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the right.’ Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433, 434(1)(a) & n. 1 (330 S.E.2d 588) (1985).” OCGA § 40-5-67.1(d.1) “is not merely a procedural or evidentiary change, but one eliminating a defendant's substantive right to refuse to submit to testing.” Strong overruled by Williams v. State , 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (March 27, 2015) to the extent Strong holds that dissipating blood alcohol is always an exigent circumstance justifying nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in DUI cases. State v. Morgan, 289 Ga.App. 706, 658 S.E.2d 237 (February 22, 2008). In defendant’s vehicular homicide prosecution, trial court properly suppressed results of state administered blood test, done by consent without reading of implied consent. Officer testified that he didn’t read implied consent because he didn’t have probable cause for arrest, so he simply asked for consent. “We do not condone such conduct. Were we to do so, we would effectively eviscerate the implied consent statute. If, under State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316, 316-317, 612 S.E.2d 281 (2005) (test results suppressed where DUI suspect was given implied consent warning and refused test, then police threatened to obtain a search warrant and forcibly obtain blood sample if suspect did not consent), an officer is prohibited from obtaining a search warrant to require a blood test from a DUI suspect following his refusal, it follows that an officer is not permitted to circumvent the implied consent statute by merely requesting consent without giving any implied consent notice or warning. … We will not permit or encourage the circumvention of the mandatory implied consent statute by police. Therefore, we hold that in all cases in which police officers request a chemical test of a person’s blood, urine or other bodily substances in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle for the purpose of determining whether the driver was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, they must give the notice required by the implied consent statute.” Makes no reference to OCGA § 40-5-67.1(d.1) (making voluntary tests admissible), effective July 1, 2006; opinion does not disclose date of offense. Harrelson v. State, 287 Ga.App. 664, 653 S.E.2d 98 (September 27, 2007). At defendant’s trial for vehicular homicide, trial court erred in admitting into evidence results of state tests of defendant’s blood and urine where samples were given by consent but the statutory implied consent warning was never read. “‘Ordinarily, a person is presumed to know the law and his rights secured thereby. But where the statute itself provides that a person ‘shall’ be advised of his rights under the law, the legislature obviously meant to abrogate this presumption and replace it with the requirement that notice be given. Thus, it was necessary, under this statute, for the [requesting] officer to notify [Harrelson] of his right to have an additional test made and that this right be made known to [him] ... In the absence of the advice, the [blood] test results are inadmissible.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) [ State v. Peters, 211 Ga.App. 755, 756 (440 S.E.2d 515) (1994).]” Note, incident here occurred in 2005; OCGA § 40-5-67.1 amended effective July 1, 2006 by Ga. L 2006, Act 545, by adding new subsection (d.1): “Nothing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state or the United States.” L. JURY CHARGE See also JURIES AND JURORS – CHARGE, below 1. ACCIDENT Rutland v. State, A06A2374, 282 Ga.App. 728, 639 S.E.2d 628 (December 5, 2006). Trial court properly refused defendant’s request to charge on accident in her prosecution for DUI and reckless driving. “It is firmly established that a defendant charged with DUI is not entitled to a jury instruction on accident or misfortune based on the claim that a traffic mishap that occurred while he was operating the motor vehicle was unavoidable, because a DUI charge relates not to the accident but to the defendant’s condition while driving. Stefanell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 412, 413 (587 S.E.2d 868) (2003); compare Moore v. State, 258 Ga.App. 293, 294(1) (574 S.E.2d 372) (2002) (jury instruction on accident or misfortune approved in vehicular homicide/DUI cases, if there is evidence that defendant could not have avoided collision due to circumstances beyond his control). For the same reasons, the defense of accident has been held inapplicable to a charge of reckless driving. Winston v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 670(5) (607 S.E.2d 147) (2004).” Accord, Davis v. State , 301 Ga.App. 484, 687 S.E.2d 854 (November 13, 2009). 2. ALCO-SENSOR Hatcher v. State, 277 Ga.App. 611, 627 S.E.2d 175 (February 14, 2006). No error by trial court here: charge that roadside alco-sensor can’t be used to establish alcohol level was not required where State made no effort to introduce any alco- sensor evidence other than positive result. Charge that positive alco-sensor alone is insufficient was not required where trial court thoroughly charged on State’s burden to prove that alcohol impaired defendant’s “manner of driving or ability to drive.”