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held that this very jury instruction is proper. Brantley v. State; 199 Ga.App. 623, 626(8) (405 S.E.2d 533) (1991); Trotter v. State. 179 Ga.App. 314, 315(2) (346 S.E.2d 390) (1986). We see no reason to overrule these binding cases.” Haynes v. State , 244 Ga.App. 79, 534 S.E.2d 807 (May 18, 2000). DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in jury charge on reliability of breathalyzer: “the trial court instructed the jury that the breathalyzer machine's margin for error ‘did not diminish the evidentiary value of the test results.’ While this analysis may be appropriate when considering whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a DUI conviction, it is not an appropriate jury charge.” Harmless, however, in light of charge as a whole and evidence of defendant’s 0.20 blood alcohol content. Additional charges given by trial court: “[T]he reliability and performance of any given breathalyzer machine [are] subject to challenge. If there is any evidence that a particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed to operate so as to produce unreliable results, such evidence is relevant to the weight you should accord the test results.... I charge you that an accused may always introduce evidence of the possibility of error or circumstances that might have caused the State's breath-testing machine to malfunction. Such evidence goes to the weight of the breathalyzer results.” 9. INTENT Myers v. State, 302 Ga.App. 753, 691 S.E.2d 650 (March 9, 2010). DUI conviction affirmed; jury charge on intent was correct: “‘I charge you, ladies and gentlemen, that driving under the influence and driving on the wrong side of the road are crimes malum prohibitum, the criminal intent element of which is simply the intent to do the act which results in the violation of the law, not the intent to commit the crime itself. Consequently, to the extent that the defendant here argues inability to form an intent to commit the crime for which she is charged, it is immaterial, which means it should not be considered. While proof of criminal intent is required to convict the defendant of the crimes with which she is prosecuted, the [s]tate is not required to prove that the defendant intended to drive under the influence of alcohol in violation of the law or on the wrong side of the road, rather, it is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that while intoxicated she drove and drove crossing over ... the right line, intending such acts.’ The charge given by the court is aligned with our holding in Crossley v. State, 261 Ga.App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (2003), wherein we rejected the defendant's argument that he lacked the intent to drive under the influence or to drive recklessly because he ‘blacked out’ and did not remember the attendant circumstances of the blackout but nevertheless conducted himself normally when talking with police. Id. at 251- 252, 582 S.E.2d 204. … Similarly, in Larsen v. State, 253 Ga.App. 196, 558 S.E.2d 418 (2001), we found the evidence sufficient to support the defendant's DUI conviction where she argued that she had no intent to drive and remembered nothing between the time she took her bedtime medication and realized she was handcuffed in the back of a police car. [fn] Here, as in the cases cited above, the evidence is undisputed that Myers intentionally ingested alcohol, Xanax, and Ambien, and then drove in an intoxicated state and failed to maintain her lane.” Cornwell v. State, 283 Ga. 247, 657 S.E.2d 195 (January 28, 2008). “Cornwell asserts that the trial court erred in its jury charge on driving under the influence. Specifically, he argues that the trial court instructed the jury that driving under the influence is a ‘strict liability’ offense for which the State is not required to prove intent. Contrary to this assertion, however, the record reveals that ‘[i]n addition to charging the jury on strict liability, the court instructed the jury that the defendant is not presumed to have acted with criminal intent, but that the jury may find such intention or the absence of it upon a consideration of words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and other circumstances connected with the acts for which the defendant is being tried. The court added that criminal intent must be proved by the state in every prosecution, and that criminal intent does not mean an intention to violate the law or to violate a penal statute, but simply means to intend to commit the act which is prohibited by statute. These were correct statements of the law. Viewed in its entirety, the court’s charge on criminal intent was sufficient to inform the jury that it had to find that [Cornwell] intended to evade the duty imposed by [OCGA § 40-6-391], and that it had to find that he knowingly drove [while under the influence].’ (Footnotes omitted.) Augustin v. State, 260 Ga.App. 631, 634(2) (580 S.E.2d 640) (2003).” Crossley v. State, 261 Ga.App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (May 13, 2003). “[D]riving under the influence and reckless driving are crimes malum prohibitum , the criminal intent element of which ‘is simply the intention to do the act which results in the violation of the law, not the intent to commit the crime itself.’…[I]t was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that while intoxicated, he drove and drove crossing over the center and side lines of the roadway, intending such acts.” Prine v. State, 237 Ga.App. 679, 515 S.E.2d 425 (April 1, 1999). Trial court’s jury charge on intent was correct as it related to defendant’s prosecution for DUI. “Prine contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that ‘intent’ is an essential element of any crime and that the State has the burden of proving ‘intent’ beyond a reasonable