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deputy “was on patrol when he received a telephone call from a truck stop employee whom he had known for more than a year and who had previously given him reliable information. The employee asked the deputy to come to the truck stop because a waitress had complained that a woman and a man, who smelled of alcohol, were causing a disturbance in the restaurant. As the deputy was driving to the truck stop, he received another call from the employee telling him that the man and the woman were leaving the truck stop in a car. The employee described the car and gave the sheriff its license plate number. Upon arriving at the truck stop, the deputy saw the described car driving out of a nearby gas station. When the driver of the car saw the deputy, he stopped and backed up into the gas station. After the deputy drove past the station, the driver pulled the car out of the station and headed in the opposite direction. The deputy turned his car around and followed the other car onto an interstate highway. The deputy eventually stopped the car for exceeding the speed limit.” “When hearsay information is supplied by an identified interested citizen, the citizen's credibility is not as suspect and the analysis is not as stringent as when information is given by an anonymous tipster; a law- abiding concerned citizen has a built-in credibility and is deemed to be reliable. Hinson v. State, 229 Ga.App. 840, 842(1)(c), 494 S.E.2d 693 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 269 Ga. 862, 506 S.E.2d 870 (1998). The hearsay information in the current case was provided by a reliable and concerned citizen known to the deputy. Her credible information that Yearwood had caused a disturbance at the truck stop and was believed to be driving while under the influence of alcohol gave the deputy a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the stop of Yearwood's car. See State v. Noble, 179 Ga.App. 785, 347 S.E.2d 722 (1986).” Horne v. State, 237 Ga.App. 844, 517 S.E.2d 74 (April 29, 1999). Officer had articulable suspicion for DUI stop based on “weaving across the centerline into the opposite lane of traffic several times.” Driver also pulled off the road to allow officer to pass, waited a short time, then proceeded in same direction. Finally, driver pulled into a parking lot and switched places with his (also intoxicated) passenger. “Horne’s attempts to elude Martin support a finding that the appropriate articulable suspicion was present in this case.” Davis v. State, 236 Ga.App. 32, 510 S.E.2d 889 (January 14, 1999). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress evidence resulting from stop; evidence was sufficient to establish articulable suspicion for stop. “Davis moved to exclude the evidence arising out of the stop, contending that it was based on pretext. The officer testified that at 3:30 a.m., while following Davis’ vehicle on a road with three westbound lanes, she witnessed him weave from the center lane toward the left lane and straddle the dividing stripes for twenty feet, return to the center lane, weave toward the right lane and straddle those dividing stripes for ten feet, and return to the center lane.” “‘Numerous cases have held that weaving out of one’s lane justifies a stop.... Most of these cases focus on the weaving not as a traffic offense but as an indication that the driver was possibly intoxicated, which in this context authorized police to stop the driver to determine if the suspicion, a reasonable one, was accurate. This Court has specifically determined that an officer’s observation of a motorist’s ‘weaving’ may serve as sufficient reason to warrant an investigative stop for a possible DUI violation. Thus the behavior giving rise to the reasonable suspicion need not be a violation of the law.... [T]he police can stop drivers who engage in erratic driving behavior, even if it is simply weaving within a lane.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Semich v. State, 234 Ga.App. 89, 91-92, 506 S.E.2d 216 (1998). Davis’ behavior (lack of adequate control of car) justified the stop. See State v. Diamond, 223 Ga.App. 164, 166, 477 S.E.2d 320 (1996) (straddling lanes justified stop). Evidence supported the court’s inferred finding that the stop was not pretextual, particularly in light of Davis’ failure to identify an alleged pretext for the stop. [Cit.]” Accord, Polk v. State , 305 Ga.App. 677, 700 S.E.2d 839 (August 25, 2010). 3. EVIDENCE – PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST Blanks v. State, 334 Ga.App. 626, 778 S.E.2d 261 (November 3, 2015). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as officer had probable cause for DUI arrest. “Here, after the traffic stop, [Officer] DiGrazia detected the odor of alcohol coming from Blanks’s person, and one of the field sobriety tests (the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test) and the portable breath test both indicated that Blanks was under the influence of alcohol. Also … probable cause may rest on the collective knowledge of the investigating officers as long as there is some degree of communication between them. Thus, the facts that Blanks was swerving, unable to maintain his lane, and speeding may also be considered. We therefore conclude that the totality of the above circumstances provided DiGrazia with sufficient probable cause to arrest Blanks for driving under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he was less safe.” State v. Young, 334 Ga.App. 161, 778 S.E.2d 402 (October 14, 2015). In DUI prosecution, trial court erred by granting motion to suppress. Officers had probable cause to arrest for DUI based on trial court’s findings that officer smelled alcohol on defendant, defendant admitted drinking, and defendant “drove his SUV into a crosswalk, hitting the victim.” Bostic v. State, 332 Ga.App. 604, 774 S.E.2d 175 (June 25, 2015). Interim appeal in DUI prosecution. Trial court erred in