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6. GENERALLY Keller v. State, 271 Ga.App. 79, 608 S.E.2d 697 (December 1, 2004). No error where jury charge referred to “intoxicants” in one portion, where “the charge as a whole repeatedly refers to alcohol or drinking” on defendant’s charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. “‘We do not evaluate jury charges in isolation, but rather consider them as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a challenged instruction.’ [Cit.]” Marryott v. State, 263 Ga.App. 65, 587 S.E.2d 217 (September 4, 2003). Suggests, without deciding, that it is error to charge the jury on “being in actual physical control” of vehicle where accusation alleges “driving.” Colon v. State, 256 Ga.App. 505, 568 S.E.2d 811 (July 12, 2002). Trial court committed reversible error by charging jury that involuntary intoxication is not a defense to DUI. Muir v. State, 248 Ga.App. 49, 545 S.E.2d 176 (February 14, 2001). At trial on her DUI, the defendant used as a defense (by way of an expert witness), that women score higher than men on the Intox 5000 machine because it is calibrated to a man’s physiological factors. Held, the trial court erred in charging that a chemical analysis of a person’s blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance shall be considered valid if the analysis was performed according to approved methods. This charge nullified the defendant’s defense because it mandated that the jury find valid the test results showing that her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. Distinguishes Johnson v. State , 231 Ga.App. 215, 498 S.E.2d 778 (1998), where following charge was approved: “I charge you that breath alcohol measuring equipment approved by the State Crime Lab is considered accurate if properly operated.” 7. HGN Johnson v. State, 323 Ga.App. 65, 744 S.E.2d 921 (July 3, 2013). DUI and improper lane change convictions affirmed; no error in jury charge on HGN evidence: “[t]he [HGN] test about which you heard testimony is based on well-known and medically accepted principles that nystagmus can be caused by ingestion of alcohol. The HGN ... test is an accepted, common procedure that has reached a state [of] verifiable certainty in the scientific community and is admissible as a basis upon which an officer can determine whether a driver was impaired by alcohol. You may consider the [HGN] evaluation as a symptom indicative of, but not determinative of the presence of alcohol. In other words, the presence of alcohol is just one factor that might cause [HGN] to occur. The HGN evaluation of a subject, suspect may be subject to human error in its administration or interpretation. The jury must decide what weight, if any, to give the HGN evaluation. The other field sobriety evaluations about which you heard testimony, such as the one-legged stand and walk-and-turn tests, are not scientific tests but are simply observations of the driver's behavior by the officer. In considering the evidence, you should consider all the factors surrounding the administration of such exercises.” Kuehne v. State, 274 Ga.App. 668, 618 S.E.2d 702 (July 27, 2005). “The record shows that the trial court charged the jury: ‘[T]he HGN test is based on the well known and medically accepted principle that nystagmus can be caused by the ingestion of alcohol. The HGN test is an accepted, common procedure that has reached a state of verifiable certainty in the scientific community and is admissible as a basis upon which an officer can determine that a driver was impaired by alcohol.’ We have indicated the propriety of this charge in earlier cases. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 252 Ga.App. 695, 704(4) (556 S.E.2d 892) (2001).” Accord, Mullady v. State , 270 Ga.App. 444, 606 S.E.2d 645 (November 15, 2004); Duncan v. State , 305 Ga.App. 268, 699 S.E.2d 341 (June 28, 2010). Wrigley v. State, 248 Ga.App. 387, 546 S.E.2d 794 (March 2, 2001). Jury instruction on HGN test containing language that nystagmus could be caused by ingestion of alcohol and that the test had reached a state of “verifiable certainty” in the scientific community did not give HGN evidence undue weight, in prosecution for driving under the influence. Citing Waits v. State , 232 Ga.App. 357, 501 S.E.2d 870 (1998) and Hawkins v. State , 223 Ga.App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996). 8. IMPLIED CONSENT Jones v. State, 273 Ga.App. 192, 614 S.E.2d 820 (May 6, 2005). “Jones complains that the court instructed the jury from the Implied Consent statute (OCGA § 40-5-55(a)) that the State of Georgia considers that persons who are under the influence of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle constitute a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and safety of the general public, and that therefore all drivers are deemed under specified circumstances to have given consent to certain chemical tests. Citing Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291, 293-294(5) (519 S.E.2d 206) (1999), Jones argues that jury charges should not include language used by appellate courts to explain the rationale of a legal principle. Noting that this language comes from the statute itself, not from an appellate court opinion, we have twice rejected this same argument and have