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Davis v. State, 236 Ga.App. 32, 510 S.E.2d 889 (January 14, 1999). Less safe DUI-alcohol conviction reversed where trial court charged jury that “‘if there was at that time an alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more, it shall be inferred that the person was under the influence of alcohol as prohibited by Code Section 40-6-391.’ This mandatory inference, even though paraphrased in the language of OCGA § 40-6-392(b)(3), impermissibly shifted the burden to Davis to prove his innocence of the DUI charge under OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) (less safe to drive). Stepic v. State, 226 Ga.App. 734, 735(1), 487 S.E.2d 643 (1997); Holcomb v. State, 217 Ga.App. 482, 484(3), 458 S.E.2d 159 (1995); Ellerbee v. State, 215 Ga.App. 102, 105(4), 449 S.E.2d 874 (1994). Compare Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 125(1), 401 S.E.2d 516 (1991) (permissible inference allowed). Note, however, that the per se “DUI conviction under OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5), which defines DUI as the act of having an alcohol concentration of .10 or more within three hours of driving, is not affected by reading to the jury the language of OCGA § 40-6-392(b). Lester v. State, 253 Ga. 235, 237-238(2), 320 S.E.2d 142 (1984); Ellerbee, supra, 215 Ga.App. at 104-105(5), 449 S.E.2d 874.” Compare Davis (February 25, 2003), above. 11. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES Shockley v. State, 256 Ga.App. 892, 570 S.E.2d 67 (August 7, 2002). “Considering that the elements are different and that both reckless driving and driving under the influence are equally ‘serious traffic offenses,’ it would appear that they are entirely separate and distinct crimes and that neither can ever be considered a lesser included offense of the other, as either a matter of law or of fact.” 12. OPINION EVIDENCE McArthur v. State, 276 Ga.App. 872, 625 S.E.2d 68 (December 2, 2005). “The decision to give a jury charge on expert opinion is a matter for the sole discretion of the trial judge, whether the witness is tendered as an expert or not. [Cits.] Here, although none of the State’s witnesses were tendered as experts, the officer administering the Intoxilyzer 5000 test was certified with the GBI’s Division of Forensic Services, as was shown at trial. Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it charged the jury on expert opinion.” 13. PER SE DUI Frazier v. State, 267 Ga.App. 682, 601 S.E.2d 145 (June 4, 2004). Not error to charge the jury on both DUI – less safe and DUI – per se, where he was only indicted for per se DUI, because “the evidence presented at trial would not have led the jury to find Frazier guilty of committing a crime in any manner other than the manner in which he was charged. ” Johnson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 633, 583 S.E.2d 489 (June 12, 2003). Approves this charge: “If you should find from the evidence in this case that at the time of the alleged offense the amount of alcohol in the defendant’s blood as shown by a chemical analysis of the defendant’s blood or breath was .08 grams or more of alcohol, you may infer that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. However, whether or not you make such inference is a question for you to decide.” Distinguishes Baird v. State , 260 Ga.App. 661, 580 S.E.2d 650 (March 28, 2003), on basis that “the charge in this case did not authorize the jury to infer that the influence of alcohol actually impaired the defendant’s driving.” 14. PRESUMPTIONS BASED ON ALCOHOL LEVEL Travis v. State, 314 Ga.App. 280, 724 S.E.2d 15 (February 22, 2012). DUI and related convictions affirmed; defendant wasn’t “entitled to a jury charge on the statutory presumption of sobriety because her state-administered breath test registered a blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.05 grams. Under OCGA § 40–6–392(b)(1), ‘[i]f there was at that time an alcohol concentration of 0.05 grams or less, the trier of fact in its discretion may infer therefrom that the person was not under the influence of alcohol, as prohibited by [OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(1) and (a)(4).]’ Thus, the presumption applies to violations of OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(1) or (a)(4), for DUI to the extent that the person was a less safe driver (‘DUI less safe’). [fn] See Ricks v. State, 255 Ga.App. 188, 190(1) (564 S.E.2d 793) (2002). Such a presumption does not arise, however, with respect to violations of OCGA § 40–6–391(k)(1), for DUI of more than 0.02 percent blood alcohol content while under the age of 21 [Cit.],” and “did not entitle Travis to a presumption of sobriety with respect to her reckless driving violation. See Cornell v. State, 239 Ga.App. 127, 128(2) (520 S.E.2d 782) (1999) (‘It is clear that OCGA § 40–6–392(b)(1) creates a rebuttable negative presumption in criminal actions arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person in violation of Code Section 40–6–391.’) (citation omitted).” Cornwell v. State, 239 Ga.App. 127, 520 S.E.2d 782 (July 14, 1999). At defendant’s DUI trial, trial court properly charged jury that an alcohol concentration of 0.05 grams or less creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant is not under the influence of alcohol. “‘It is clear that OCGA § 40-6-392(b)(1) creates a rebuttable negative presumption in