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3. CHEMICAL TESTS Thrasher v. State, 292 Ga.App. 566, 666 S.E.2d 28 (June 18, 2008). “‘Breath alcohol measuring equipment approved by the State Crime Lab is considered accurate if properly operated. No more than two sequential series of a total of two adequate breath samples each shall be requested of the State.’ … [T]his Court has previously ruled that the first sentence of the challenged instruction is a correct statement of the law. Johnson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 215, 216 (498 S.E.2d 778) (1998). Further, the second sentence of the instruction is consistent with the language of OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(1)(B).” Muir v. State, 248 Ga.App. 49, 545 S.E.2d 176 (February 14, 2001). At trial, the defendant used as a defense (by way of an expert witness), that women score higher than men on the Intox 5000 machine because it is calibrated to a man’s physiological factors. Held, the trial court erred in charging that a chemical analysis of a person’s blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance shall be considered valid if the analysis was performed according to approved methods . This charge nullified the defendant’s defense because it mandated that the jury find valid the test results showing that her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. Distinguishes Johnson v. State , 231 Ga.App. 215, 498 S.E.2d 778 (1998), where following charge was approved: “I charge you that breath alcohol measuring equipment approved by the State Crime Lab is considered accurate if properly operated.” Accord, Bailey v. State , 323 Ga.App. 424, 747 S.E.2d 210 (July 26, 2013). Haynes v. State, 244 Ga.App. 79, 534 S.E.2d 807 (May 18, 2000). Trial court erred in giving this charge to the jury: “I charge you the mere fact that the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine has some margin of error or may give an erroneous result under certain circumstances does not diminish the evidentiary value of the test results.” While this is a correct statement of law, it is up to the jury to decide what evidentiary value to give any particular evidence. The language employed by a judge of a reviewing court in discussing a case, or in giving reasons for a decision[,] is not always appropriate for use by a trial judge in charging a jury. Error was harmless, however, because the court twice correctly charged the jury, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Margin of error in Intoxilyzer goes to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. 4. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Taylor v. State, 278 Ga.App. 181, 628 S.E.2d 611 (March 10, 2006). Defendant’s DUI conviction reversed based on trial court’s failure to give defendant’s requested jury charge on circumstantial evidence. “In a DUI case, ‘the opinion testimony of a trained officer based upon his observation of an accused that the accused was impaired and a less safe driver ... is direct evidence. But the evidence upon which the officer’s opinion is based must be characterized as circumstantial. Failing field sobriety tests, for instance, may be caused by illness or handicap; the odor of alcohol about one’s person may derive from alcohol inadvertently spilled on one’s clothing by another. This evidence is certainly admissible and sometimes sufficient. It is nevertheless circumstantial in nature.’ Waits v. State, 232 Ga.App. 357, 359(2) (501 S.E.2d 870) (1998).” 5. FIELD SOBRIETY EVALUATIONS Duprel v. State, 301 Ga.App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (November 19, 2009). At defendant’s DUI trial, following charge was not burden shifting: “[i]f in this case you find from the evidence that the arresting officer erred in the administration or interpretation of the field sobriety evaluations, that evidence is to be received by you, members of the jury, and given only such weight as you think it is properly entitle [sic] to receive in your considerations.” Citing Howell (March 24, 2004), below. Howell v. State, 266 Ga.App. 480, 597 S.E.2d 546 (March 24, 2004). No error in charging the jury as follows: “‘Field sobriety evaluations, as with any other form of evaluation, may be subject to human error in their administration or interpretation, and the burden of showing such errors rests with the party who is challenging the weight of said evidence.’” This was not burden shifting because the instruction “did not relate to any element of the crime. It was merely an application of the principle, as contained in OCGA § 24-4-1, that the burden of proving a fact generally lies upon the party who is asserting it.” Accord, Duprel (November 19, 2009), above . Pinch v. State, 265 Ga.App. 1, 593 S.E.2d 1 (December 2, 2003). Field sobriety evaluations were enough to justify jury charge that “‘in deciding this issue [of] whether the defendant was a less safe driver … you may consider whether any test indicated the presence of alcohol in the defendant’s system,’” without any chemical tests. Notwithstanding that field sobriety evaluations aren’t tests, either, according to other case law, see, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga.App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996).