☢ test - Í

compliance with the implied consent notice requirements. The trial court therefore should have granted Miller’s motion to suppress the breath test results. See State v. Peters, 211 Ga.App. 755, 756-757, 440 S.E.2d 515 (1994).” Accord, Epps v. State , 298 Ga.App. 607, 680 S.E.2d 636 (June 29, 2009) (trial court erred in denying motion to suppress implied consent test results where State failed to tender card into evidence or prove contents of notice read by officer). Distinguished, Cullingham (February 2, 2000), above. State v. Moses, 237 Ga.App. 764, 516 S.E.2d 807 (April 27, 1999). Judgment that suppressed defendant’s blood test results reversed; arresting officer did not have to give Miranda warnings before asking defendant to submit to blood test as an additional chemical test since amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1 authorizes officers to require subsequent tests. State v. Payne, 236 Ga.App. 338, 512 S.E.2d 292 (February 9, 1999). Trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion to suppress results of implied consent test; officer’s reading of implied consent warning, while not exact, did not “change[ ] the substance of the statutory notice.” Officer substituted “test” for “tests,” “substance” for “substances,” and other non- substantive changes. Based on 1998 amendment to OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b), changing former law (which demanded verbatim reading of statutory warning) “to provide that the implied consent notice ‘shall be read in its entirety but need not be read exactly so long as the substance of the notice remains unchanged.’ We held in State v. Moncrief, 234 Ga.App. 871, 872-873, 508 S.E.2d 216 (1998) (1998) that the amendment had retroactive effect. Accordingly, the prior opinions of this Court relied upon by the trial court requiring the exact statutory language are no longer applicable.” Accord, Sheridan v. State , 236 Ga.App. 350, 511 S.E.2d 908 (February 9, 1999) (“test” instead of “tests”; “Sheridan was informed that the law required him to submit to a state-administered test, and that is the significant point in that portion of the warning.”); State v. McGraw , 237 Ga.App. 345, 514 S.E.2d 34 (February 17, 1999) (“the trial court erred in concluding that the officer substantially changed the warning” based on “test” instead of “tests,” “indicates” instead of “indicate,” “point one-oh grams” instead of “zero point one zero grams.”); Eberly v. State , 240 Ga.App. 221, 522 S.E.2d 294 (September 9, 1999) (“test” for “tests.”); State v. Garnett , 241 Ga.App. 315, 527 S.E.2d 21 (December 6, 1999) (officer omitted “law” at end of warning). State v. Terry, 236 Ga.App. 248, 511 S.E.2d 608 (February 5, 1999). Trial court properly suppressed refusal of state test; officers’ statements to defendant, implying that she would have to post bond before getting an independent test, were misleading and may have contributed to her refusal , notwithstanding correct reading of the statutory notice and notwithstanding that officers did not intend to mislead defendant. “If we were to adopt the state’s position, a police officer could give a defendant false, misleading or confusing information regarding his rights under the implied consent law, so long as the officer at some point read the defendant the complete and correct implied consent notice. Clearly, that cannot be the intended result of the implied consent statute. Further, we do not believe that the officer’s intent with regard to such information is determinative. Even if an officer did not intend to mislead, if the defendant is misled or misinformed as to his rights, his ability to make an informed decision would be impaired.” Distinguishing State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 479(1)(c), 502 S.E.2d 314 (1998) (where officer’s statements following implied consent warning were found not to be false or misleading); Sorrow v. State, 178 Ga.App. 83, 84, 342 S.E.2d 20 (1986) (where inaccurate information ‘had nothing to do with the defendant’s options under the Implied Consent Statute’).” Distinguished, Fedrick (September 16, 2014), above (insertion of words into statutory warning, which didn’t change meaning of the warning, shouldn’t have resulted in suppression of test results). State v Black, 236 Ga.App. 56, 510 S.E.2d 903 (January 19, 1999). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress; officer’s substitution of the word “test” for “tests” in implied consent warning did not require suppression of defendant’s subsequent refusal. 20. NOTICE – TIMING Seminal case: Hough v. State , 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005) (see below). Buford v. State, 312 Ga.App. 411, 718 S.E.2d 605 (November 4, 2011). DUI conviction affrmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress State blood test, finding that defendant was under arrest when implied consent was read. “It is undisputed that at the time of his encounter with the trooper, Buford was secured to a board in a hospital room with tubes attached to his body. Even assuming that Buford was alert rather than coming in and out of consciousness at the time, a reasonable person in his situation could not have thought that he was free to leave when the trooper announced that he was charging him with DUI. ‘“[A] defendant may voluntarily submit to being considered under arrest without any actual touching or show of force.”’ Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 716 (620 S.E.2d 380) (2005), quoting Clement v. State, 226 Ga. 66, 67(2) (172 S.E.2d 600) (1970).”