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resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.’ See [ Hough v. State , 279 Ga. 711, 715(1)(b) n.2 (620 S.E.2d 380) (2005)] (driver in single-car wreck who was ‘momentarily knock[ed] ... unconscious’ was held to be involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injury).” Jenkins v. State, 282 Ga.App. 106, 637 S.E.2d 818 (October 25, 2006). Victim’s broken kneecap made the accident a “serious injury accident” although the extent of the injury was only “later discovered.” “According to the officer’s observations, the victim ‘appeared to be injured.’” Because of the “serious injury” and the fact that the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). “[N]othing in OCGA § 40-5-55 requires a DUI suspect to be arrested in order to trigger his or her implied consent to testing following a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.” Hough’s conviction, following a serious injury accident, is therefore upheld. However, companion case defendant Handschuh’s conviction was properly reversed by the Court of Appeals, because Handschuh’s accident did not meet the strict definition of a “serious injury accident” found in OCGA § 40-5-55(c). “[A] suspect who is not involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities must be under arrest before implied consent rights are read to him.” “Here, there is no question that Handschuh was not arrested until six days after the day he was read his implied consent rights. Thus, the reading of Handschuh’s implied consent rights was in no way contemporaneous to his arrest for DUI. As such, we must agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred by denying Handschuh’s motion to suppress. However, we must disapprove of the Court of Appeals decision to the extent that it, in turn, disapproves of its decision in Hough v. State and other decisions which are not inconsistent with our rulings today.” Accord, Ellis v. State , 275 Ga.App. 881, 622 S.E.2d 89 (October 17, 2005); Hannah v. State , 280 Ga.App. 230, 633 S.E.2d 800 (June 30, 2006) (no arrest required where defendant involved in serious injury accident, officer has probable cause to believe defendant may have committed DUI). Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (March 22, 2005). “Whether fractured bones constitute serious disfigurement will depend on the specific facts of the case (See, e.g., Pollard v. State, 230 Ga.App. 159, 160(1) (495 S.E.2d 629) (1998) (jury could reasonably find fractured nose constituted serious disfigurement)), and the state is not required to allege all of those facts in the indictment. [Cits.]” Handschuh v. State, 270 Ga.App. 676, 607 S.E.2d 899 (December 1, 2004). Officer could not proceed under OCGA § 40- 5-55 where accident didn’t actually result in a serious injury, notwithstanding officer’s reasonable belief that defendant was seriously injured (based on defendant’s declarations that he was an organ donor, requests to tell his parents he loved them, and reports to EMTs that he couldn’t feel his lower extremities). Affirmed, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Hough v. State, 269 Ga.App. 744, 605 S.E.2d 43 (September 3, 2004). “An arrest or serious injury are alternative conditions precedent to seeking a chemical test pursuant to Implied Consent laws where reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(DUI) are also present. Here, … the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Hough was DUI in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) and Hough was involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injury. Under these circumstances, an arrest is not also required by OCGA § 40-5-67.1 for the administration of chemical testing per Implied Consent law” (emphasis in Court of Appeals decision). Affirmed, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (October 3, 2005). Accord, Ellis v. State , 275 Ga.App. 881, 622 S.E.2d 89 (October 17, 2005); Hannah v. State , 280 Ga.App. 230, 633 S.E.2d 800 (June 30, 2006) (no arrest required where defendant involved in serious injury accident, officer has probable cause to believe defendant may have committed DUI). Oliver v. State, 268 Ga.App. 290, 601 S.E.2d 774 (July 1, 2004). “In this case, Oliver was suspected of violating OCGA § 40-6-391 the first time his implied consent rights were read to him and under arrest for such violation the second time his rights were read. Implied consent warnings were not administered solely pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-55, as in Cooper, and, at the time that a test was conducted of Oliver’s blood, probable cause that he had been driving under the influence was established. As such, Cooper does not control the case at hand. For the same reason, Buchanan v. State [November 13, 2003, below] may also be distinguished from the case at hand.” Buchanan v. State, 264 Ga.App. 148, 589 S.E.2d 876 (November 14, 2003). Based on Cooper (see below), trial court should have suppressed implied consent results obtained pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-55, even though probable cause to arrest for DUI was present (“[t]he officer noticed that Buchanan was incoherent, had red, bloodshot eyes and slurred