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speech, and was unsteady on his feet.” Defendant “had been seen weaving, changing speeds erratically, and running a red light just before his truck veered off the road into the culvert.”). Officer told defendant that “‘due to the fact that he had been in an accident where I thought there might be serious injuries involved, I needed to draw blood,” thus, in light of Cooper , unintentionally misstating the law. Reversed and remanded. Distinguished in Oliver (July 1, 2004), above. Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (October 6, 2003). Trooper took blood samples from both drivers in serious-injury accident because he thought law required him to; he had no suspicion that defendant committed any violation. Held, trial court should have suppressed test results. “[T]o the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions.” Purpose of statute is primarily the gathering of evidence for criminal prosecution; hence, no “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment applies, distinguishing this case from Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association , 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ( railway employees can be blood tested after accidents due to government’s interest in regulating their behavior) and Adams v. State , 269 Ga. 405, 498 S.E.2d 268 (1998) (state has special need to test some criminals for HIV to protect crime victims). Accord, Ferguson v. State , 277 Ga. 530, 590 S.E.2d 728 (November 17, 2003). Distinguished in Oliver (July 1, 2004), above. Pilkenton v. State, 254 Ga.App. 127, 561 S.E.2d 462 (March 6, 2002). Officer responded to two-car accident, finding both drivers injured. Other driver had “visible bleeding” and was treated by paramedics and taken to hospital via ambulance. Defendant complained of pain in wrist and the officer read her implied consent notice and advised her that because of the serious injuries involved she was required to submit to a blood test. The officer drove Defendant to a hospital where she submitted to having her blood drawn. She also received one stitch to her thumb and was treated for a sprained ankle but received no treatment for any wrist injury. The record presents no evidence that anyone suffered a fractured bone, although the officer believed Defendant’s wrist might be broken based on her complaints. Nor was there any evidence that either driver suffered “disfigurement.” Held, because there is insufficient evidence that Defendant or the other driver suffered a serious injury so as to invoke implied consent to the tests under OCGA § 40-5-55(a), the trial court erred in failing to suppress the test results. Joiner v. State, 239 Ga.App. 843, 522 S.E.2d 25 (August 11, 1999). Defendant had been driving the car that ran over, and killed, the victim. Because defendant, when officers arrived on the scene, was “very emotional ... yelling ... screaming ... and trying to run to [the victim]”, defendant was read Miranda rights, handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a patrol car so that officers could investigate the scene. According to the testimony of at least one officer, defendant was not under arrest. Defendant was eventually taken to the sheriff’s department. After his on-site investigation, one of the officers met with Defendant at the sheriff’s department and gave her implied consent notice, as well as another Miranda warning, because defendant had been involved in a serious collision which caused a fatality. See OCGA §§ 40-5- 55(a); 40-5-67.1. Defendant was taken to a hospital and given a blood test, not requesting or receiving an independent blood alcohol test, and released without being booked and without bond. Five months later, defendant was arrested for DUI and vehicular homicide. Held, defendant erroneously relied on untimely reading of implied consent under OCGA § 40-6-392(a), which calls for such notice at time of arrest for DUI , because the evidence shows Defendant received implied consent notice and a blood test before her arrest for DUI and the statute does not apply to situations where the notice and test precede a DUI arrest. Held, under OCGA §§ 40-5-55 and 40-5-67.1, the required timing of the implied consent notice for a person driving a vehicle and being involved in a traffic incident resulting in serious injuries or a fatality, and who is not arrested at that time for a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, is as follows: (a) law enforcement officers must administer chemical tests for alcohol and drugs as soon as possible , and (b) the implied consent notice must be given at the time such test is requested , which may or may not be at the time of actual testing. (Emphases in original). 28. TEST – TIMING See subheading PER SE, below 29. “TWENTY-MINUTE RULE” State v. Palmaka, 266 Ga.App. 595, 597 S.E.2d 630 (March 26, 2004). Unanimous whole court opinion. Since “‘administrative, procedural, and/or clerical steps performed in conducting a test shall not constitute a part of the approved method of analysis,’ Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 92-3-.06(12)(b),” trial court erred in suppressing Intox test results based on violation of “twenty minute rule” after invalid first test. “Any deviation from the operator’s manual goes to the weight to be given the test results and not to their admissibility. [Cits.]” Overrules Casey v. State , 240 Ga.App. 329, 523 S.E.2d 395 (1999).