☢ test - Í

is waived. McKay at 558. As the error Tucker complains of, at best, concerns the form of the indictment, it should have been raised in a special demurrer. England v. State, [232 Ga.App. 842, 844(1), 502 S.E.2d 770 (1998)].” Alleged error here is fatal variance between evidence and allegations of indictment. Accord, Haynes v. State , 302 Ga.App. 296, 690 S.E.2d 925 (February 11, 2010) ( reversed on other grounds, Watson v. State , 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (September 14, 2015). Williams v. State, 237 Ga.App. 814, 515 S.E.2d 875 (April 8, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict, regardless of defendant’s claim that indictment didn’t adequately set out manner of defendant’s injury. “‘ A motion for directed verdict of acquittal is not the proper way to contest the sufficiency of an indictment. A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the underlying indictment. (Cit.)’ (Punctuation omitted.) McKay v. State, 234 Ga.App. 556, 559(2), 507 S.E.2d 484 (1998).” Accord, Adkins v. State , 279 Ga. 424, 614 S.E.2d 67 (June 6, 2005) (failure to identify victims in indictment should have been addressed by demurrer); Clark v. State , 278 Ga.App. 412, 629 S.E.2d 103 (March 23, 2006) (Physical precedent only); Smith v. State , 282 Ga.App. 339, 638 S.E.2d 791 (November 8, 2006) (sufficiency of indictment cannot be attacked for first time on appeal); Craft v. State , 309 Ga.App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (May 31, 2011). 3. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL State v. Graves, 322 Ga.App. 798, 746 S.E.2d 269 (July 11, 2013). Following conviction for loitering and prowling, trial court erred in granting motion for new trial, essentially based on defect in accusation. “The portion of Graves's ‘amended motion for new trial’ granted by the trial court was, in substance, a claim that the accusation was fatally defective because Graves could admit the allegation that he was ‘masturbating while driving a motor vehicle in a residential area’ and still be innocent of the charge that, by this conduct, he violated the loitering or prowling statute set forth in OCGA § 16–11– 36. State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 485–486 (238 S.E.2d 38) (1977). This was a claim that could only be made by a pre- trial general demurrer or by a motion in arrest of judgment after conviction. Parks v. State, 246 Ga.App. 888, 889 (543 S.E.2d 39) (2000); Eubanks, 239 Ga. at 485. [fn] A motion for a new trial is not a viable procedural substitute for a motion in arrest of judgment. Abreu v. State, 206 Ga. App 361, 363 (425 S.E.2d 331) (1992); Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 85 (90 S.E.2d 664) (1955). In Abreu, we found that the issue of whether an indictment was defective could not be considered in the trial court by motion for new trial, and that, because the issue was not properly raised in the trial court, it presented nothing for this Court to review on appeal. Id. at 363. [fn] Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether the accusation on which Graves was convicted was fatally defective. Because the trial court lacked authority to consider or grant a claim seeking to arrest the judgment of conviction brought before the court in the motion for new trial, we find that the portion of the court's order granting Graves's motion was void and must be vacated.” Thomas v. State, 314 Ga.App. 124, 723 S.E.2d 5 (January 26, 2012). Armed robbery, kidnapping, and related convictions affirmed; challenge to form of indictment wasn’t properly raised in motion for new trial. “‘[A] motion for new trial is ordinarily not the proper method to attack the sufficiency of the indictment.’ (Citations omitted.) Harris v. State, 258 Ga.App. 669, 671(1) (574 S.E.2d 871) (2002). Instead, ‘[a] claim attacking the legality of an indictment is cognizable in a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus when no demurrer to the indictment is interposed before judgment is entered on the verdict. Otherwise, the claim is improperly before this court.’ (Citations omitted.) Fairwell v. State, 311 Ga.App. 834, 843(3) (717 S.E.2d 332) (2011).” Accord, Fouts v. State , 322 Ga.App. 261, 744 S.E.2d 451 (June 14, 2013). 4. MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT Jones v. State, 332 Ga.App. 449, 773 S.E.2d 408 (June 9, 2015). DUI and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s challenge to the accusation was waived by failure to file a timely demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment. “Jones contends that Count 1 of the accusation fails to charge him with any offense under Georgia law. … A claim that a charging instrument fails to charge the defendant with any offense under Georgia law can be raised in a general demurrer[fn] or a motion in arrest of judgment.[fn] Coleman v. State, 318 Ga.App. 478, 479(1), 735 S.E.2d 788 (2012). The record shows that Jones did not file a general demurrer before trial or a motion in arrest of judgment within the term of court in which judgment was entered. ‘The failure to file a general or special demurrer, or a timely motion in arrest of judgment, waives any claim that could have been raised in a general or special demurrer.’ Coleman v. State, 318 Ga.App. at 479(1), 735 S.E.2d 788.” Zabain v. State, 315 Ga.App. 749, 728 S.E.2d 273 (May 2, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; on appeal, defendant couldn’t challenge conviction based on statute of limitation where he never raised the issue either by attack on the sufficiency of the indictment or the evidence. “When a count of the indictment is ‘absolutely void in that it fails to charge the accused with any act made a crime by the law and, upon the trial, no demurrer to the indictment is