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OCGA § 40–6–48(1) and justifies a stop’) (punctuation and footnote omitted). Since the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Acree violated OCGA § 40–6–48(1), the stop was justified, and the trial court did not err in denying Acree's motion to suppress.” Pierce v. State, 319 Ga.App. 721, 738 S.E.2d 307 (February 8, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; defendant wasn’t “seized” where officer “knocked on the window of her parked vehicle and asked her to roll it down.” 1. “Here, the police officer's testimony showed that Pierce was already stopped when the officer approached her vehicle” – a first-tier encounter. “During this first-tier encounter, the officer was permitted to “ask [Pierce] to roll down a window or step out of a car, and freely question [her] without any articulable suspicion, as long as the officer[ ] [did] not detain [her] or create the impression that [she] may not leave.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [ Akins v. State, 266 Ga.App. 214, 216(1), 596 S.E.2d 719 (2004)]; see also Mauge v. State, 279 Ga.App. 36, 38, 630 S.E.2d 174 (2006). There is no evidence that the officer asked Pierce to roll down her window in a manner ‘that would have made a reasonable person in her position believe she was not free to leave.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Akins, supra, 266 Ga.App. at 215(1), 596 S.E.2d 719. 2. Officer had articulable suspicion for stop when he found defendant “ asleep behind the wheel of a vehicle with the engine running, and she was unresponsive when he initially shined his flashlight inside her vehicle. See Hendrix [ v. State, 273 Ga.App. 792, 792-794(1), 616 S.E.2d 127 (2005)] (officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant when defendant was asleep at the wheel of his vehicle and was unresponsive to officer's initial attempt to wake him).” Parker v. State, 307 Ga.App. 61, 704 S.E.2d 438 (November 23, 2010). DUI conviction affirmed; officer had articulable suspicion for stop. “Here, the officer testified at the suppression hearing that he observed Parker change lanes by cutting him off in a manner he believed to be unsafe, causing him to abruptly apply his brakes. OCGA § 40-6-123(a) provides that ‘[n]o person shall ... change lanes or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.’” Ivey v. State, 301 Ga.App. 796, 689 S.E.2d 100 (December 29, 2009). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. “Ivey argues that his acquittal of the charge of failure to operate his vehicle within a single lane supports his contention that the officer had no reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the traffic stop. … [W]e disagree. Ivey's ‘eventual acquittal of failure to maintain lane is not determinative of whether the traffic stop was lawful.’ Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga.App. 417, 419(1) (650 S.E.2d 268) (2007). Indeed, ‘[t]he conduct forming the basis of the reasonable suspicion need not be a violation of the law.’ Veal [ v. State, 273 Ga.App. 47, 49 (614 S.E.2d 143) (2005)].” Accord, Parker v. State , 307 Ga.App. 61, 704 S.E.2d 438 (November 23, 2010) (stop based on improper lane change was valid despite later acquittal on that charge). Blankenship v. State, 301 Ga.App. 602, 688 S.E.2d 395 (December 14, 2009). Officer was authorized to initiate DUI investigation: “Before the officer asked Blankenship to exit the vehicle [at a roadblock] so as to conduct a DUI investigation (including field sobriety tests), the officer had smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Blankenship's breath and had observed Blankenship's watery, bloodshot eyes. ‘The alcoholic smell provided the officer reasonable grounds to conduct a second-tier investigatory detention.’ Whitmore v. State, 289 Ga.App. 107, 109 (657 S.E.2d 1) (2008). See Peterson v. State, 294 Ga.App. 128, 130(1) (668 S.E.2d 544) (2008) (alcoholic smell alone gave police ‘sufficiently reasonable and articulable suspicion to administer field sobriety ... tests’); McClain v. State, 226 Ga.App. 714, 718(1) (487 S.E.2d 471) (1997) (same).” Accord, State v. Gauthier , 326 Ga.App. 473, 756 S.E.2d 705 (March 21, 2014). Johnson v. State, 299 Ga.App. 474, 682 S.E.2d 601 (July 2, 2009). Officer’s temporary detention of defendant was supported by articulable suspicion. “At the time that the officer detained Johnson, he was aware that Johnson had failed to call 911 when a violent domestic disturbance had occurred on her [day care] premises that potentially placed the children at risk, and that she had ‘left real quick’ upon learning that the police had been summoned. The officer had also been informed Johnson may have been drinking. Finally, when Johnson returned driving a van full of young children, the officer observed that she had glossy eyes and was in an ‘over-emotional state.’ These specific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, warranted the officer's temporary detention of Johnson based on a reasonable suspicion that she had committed the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol. See generally Maloy v. State, 293 Ga.App. 648, 650(1) (667 S.E.2d 688) (2008) (the observation of glassy eyes and suspicious demeanor of a driver may justify a temporary detention); Veal v. State, 273 Ga.App. 47, 49-50 (614 S.E.2d 143) (2005) (the behavior giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity need not itself be unlawful); Johnson v. State, 251 Ga.App. 659, 661(3) (555 S.E.2d 34) (2001) (an apparent attempt to avoid police in conjunction with other factors can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Moreover, the fact that a violent domestic disturbance had erupted in the presence of children under Johnson's care and control and Johnson failed to summon the police supported a reasonable