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giving of any chemical test once the suspect refuses to submit to the requested one. It certainly makes no provision for the police to then attempt to obtain a search warrant.” The plain language of the statute trumps State’s attempts to construe it in light of legislative history or purpose. “The right to refuse to submit to state-administered chemical testing has been created by the General Assembly. Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605, 606(1) (533 S.E.2d 92) (2000). The General Assembly expressly contemplated the possibility of refusal and provided adverse consequences, other than the involuntary taking, by warrant or otherwise, of a specimen from the non-consenting suspect. [Cit.] At present, the plain language of OCGA § 40-5-67.1(d) restricts the ability of law enforcement to forcibly obtain that which has been refused.” “This is so even though our State Constitution generally does not protect citizens from the compelled testing of certain bodily substances and the use at trial of the results of such compelled testing.” Here, defendant (in vehicular homicide case) initially refused testing, then consented when threatened with search warrant. Defendant later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because the attorney did not seek to suppress the test results. This decision affirms the Court of Appeals finding ( see Collier v. State , 266 Ga.App. 762, 598 S.E.2d 373 (April 5, 2004)) that defendant indeed received ineffective assistance. OCGA § 40-5-67.1 amended effective July 1, 2006 by Ga. L 2006, Act 545, by adding new subsection (d.1): “Nothing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state or the United States.” Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (March 22, 2005). Defendant withdrew his implied consent and refused state test. Officers then obtained search warrant and got blood sample. State also admitted at trial results of medical tests on defendant’s blood. Held, while State was not entitled to obtain sample by search warrant in face of implied consent refusal, the refusal itself and the medical tests were admissible. Distinguished from Collier, where defendant withdrew refusal in face of threat of search warrant. Legislatively superseded by OCGA § 40-5-67.1(d.1) , effective July 1, 2006. State v. Allen, 272 Ga.App. 169, 612 S.E.2d 11 (February 21, 2005). Trial court erred in suppressing test results: “The arresting officer testified at the motion to suppress hearing that Allen was transported to the jail after she indicated she was unsure whether she would take the state’s test. The officer told Allen he would set up the Intoxilyzer and give Allen an opportunity to decide whether she wanted to take the test. The officer set up the Intoxilyzer and explained it to Allen after they arrived at the jail. He then asked Allen ‘Ma’am, it’s time for me to get a breath sample. Do you want to?’ The officer testified that Allen then stood up and blew into the machine.” “Based on the facts here, we conclude that Allen was informed of her rights in a timely manner, and that the procedure the officer employed to gain Allen’s consent was fair and reasonable.” Distinguished from Howell (March 24, 2004) and Adams (December 13, 2004), below. Handschuh v. State, 270 Ga.App. 676, 607 S.E.2d 899 (December 1, 2004). Defendant’s refusal was not admissible where implied consent warning read prior to arrest. Not a serious injury accident. Whole court opinion; five judges dissent. Affirmed, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Shaheed v. State, 270 Ga.App. 709, 607 S.E.2d 897 (December 1, 2004). “[W]hile Shaheed’s refusal to submit to chemical testing may ‘be considered as positive evidence creating an inference that the test would show the presence of alcohol,’ [cit.] it also does not create an inference that he had impaired driving ability as a result of drinking alcohol. [Cit.]” Appears to conflict with Mathis, Walker, Vanorsdall, Johnson and Lucas, all cited below. Accord, Baird (March 28, 2003), below. State v. Simmons, 270 Ga.App. 301, 605 S.E.2d 846 (October 19, 2004). Trial court erred in suppressing implied consent blood test results; defendant could not withdraw consent to test after blood had been drawn but before it had been analyzed, “in this case eleven days thereafter.” “[N]o fair analogy may be drawn between rescinding refusal of State testing and withdrawing consent to State testing once consent has been given, the latter as contrary to public safety policy mandating that drivers arrested for DUI submit to State-administered chemical testing, subject to the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-392, to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs in their persons. OCGA §§ 40-5-55(a); 40-5-67.1; OCGA § 40- 6-391; compare Garcia v. State, 207 Ga.App. 653, 656(1)(d) (428 S.E.2d 666) (1993) (in the general criminal law voluntary consent legally obtained continues until revoked or withdrawn absent probable cause to arrest).” Howell v. State, 266 Ga.App. 480, 597 S.E.2d 546 (March 24, 2004). Officer arrested defendant for DUI and read him implied consent warning . Defendant refused to take the state test. Officer took defendant to the county jail, placed him in front of the machine, and another officer then administered a test. Defendant moved to suppress the results, contending that he had not withdrawn his refusal. Trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant withdrew his refusal by actually taking the test. Held, trial court erred in denying motion to suppress. “‘As with any procedure, the