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tested only if he first submitted to a breath test,’ the trial court concluded that Brookbank had not refused the test.” Held, defendant’s response amounted to a refusal, regardless of whether he was confused; officer’s repeated reading of the implied consent warning, emphasizing the difference between the state test and the independent test, was not misleading. “‘ The law does not require the arresting officer to ensure that the driver understands the implied consent notice .’ (Citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Furcal-Peguero [v. State, 255 Ga.App. 729, 733 (566 S.E.2d 320) (2002)]; State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 479(1)(b) (502 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (‘[T]he officer was under no duty to give further warnings or instructions after the implied consent warning was given properly at the time of arrest.’) (citations omitted, emphasis in original). See also [ State v. Tosar, 180 Ga.App. 885, 888 (350 S.E.2d 811) (1986).] In this case, it is not disputed that the officer’s delivery of the implied consent notice was substantially accurate and timely delivered to Brookbank. Irrespective of whether Brookbank’s refusal resulted from confusion, it was in fact a refusal to take the state-administered breath test in light of the officer’s proper administration of the implied consent warning. [ footnote: Of course, Brookbank will be free to argue to the trier of fact that his refusal was based on his confusion, not a consciousness of guilt. See Hernandez v. State, 238 Ga.App. 796, 798-799(2) (520 S.E.2d 698) (1999). ] Thus, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of Brookbank’s refusal.” Doyle v. State, 281 Ga.App. 592, 636 S.E.2d 751 (September 18, 2006). State didn’t have to show defendant’s express consent to taking test where defendant actually took the test without objection or refusal. “‘The State did not have to show [Doyle’s] consent. The State had only to show that, after being advised of [his] rights pursuant to OCGA § 40-6- 392, [Doyle] did not refuse to submit to the State-administered test.’ Wadsworth v. State, 209 Ga.App. 333, 334(2) (433 S.E.2d 419) (1993). Given that Doyle, in fact, took the test, he obviously did not refuse to submit to it. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the results of the state-administered chemical test.” Compare Howell (March 24, 2004), below, and cases cited in note, especially State v. Adams , 270 Ga.App. 878, 609 S.E.2d 378 (December 13, 2004) (confused defendant was read warning, said he didn’t understand, never expressly consented to take test, but took it when placed in front of machine and told to blow; said he thought he had to. Trial court properly suppressed results.). Accord, Jones (January 15, 2013), above. Stapleton v. State, 279 Ga.App. 296, 630 S.E.2d 769 (April 13, 2006). Read implied consent upon arrest, defendant indicated her refusal. At police station, officer asked her again; this time, she agreed. Officer did not re-read implied consent at the station. Held, test results were properly admitted. “ Although Stapleton clearly refused to take a breath test when asked at the scene, she rescinded that refusal by agreeing to take the test at the police station . No evidence was presented showing that the officer coerced or threatened Stapleton to take the test or that Stapleton was intimidated in any way by the officer’s request. Under these circumstances, we cannot hold that the officer acted unreasonably when he again asked Stapleton to take a breath test following her initial refusal at the scene. See id.; compare Howell v. State, 266 Ga.App. 480, 482(1)(a) (597 S.E.2d 546) (2004) (instructing suspect to blow into Intoxilyzer was unreasonable where suspect earlier refused to take a breath test and was not asked again whether he would consent). In this case, the officer’s failure to repeat the implied consent notice does not require suppression of the evidence . The proper inquiry is whether the officer informed Stapleton of her rights in a timely fashion and whether the officer’s conduct in securing her consent was fair and reasonable. See State v. Allen, 272 Ga.App. 169, 170 (612 S.E.2d 11) (2005). Here, the officer timely informed Stapleton of her rights at the scene and there was no reason for the officer to believe that Stapleton did not understand the implied consent notice after reading it to her a second time. Because the officer did not act unreasonably in later securing Stapleton’s consent to take a breath test, the trial court did not err in denying Stapleton’s motion to suppress the breath test results.” Accord, State v. Quezada , 295 Ga.App. 522, 672 S.E.2d 497 (January 13, 2009) (while filling out paperwork regarding refusal at police station, officer told defendant to let him know if she changed her mind about breath test, a “fair and reasonable” procedure). Taylor v. State, 278 Ga.App. 181, 628 S.E.2d 611 (March 10, 2006). “In Kelly v. State, 242 Ga.App. 30, 33-34(5) (528 S.E.2d 812) (2000), we found no error resulted from the State’s argument that the defendant refused the breath test because she was conscious of her impairment or guilt. We likewise find no error here.” Alewine v. State, 273 Ga.App. 629, 616 S.E.2d 472 (May 31, 2005). “‘[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test ... created an inference that the test would reveal the presence of a prohibited substance and bears directly on the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Stephens v. State, 271 Ga.App. 634, 635 (610 S.E.2d 613) (2005).” State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316, 612 S.E.2d 281 (April 26, 2005). Defendant having refused implied consent testing, State was not entitled to seek a search warrant to obtain blood or urine samples. “OCGA § 40-5-67.1(d) clearly prohibits the