☢ test - Í

doubt. We disagree. DUI is a crime of general, not specific, intent. Tam v. State, 232 Ga.App. 15, 501 S.E.2d 51 (1998). In a crime of general intent, the ‘intent’ required is proved through proof of the commission of the act itself. In a DUI case such as the one charged herein, the act consists of (1) driving, (2) after consuming alcohol to the extent that one is (3) a less safe driver. OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1). There is no proof of intent beyond proof of the act. ‘To prove DUI, the State need not prove intent to commit the crime[,] but it must show the condition of being under the influence of alcohol to the extent of impairment and the intent to drive while in this condition. This general intent may be inferred from the conduct of the accused and other circumstances. OCGA § 16-2-6.’ Tam v. State, supra at 15(1), 501 S.E.2d 51. Since the trial court in this case charged the jury that the State must prove the commission of the act or offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also charged the jury regarding the law of general intent pursuant to OCGA §§ 16-2-5 and 16-2-6, such is sufficient to encompass the notion that ‘general intent’ must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, ‘we find nothing in the transcript to support [defendant’s] contention that the jury could not, or did not, understand the charge on intent as applied to [DUI].’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fowler v. State, 188 Ga.App. 873, 374 S.E.2d 805 (1988).” 10. LESS SAFE DRIVER McWilliams v. State, 287 Ga.App. 585, 651 S.E.2d 849 (September 18, 2007). Trial court’s jury instructions using the terms “drunk” and “sober” were not error: “The State will have met its burden as to the defendant’s criminal intent if you should find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to operate the vehicle at such time that he was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was less safe to do so than he would have been if sober.” “McWilliams … argues that the trial court’s use of the term ‘sober’ in part of its charge on criminal intent was confusing in that it suggested that the jury should find him guilty based on his consumption of any amount of an alcoholic beverage whatsoever. However, sober means simply that one is not under the influence of intoxicants, whether because one has ingested no intoxicants or because the amount of intoxicants ingested is so moderate that one is not influenced by them. [fn] Thus, the trial court was correct in its instruction that the impairment required by the statute is that McWilliams had to have been under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was less safe to drive than he would have been if sober, i.e., uninfluenced by intoxicants. There is no reason to speculate that this instruction led the jury to believe that it could convict McWilliams based on his consumption of any amount of an alcoholic beverage.” Also upholds charge identical to one in Shelton (February 3, 1999), below. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 426, 602 S.E.2d 177 (July 9, 2004). Not error, or violation of Equal Protection, for trial court to charge jury using “less safe driver” language of statute rather than “incapable of driving safely” language found to be equivalent in Kachwalla . Frazier v. State, 267 Ga.App. 682, 601 S.E.2d 145 (June 4, 2004). Not error to charge the jury on both DUI – less safe and DUI – per se, where he was only indicted for per se DUI, because “the evidence presented at trial would not have led the jury to find Frazier guilty of committing a crime in any manner other than the manner in which he was charged. ” Pinch v. State, 265 Ga.App. 1, 593 S.E.2d 1 (December 2, 2003). Field sobriety evaluations were enough to justify jury charge that “‘in deciding this issue [of] whether the defendant was a less safe driver … you may consider whether any test indicated the presence of alcohol in the defendant’s system,’” without any chemical tests. Notwithstanding that field sobriety evaluations aren’t tests, either, according to other case law, see, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga.App. 34, 476 S.E.2d 803 (1996). Anderson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 606, 580 S.E.2d 249 (February 25, 2003). Jury charge on inference of intoxication based on BAC level was not burden-shifting so long as it “contained language reaffirming that it was within the jury’s discretion” whether to find the defendant to be a less safe driver. ( Cf, Stepic v. State , 226 Ga.App. 734, 487 S.E.2d 643 (1997), where charge said “shall be inferred.”) Compare Davis (January 14, 1999), below. Shelton v. State, 236 Ga.App. 611, 512 S.E.2d 17 (February 3, 1999). No error in court’s charge: “ it is not necessary for the State to show that the accused was drunk. It is sufficient that the State shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive a car than it would have been if he were not so affected, whether drunk or not.” “This Court has already considered and upheld similar charges which advised the jury that a defendant does not have to be drunk in order for him to be a less safe driver. Brownlee v. State, 225 Ga.App. 311, 312-313(1), 483 S.E.2d 370 (1997); Mattarochia v. State, 200 Ga.App. 681, 685(5)(e), 409 S.E.2d 546 (1991).” Accord, McWilliams (September 18, 2007), above; Schlanger v. State , 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008) (Physical precedent only).