☢ test - Í

Hernandez opened the door to being questioned on this subject, that the fact that he had submitted to chemical tests after having been given the warnings twice before increased the likelihood that he understood the warnings on this occasion, and that the probative value of the elicited testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We find no abuse of discretion. There is no merit in Hernandez's complaint that certified copies of his DUI convictions should have been admitted. This amounts to a best evidence objection, which was not raised at trial and was therefore waived. Moret v. State, 246 Ga. 5, 6(3), 268 S.E.2d 635 (1980). Moreover, the State was seeking to impeach Hernandez with evidence concerning the circumstances of his arrest, not his criminal conviction. Therefore, the State was not required to prove the conviction, by introducing a certified copy or otherwise. See Wadsworth v. State, 209 Ga.App. 333, 334(5), 433 S.E.2d 419 (1993); compare Hood v. State, 179 Ga.App. 387, 389(1), 346 S.E.2d 867 (1986). Nelson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 620, 516 S.E.2d 98 (April 12, 1999). Refusal to submit to a drug test may be considered as positive evidence creating an inference that the test would show the presence of the prohibited substance. Quoting from Brooks v. State , 187 Ga.App. 194, 195, 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988). Komala v. State, 237 Ga.App. 236, 515 S.E.2d 185 (March 22, 1999). “Unless encumbered by a physical or medical limitation, a person submitting to the breathalyzer test may be considered to have refused to comply if an adequate breath sample has not been provided. Komala produced no evidence at any time that she had any physical or medical difficulties which prevented her from providing adequate breath samples. ‘However, the arresting officer ... testified unequivocally that [Komala] failed ... to provide adequate breath samples and that the instrument did not produce a printed alcohol concentration analysis, which was objective evidence of [her] refusal.’ Allen v. State, 229 Ga.App. 435, 437(1), 494 S.E.2d 229 (1997). As such, Komala’s failure to provide an adequate breath sample was properly considered a refusal, and the instructions given by the trial court regarding the evidentiary ramifications of such a refusal were both proper and warranted.” Accord, Komala (November 21, 2000), above. Miles v. State, 236 Ga.App. 632, 513 S.E.2d 39 (February 23, 1999). DUI conviction affirmed; defendant’s silence when asked to submit to state test was properly admitted in evidence. “‘A defendant's refusal to permit a chemical analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of his arrest is admissible in evidence against him in any criminal trial.’ Moore v. State, 217 Ga.App. 536, 537(1), 458 S.E.2d 479 (1995). Each defendant who receives the implied consent warning is informed of this fact. OCGA § 40–5–67.1(b). We see no reason, in the circumstances of this case, why silence in the face of a request to take such a test should be treated any differently than a refusal. Allen v. State, 229 Ga.App. 435, 437–438(1), 494 S.E.2d 229 (1997) ( A ‘non-verbal refusal’ to take a breath test is admissible). ‘[T]he choice afforded a suspect under the Implied Consent Statute does not rise to the level of constitutional self-incrimination.’ State v. Highsmith, 190 Ga.App. 838, 839, 380 S.E.2d 272 (1989); accord Buchnowski v. State, 233 Ga.App. 766, 768(2), 505 S.E.2d 263 (1998).” Accord, Fairbanks (May 8, 2000), above. Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 515 S.E.2d 397 (February 2, 1999). “[A]lthough Aldridge agreed to take an alco- sensor test, and passed it, he declined to take a urine test. The jury was authorized to infer from this that a urine test would reveal the presence of methamphetamine or marijuana in Aldridge’s system,” especially given that those substances were found in the vehicle. Albert v. State, 236 Ga.App. 146, 511 S.E.2d 244 (January 28, 1999). “It is well established that ‘refusal to submit to a [blood or urine] test itself may be considered as positive evidence creating an inference that the test would show the presence of the prohibited substance. OCGA § 40-6-392(c).’ (Punctuation omitted.) Mendoza v. State, 196 Ga.App. 627, 629(2), 396 S.E.2d 576 (1990); Bartnick v. State, 203 Ga.App. 369, 416 S.E.2d 739 (1992); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga.App. 194, 369 S.E.2d 801 (1988).” 23. RESULTS, USE OF – OTHER CHARGES Gentry v. State, 236 Ga.App. 820, 513 S.E.2d 528 (March 8, 1999). “[T]he trial court correctly ruled that Gentry’s consent to the testing done pursuant to the implied consent notice did not constitute additional consent for the State to test his blood and urine for the purpose of establishing evidence to support a criminal prosecution for possession of cocaine. State v. Lewis, 233 Ga.App. 390, 393, 504 S.E.2d 242 (1998).” Accord, Turpin v. Helmeci , 271 Ga. 224, 518 S.E.2d 887 (June 14, 1999) (counsel’s failure to seek suppression of implied consent results used as sole evidence of drug possession constituted ineffective assistance). Cronan v. State, 236 Ga.App. 374, 511 S.E.2d 899 (February 9, 1999). Results of implied consent testing could not form “the basis” of charge of possession of marijuana, but could be used “to corroborate the independent evidence of