☢ test - Í

proximity to the instant of arrest as the circumstances of the individual case might warrant) requires a finding that the implied consent warning was not timely read to the defendant and that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Certain language suggesting that implied consent may be read prior to arrest disapproved, Hough v. State , 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Crawford v. State, 246 Ga.App. 344, 540 S.E.2d 300 (October 12, 2000). The results of the state administered breath test were admissible, even though the officer read the implied consent notice before giving an initial alco-sensor test, because the officer read the notice reasonably close to the time of defendant’s arrest. This reasoning disapproved, Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Joiner v. State, 239 Ga.App. 843, 522 S.E.2d 25 (August 11, 1999). Denial of motion to suppress blood-alcohol test results affirmed; implied consent notice was timely, even though it was given hours after police took defendant into custody at scene of fatal accident and five months before defendant was charged with crime or arrested for DUI; if defendant was under arrest at accident scene, she was arrested for vehicular homicide not DUI, and implied consent warning does not have to be given at time of non-DUI arrest; delay between defendant’s being taken into custody and blood test did not invalidate test results, since it was necessary for investigation and to allow defendant to recover sufficiently to understand her rights. Certain language suggesting that implied consent may be read prior to arrest disapproved, Hough v. State , 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Townsend v. State, 236 Ga.App. 530, 511 S.E.2d 587 (February 4, 1999). Implied consent warning was not untimely where read at hospital in these circumstances. “There exists sufficient evidence … from which the trial court could infer there was an apparent need for Townsend to be promptly transported to a hospital. The officer also testified that for safety reasons, he stayed at the accident scene until the vehicles were towed; and when he reached the hospital, Townsend was still receiving medical treatment. The officer read Townsend the implied consent warning when he next had the opportunity to speak to him.” 21. REBUTTAL Jones v. State, 241 Ga.App. 515, 527 S.E.2d 223 (December 15, 1999). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; intox results were properly admitted to rebut defendant’s testimony that he didn’t have much to drink, although the parties had stipulated that it wouldn’t be admitted “because of an issue regarding Jones' request for an independent chemical test.” ““Evidence should be admitted if it is admissible for any legitimate purpose.” Goodwin v. State , 222 Ga.App. 285, 287(3), 474 S.E.2d 84 (1996); Smith v. State, 260 Ga. 746, 748(1), 399 S.E.2d 66 (1991). Valid results of a breath, blood, or urine test, which are otherwise determined to be inadmissible on procedural grounds, may be properly admitted for impeachment purposes. Charlton v. State, 217 Ga.App. 842, 459 S.E.2d 455 (1995); Goodwin v. State, supra. [fn: A blood, breath, or urine test which is held inadmissible on substantive grounds, i.e., because the result of the test is defective, would not be admissible for impeachment purposes, since a defective test result could not serve to prove a defendant's BAC. ] … As the breath test result was admissible to rebut Jones' testimony that he consumed only three beers over a five-hour period and the inferences raised thereby, the trial court did not err in the admission of such evidence.” 22. REFUSAL OF STATE TEST Humphries v. State, 327 Ga.App. 542, 759 S.E.2d 611 (June 11, 2014). DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress implied consent breath test. Consent to breath test wasn’t coerced by “threat” of forced blood draw. Defendant contended officer coerced her into rescinding her refusal by threatening her with a forced blood draw and telling her “it's going to be a longer process [getting out of jail] because you refused ... the State's test.” Trial court properly disagreed. “Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court had a substantial basis for making its finding that the officer's statements did not render Humphries incapable of making an informed decision about whether to submit to the breath test. The traffic stop video does not clearly suggest that the officer's statements were made to coerce Humphries into consenting. The officer continued to alert Humphries that it was her decision to make, and that the booking department at the jail would provide her with further information regarding future processes.” Hammill v. State, 327 Ga.App. 588, 758 S.E.2d 336 (May 30, 2014). Conviction for serious injury by vessel (jetski) and related offenses affirmed; prosecutor’s argument was a correct statement of law. “Here, following defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor ultimately clarified to the jury that Hammill's refusal to take a State-administered test “need[ed] to be taken with other evidence in order to come to a conclusion of impairment.” This clarification by the prosecutor was consistent with our case law reflecting that a defendant's refusal to take a State-administered test “together with other