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Kelly v. State, 242 Ga.App. 30, 528 S.E.2d 812 (January 21, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly allowed prosecutor to argue in closing that refusal of implied consent testing “showed that she was conscious of her impairment and guilt. Kelly concedes that the evidence of her refusal to submit to the test is admissible but contends that it only creates an inference that the substance would be present in her blood-not that she is conscious of her impairment or guilt. Thus, Kelly maintains that the State exceeded the scope of permissible argument. We disagree. Attorneys are allowed considerable latitude in making closing argument, and they may draw any inference from the evidence so long as that inference is both reasonable and legitimate. Brooks v. State, 232 Ga.App. 115, 118(11), 501 S.E.2d 286 (1998). Here, Kelly refused to submit to a State-administered test. It is not unreasonable to infer that her refusal stemmed from a fear that the results would be unfavorable – i.e., that she was conscious of her impairment or guilt. Accordingly, this enumeration of error lacks merit. See McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 383-384(3)(b)(1), 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996).” Accord, Taylor (March 10, 2006), above. Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 871, 528 S.E.2d 312 (January 19, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed. “In addition to Vanorsdall's inability to pass several field sobriety tests, the odor of alcohol on his breath, and his bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, the fact that he refused to submit to a blood test ‘is circumstantial evidence of his intoxication.’ Lucas v. State, 234 Ga.App. 534, 535(1), 507 S.E.2d 253 (1998).” See also Johnson v. State , 249 Ga.App. 29, 546 S.E.2d 922 (March 21, 2001) (“Refusal to take the state-administered chemical test was admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication.”); Lucas v. State , 234 Ga.App. 534, 507 S.E.2d 253 (September 25, 1998). Accord, Bowling v. State , 275 Ga.App. 45, 619 S.E.2d 688 (July 26, 2005) (boating under influence case). Walker v. State, 239 Ga.App. 831, 521 S.E.2d 861 (August 27, 1999). Defendant refused state’s request for blood test because she had already told officer she was on an antidepressant prescription drug. Defendant claimed that, plus other manifestations, were insufficient to prove guilt. Held, defendant’s refusal authorized a presumption that she was under the influence of a substance which impaired her driving. See also : O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(d); Mendoza v. State , 196 Ga.App. 627, 629(2); 396 S.E.2d 576 (1990); Brooks v. State , 187 Ga.App. 194(1); 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988) ( but note, Mendoza and Brooks only authorize inference of presence of substance, not impairment ). Miles v. Smith, 239 Ga.App. 641, 521 S.E.2d 687 (August 17, 1999). At administrative license suspension hearing, ALJ could find that defendant’s dilatory tactics amounted to refusal of the implied consent test. Defendant told the officer he’d agree to a breath test but them complained of chest pains when in front of the intox machine. Defendant then agreed to a blood test at the hospital but “when the hospital personnel arrived to take the blood sample, Smith told them that ‘they were not to treat him and were not to take anything out of his body or place anything in his body; and that he refused treatment and requested to be transferred to another hospital.’” “Although Smith never expressly said ‘I refuse to take your test,’ the ALJ was authorized to interpret Smith's actions as an effective refusal, especially since Smith's injuries were minor and his actions could be interpreted as manipulating events to delay the test until he had metabolized the alcohol in his system.” State v. Marks, 239 Ga.App. 448, 521 S.E.2d 257 (July 29, 1999). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress her refusal of implied consent testing. Officer arrested defendant and placed her in back of patrol car with another drunk motorist, who urged defendant to refuse implied consent testing; trial court found that officer “allowed” the other motorist to interfere with defendant’s implied consent decision. Court of Appeals reverses; “ The law does not require an officer to ensure that a DUI suspect be provided an environment free from a non-State actor's ‘bad advice’ when deciding whether to cooperate with a properly administered implied consent notice, especially when that advice does not inure to the State's benefit and especially when the DUI suspect is equally free to ignore such advice. In Allenbrand v. State, 217 Ga.App. 609, 610-611(2), 458 S.E.2d 382 (1995) (rejecting defendant's contention that he was deprived of an opportunity to make an informed choice regarding implied consent because ‘“attorneys in the past had advised him never to take the breath test”’), we specifically rejected the ‘bad advice’ basis for suppressing a refusal to submit to chemical testing; we found that a DUI suspect who acts on non-State-initiated advice demonstrates the exercise of free ‘choice,’ regardless of whether such choice is later deemed to be based upon ‘good advice’ or ‘bad advice.’ Id. at 611, 458 S.E.2d 382.” Hernandez v. State, 238 Ga.App. 796, 520 S.E.2d 798 (June 30, 1999). At defendant’s DUI trial, trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior DUI arrests to impeach defendant’s claim that he didn’t understand the implied consent warning. The arrests “established that he had been given his implied consent warnings on these two prior occasions, because such tests may be administered only after the accused has been given the warnings. OCGA § 40- 5-67.1(b); Long v. State, 185 Ga.App. 277, 278(1), 363 S.E.2d 807 (1987). The trial court was authorized to find that