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Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state or the United States.” Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (March 22, 2005). State can’t obtain blood sample by search warrant in face of defendant’s implied consent refusal. Based on Collier. 27. SERIOUS INJURY ACCIDENT, WHAT CONSTITUTES Fowler v. State, 294 Ga.App. 864, 670 S.E.2d 448 (November 4, 2008). Defendant’s fractured jaw rendered accident a “serious injury accident,” so reading of implied consent prior to arrest was timely. Snyder v. State, 283 Ga. 211, 657 S.E.2d 834 (February 25, 2008). 1. Serious injury can be to anyone, not just the driver/defendant . “OCGA § 40-5-55(a) contains no such words of limitation; rather, the statute’s lack of limitation in this regard authorizes the chemical testing of the bodily substances of a driver involved in a traffic accident in which the driver suffers a serious injury ( State v. Umbach, 284 Ga.App. 240 (643 S.E.2d 758) (2007); the driver’s passenger dies or suffers a serious injury ( Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga.App. 739 (644 S.E.2d 878) (2007); a person in another vehicle dies or suffers a serious injury (see Ellis v. State, 275 Ga.App. 881 (622 S.E.2d 89) (2005)); a pedestrian is seriously injured ( Stevenson v. State, 264 Ga. 892 (453 S.E.2d 18) (1995)); or a person rendering aid to persons injured in a traffic accident dies or suffers a serious injury. See McGrath v. State, 277 Ga.App. 825 (627 S.E.2d 866) (2006). The broad language of § 40-5-55(a) regarding who may suffer the serious injury or fatality that will trigger a request for chemical testing of the driver’s bodily substances is in keeping with the legislative declaration contained in the statute that it is the general public whose welfare and safety is directly and immediately threatened by any person who drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” 2. Contrary to State’s position, serious injury in question must be known to the officer requesting the test at the time the request is made. “We read § 40-5-67.1(a) as providing the temporal connection not expressly set forth in § 40-5-55(a) and hold that an officer’s request for testing is legally viable under the second contingency only if, at the time of the request, the driver has been involved in a traffic accident that has resulted in serious injuries or fatalities of which law enforcement is aware. This is in keeping with the statutory definition of the phrase ‘traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities’ found in OCGA § 40-5-55(c): ‘any motor vehicle accident in which a person was killed or in which one or more persons suffered a fracture bone, severe burns, disfigurement, dismemberment, partial or total loss of sight or hearing, or loss of consciousness.’ The statutory definition speaks in the past tense and lists injuries of which investigating law enforcement officers can gain knowledge by means of their own perceptions and the reports to the officers of persons involved in the accident, witnesses, and treating medical personnel. See Cunningham v. State, supra, 284 Ga.App. 739 (investigating officer quickly ascertained accident had resulted in two fatalities and requested chemical testing of driver at hospital); State v. Umbach, supra, 284 Ga.App. 240 (driver who lost consciousness at scene informed by officer requesting chemical testing at hospital that driver had serious injury due to loss of consciousness); Lewis v. State, 215 Ga.App. 796 (452 S.E.2d 228) (1994) (responding officers saw disfigurement to passenger’s leg, a 12-inch ‘knot’ on passenger’s hip, and driver’s swollen ankle). See also Hill v. State, 208 Ga.App. 714 (431 S.E.2d 471) (1993) (officer entitled to rely on nurse’s report that driver was ‘out of it’ and request testing to be done on driver he believed was unconscious under § 40-5-55(b)).” Reversing 284 Ga.App. 350, 643 S.E.2d 861 (March 20, 2007). Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga.App. 739, 644 S.E.2d 878 (March 30, 2007). Implied consent testing was properly admitted after accident resulting in death and serious injuries. Although officer did not have probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence at the time he requested the testing, he later developed it when he looked inside defendant’s purse to find defendant’s identification and insurance information, and found evidence of cocaine and other drug use. Held, test results were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. “Trooper Henry testified that at the time he discovered the items in Cunningham’s purse, the blood and urine samples had not yet been obtained. Under the particular circumstances here, we agree that it was inevitable that Trooper Henry would look in Cunningham’s purse during the course of his investigation. The items he found there, coupled with the other information he had concerning the nature and cause of the crash, provided sufficient probable cause for Henry to believe that Cunningham was driving under the influence.” First application of inevitable discovery doctrine to implied consent testing. Probably doesn’t work except in serious injury accident context, since otherwise any subsequently-discovered evidence would likely be the product of a wrongful arrest (unless the arrest was justified by an additional charge). Unclear whether same result is reached if blood/urine samples had been drawn before officer found the drug evidence. State v. Umbach, 284 Ga.App. 240, 643 S.E.2d 758 (February 22, 2007). “[T]he evidence is that Umbach lost consciousness for some period of time as a result of his injuries, which satisfies the statutory criteria for ‘a traffic accident