☢ test - Í

consent and to forcibly obtain blood and urine samples over his objection.”) and Hough v. State , above . Collier affirmed by Supreme Court, 279 Ga. 316, 612 S.E.2d 281 (April 26, 2005) (State does not have the right to seek a search warrant to compel a person to submit blood and urine samples for drug testing when that person has invoked his right under the implied consent law to refuse such testing.) Accord with Collier, Harris v. State , 272 Ga.App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (March 22, 2005). Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (October 6, 2003). Trooper took blood samples from both drivers in serious-injury accident because he thought law required him to; he had no suspicion that defendant committed any violation. Held, trial court should have suppressed test results. “[T]o the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions.” Purpose of statute is primarily the gathering of evidence for criminal prosecution; hence, no “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment applies, distinguishing this case from Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association , 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ( railway employees can be blood tested after accidents due to government’s interest in regulating their behavior) and Adams v. State , 269 Ga. 405, 498 S.E.2d 268 (1998) (state has special need to test some criminals for HIV to protect crime victims). Accord, Ferguson v. State , 277 Ga. 530, 590 S.E.2d 728 (November 17, 2003); Costley v. State , 271 Ga.App. 692, 610 S.E.2d 647 (February 17, 2005) (first-degree vehicular homicide conviction reversed); State v. Collier , 279 Ga. 316, 612 S.E.2d 281 (April 26, 2005) (defendant refused testing, but consented in face of threat to obtain search warrants for blood and urine samples; test results should have been suppressed because “OCGA § 40-5-67.1(d) clearly prohibits the giving of any chemical test once the suspect refuses to submit to the requested one. It certainly makes no provision for the police to then attempt to obtain a search warrant.” ) State v. Goolsby, 262 Ga.App. 867, 586 S.E.2d 754 (August 25, 2003). Suppresion of intox results reversed. An arresting officer need not have probable cause to arrest for DUI before asking for an intox test; it is sufficient if he has probable cause to arrest for “any offense” (here, failure to maintain lane) giving the officer at least “reasonable grounds” to believe the defendant was DUI. “[A] person who drives a motor vehicle on the highways of this State is deemed to have given consent to a breath test for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol if he is arrested for any offense alleged to have been committed while driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391. An officer need only articulate ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that the person was in violation of 40-6-391 during the commission of the offense for which a suspect was arrested. “The obvious purpose of making such a request is to determine whether a violation of 40-6-391 has occurred, so that the person may in addition be charged with it, and to provide proof thereof.” Overruled, Handschuh v. State , 270 Ga.App. 676, 607 S.E.2d 899 (December 1, 2004), affi’d, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). State v. Jones, 261 Ga.App. 357, 583 S.E.2d 139 (May 21, 2003). After arresting defendant for criminal trespass and placing him in patrol car, officer notes smell of alcohol, watery eyes and flushed face. After arriving at detention center and consulting a more experienced officer, officer arrested defendant for DUI and read implied consent. Held, since defendant was not arrested for DUI until arriving at detention center, reading of implied consent was timely. Jellie v. State, 258 Ga.App. 261, 573 S.E.2d 490 (November 1, 2002). Officer read implied consent warning to defendant at scene, but waited until reaching station to elicit a response to the question. Held, this delay “did not deprive defendant of the opportunity to make an informed decision regarding whether or not to take the test,” inasmuch as defendant acknowledged at the time of refusal that he understood “what such refusal entailed,” and any error in waiting to ask the question was therefore harmless. Carthon v. State, 248 Ga.App. 738, 548 S.E.2d 649 (March 23, 2001). The defendant was involved in auto accident, wherein the defendant ran a stop sign and collided with another vehicle. When the officer arrived at the scene, he spoke to the defendant and smelled alcohol, and was told by the defendant that she had consumed one (quart of) beer. The officer proceeded to place the defendant in the back seat of the police car while he assisted with the injured parties in the other vehicle. About 20 to 30 minutes after the police had arrived upon the scene, they turned the vehicle over to the wrecker and transported the defendant to the hospital for testing. At the hospital lab, 45 minutes to an hour after his arrival on the scene, the officer read the defendant implied consent. Held, it was incumbent upon the officer to read the implied consent warning to the defendant before he drove her away from the scene of the collision because she was under arrest when he placed her in the back of the patrol car. Because this was not done, Perano v. State , 250 Ga. 704, 300 S.E.2d 668 (1983)(which holds that implied consent should be read at the time of arrest or at a time as close in