☢ test - Í

suspicion that she may also have been guilty of reckless conduct.” Baynes v. State, 294 Ga.App. 452, 669 S.E.2d 227 (November 7, 2008). After stop for stop sign violation, “Baynes' flushed face, the smell of an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and his statement that he recently drank two beers justified a brief investigative inquiry to determine whether he had been driving under the influence of alcohol. Buchnowski v. State, 233 Ga.App. 766, 767(1) (505 S.E.2d 263) (1998) (smell of alcoholic beverage on a driver's breath and the driver's admission of drinking provide reasonable grounds to conduct a limited DUI investigation).” Bell v. State, 291 Ga.App. 437, 662 S.E.2d 248 (May 7, 2008). Officer’s “testimony that he observed Bell ‘drift’ into the adjacent lane more than seven times constitutes probable cause sufficient to justify the traffic stop. See Rayo-Leon v. State, 281 Ga.App. 74, 75(1) (635 S.E.2d 368) (2006) (‘“[w]eaving without reason into nearby lanes”... justifies a stop’); Worsham v. State, 251 Ga.App. 774, 775-776 (554 S.E.2d 805) (2001) (officer authorized to initiate traffic stop after observing driver fail to maintain lane).” Hinton v. State, 289 Ga.App. 309, 656 S.E.2d 918 (January 25, 2008). Officer had articulable suspicion to conduct DUI investigation after making traffic stop for littering. “In State v. Stansbury, 234 Ga.App. 281 (505 S.E.2d 564) (1998), … we held that a strong odor of alcohol emanating from a vehicle, coupled with other evidence that at least one of the occupants of the vehicle had been consuming alcohol, provided a basis for an officer to perform an alco-sensor test upon the driver. Id. at 283; see also State v. Johnson, 282 Ga.App. 102, 103-104 (637 S.E.2d 825) (2006) (‘[defendant] could be required to exit his vehicle and submit to a field sobriety test because the [officer] smelled alcohol in [defendant’s] vehicle’). Here, the officer observed open containers of alcohol in Hinton’s car and detected an odor of alcohol coming from within that persisted even when the open containers and the other passenger were removed. Moreover, like the officer in Stansbury, he testified that he could not identify which of the car’s occupants the odor was coming from, and he wanted to determine whether it was safe to allow Hinton to continue driving the car. See Stansbury, supra at 282 (reversing trial court’s finding that officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to administer alco-sensor).” Finally, the fact that the passenger, and not Hinton, committed the littering violation upon which the stop was based does not require a different result. See Somesso v. State, 288 Ga.App. 291, 292-293(2)(a)(653 S.E.2d 855) (2007) (odor of marijuana authorized search of defendant’s vehicle, which had been stopped to execute warrant on passenger).” State v. Lanes, 287 Ga.App. 311, 651 S.E.2d 456 (August 21, 2007). Grant of defendant’s motion to suppress affirmed; based on facts as found by trial court, “the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to ask Lanes to get out of his car,” thus turning first tier encounter into second-tier stop. Officer “observed a car parked in a closed gas station at 2:45 a.m. She approached the car and observed the driver, later identified as Lanes, ‘slumped down’ or ‘leaning forward’ and looking at a contact lens case in his hand . The officer tapped on the window, and Lanes ‘slowly looked over at’ her; she tapped again and he rolled down the window. When she asked what he was doing, he told her that he had just come from a nightclub and was ‘having problems with his contacts and wanted to let his eyes rest .’ His speech was ‘very, very slow,’ and his eyes were red and watery. She did not, however, smell any odor of alcohol. She asked Lanes if he had been smoking marijuana, and he denied it, although he said he had had a couple of beers at the nightclub. The officer asked for Lanes’s driver’s license, which she checked and found no outstanding warrants. She then asked him to step out of the car.” Trial court “found that Lanes gave a ‘reasonable explanation’ for his red and watery eyes, noting explicitly, ‘I don’t find anything else .... there was nothing there that I could see that would justify her asking him to step out of the car and taking his license from him.’” Vaughn v. State, 243 Ga.App. 816, 534 S.E.2d 513 (May 4, 2000). Trooper had articulable suspicion that defendant was less safe: “the fact that Vaughn had turned off the road before the roadblock; the smell of alcohol on Vaughn; his red and glassy eyes; his slurred speech; and the fact that the name he gave was not the name on his shirt. Thus, at this point [Trooper] Brown properly administered the field sobriety test. See State v. Stansbury, 234 Ga.App. 281, 505 S.E.2d 564 (1998).” Strickland v. State, 240 Ga.App. 604, 524 S.E.2d 305 (November 1, 1999). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. “Strickland's contention that the officer had no reason to suspect that he was impaired and driving under the influence prior to the field sobriety tests belies the uncontroverted evidence that his eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slow, there was an odor of alcoholic beverage about him, and that he admitted to having consumed alcoholic beverages. This evidence was sufficient to justify further investigation. ” Yearwood v. State, 239 Ga.App. 682, 521 S.E.2d 689 (August 18, 1999). Stop was based on articulable suspicion where