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evidence will support an inference that he was an impaired driver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hazley [ v. State, 289 Ga.App. 558, 559–560 (657 S.E.2d 628) (2008)]. See Massa [ v. State, 287 Ga.App. 494, 495(1) (651 S.E.2d 806) (2007)]; Hoffman [ v. State, 275 Ga.App. 356, 358(1) (620 S.E.2d 598) (2005)]; Jones [ v. State, 273 Ga.App. 192, 194(1)(b) (614 S.E.2d 820) (2005)]; Walker [ v. State, 239 Ga.App. 831 (521 S.E.2d 861) (1999)].” Jones v. State, 319 Ga.App. 520, 737 S.E.2d 318 (January 15, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress results of state breath test. Arresting officer read implied consent notice and requested blood test; defendant agreed. Second officer, however, took defendant to jail and had him blow into intox machine, which he did without objecting. Second officer didn’t re-read implied consent notice. Fact that defendant took breath test without objection showed that he didn’t refuse. Based on Doyle (September 18, 2006) (“the State did not have to show Doyle's consent. The State had only to show that, after being advised of his rights pursuant to OCGA § 40–6–392, Doyle did not refuse to submit to the State-administered test. Given that Doyle, in fact, took the test, he obviously did not refuse to submit to it.”). “[I]t is undisputed that Jones verbally consented to blood testing following the implied consent warning given by Officer Gleason; that he never revoked such consent; that he never indicated his refusal to submit to breath testing, either verbally or non-verbally; that he never inquired about a blood test or asked for an independent test; and that there was no evidence that he was forced or coerced into submitting to breath testing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Doyle authorized the admission of the test results.” Crusselle v. State, 303 Ga.App. 879, 694 S.E.2d 707 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; prosecutor’s closing argument on refusal was not improper: “the Judge will tell you that the refusal, along with the manifestations that are undisputed in this case, is evidence. And that you can, and our law – of that manifestation, along with the commission offense, is all evidence to show that he is impaired, and will sustain a conviction of impairment. And sustain that alcohol was a factor that impaired his ability to drive.” “[T]he comments challenged here refer to evidence in the case, that is, Crusselle's refusal to submit to testing and other manifestations of impairment, and thus were not improper under OCGA § 17-8-75. See Varner v. State, 285 Ga. 300, 301(2)(b), (c), 676 S.E.2d 189 (2009).” State v. Stewart, 286 Ga.App. 542, 649 S.E.2d 525 (June 20, 2007). Trial court erred in suppressing implied consent refusal where warning properly read (several times), but defendant didn’t understand it. “The law views the implied consent to chemical testing, or the revocation of that consent, as valid so long as the arresting officer reads the driver the implied consent notice set forth in OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b). See, e.g., Leiske v. State, 255 Ga.App. 615, 617(2) (565 S.E.2d 925) (2002) (‘The determinative issue with the implied consent notice is whether the notice given was substantively accurate so as to permit the driver to make an informed decision about whether to consent to testing.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)); Furcal-Peguero v. State, 255 Ga.App. 729, 732-733 (566 S.E.2d 320) (2002) (consent valid so long as implied consent notice read to driver); State v. Brookbank, 283 Ga.App. 814, 816 (642 S.E.2d 885) (2007) (refusal valid where implied consent notice given.) Notably, however, ‘drivers are entitled only to be advised of their rights under the implied consent law, that is, to have the implied consent notice read to them. The law does not require the arresting officer to ensure that the driver understands the implied consent notice. ’ (Citations and footnote omitted; emphasis original.) Furcal-Peguero, supra, 255 Ga.App. at 732-733. See also, [ State v. Webb, 212 Ga.App. 872, 873 (443 S.E.2d 630) (1994)] (‘In all cases the court is required only to find that the implied consent law was conveyed to the driver. The State is under no duty to prove that the ... driver fully understood his rights under [that] law.’) (emphasis in original.); Rodriguez v. State, 275 Ga. 283, 285-286(2) (565 S.E.2d 458) (2002) (no requirement that the implied consent notice be read in any language other than English, even where the driver speaks no English). The rationale underlying this rule is obvious: to hold otherwise, and allow an intoxicated driver’s professed inability to understand the implied consent warning to vitiate either the implied consent or the revocation of it, would so undermine OCGA § 40-5-55(a) as to render it meaningless. Indeed, such a holding would actually benefit most those drivers who pose the greatest threat on the road – i.e., those who are so impaired that, even though conscious, are unable to comprehend their circumstances.” Accord, Monas v. State , 270 Ga.App. 50, 606 S.E.2d 80 (October 12, 2004) (same facts). State v. Brookbank, 283 Ga.App. 814, 642 S.E.2d 885 (March 1, 2007). Trial court erred in granting motion to suppress defendant’s refusal to take state-administered test; defendant’s insistence on a blood test instead of the breath test requested by the officer was clearly a refusal, in context, regardless of whether defendant was confused, or why. “[T]he trial court granted Brookbank’s motion holding that Brookbank’s actions did not amount to a refusal to take the state- administered breath test under the implied consent law. Rather, the court held that ‘[Brookbank’s] conduct demonstrated a good faith willingness to take a chemical test that was mingled with confusion over who designated the test.’ Reasoning that the deputy ‘could have clarified [Brookbank’s] confusion with a simple explanation that [he] could have his blood