga.App. 617, 516 S.E.2d 838 (April 28, 1999). Defendant’s per se DUI conviction reversed. “The deputy … did not testify as to exactly what rights he informed Miller of or as to the actual contents of the card. The card itself was never introduced into evidence. Consequently, the state’s only evidence concerning the implied consent warning was the deputy’s conclusory statement that he read a warning contained on a card. Given the absence of any further evidence specifying the substance of the warning allegedly given, the state failed to meet its burden of proving