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interposed and the accused is convicted under the indictment and judgment is entered on the verdict, the accused's proper remedy is a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus.’ McKay [ v. State, 234 Ga.App. 556, 559(2) (507 S.E.2d 484) (1998)] We find nothing in the record that can be construed as a motion in arrest of judgment or as a petition for habeas corpus, and Zabain makes no assertion that he appeals a ruling from either proceeding.” Distinguishing Lee v. State , 289 Ga. 95 (709 S.E.2d 762) (2011): “unlike Zabain, the appellant in Lee had properly raised before the trial court the defense of the statute of limitation. [fn] And although Zabain moved for a directed verdict, he did so only on general grounds and not on the ground that any count of the indictment was barred by the statute of limitation.” Defendant’s remedy, then, is limited to habeas corpus. Accord, Jackson v. State , 334 Ga.App. 368, 779 S.E.2d 427 (November 10, 2015) (“Because Jackson did not raise an objection to the indictment in any manner before or during trial and did not move to arrest the judgment after his conviction, it can be reviewed on appeal only through a habeas corpus proceeding.”). Murkerson v. State, 264 Ga.App. 701, 592 S.E.2d 184 (December 15, 2003). “On the day of trial, Murkerson filed a general demurrer, challenging the validity of the indictment as to the bribery count. And, following trial, he filed a motion in arrest of judgment, contesting the validity of the indictment as to the charge that he violated his oath of office. As this Court noted in Motes v. State [262 Ga.App. 728, 586 S.E.2d 682 (2003)] , a general demurrer does not need to be raised before trial to preserve the issue for appeal, but ‘may even be raised after the verdict by a motion in arrest of judgment, although a motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term when the judgment was obtained.’” 5. SPEAKING DEMURRER State v. Grube, 293 Ga. 257, 744 S.E.2d 1 (June 3, 2013). Reversing 315 Ga.App. 885, 729 S.E.2d 42 (2012), trial court erred in granting special demurrer to indictment for computer pornography and related offenses based on indictment’s identification of victim. Offenses involved police officer posing as a child in internet chat rooms; the indictment indentified “the victim as ‘“Tiffany,” a person believed by the accused to be a child’ and ‘“Tiffany,” a person he believed to be a 14–year–old girl.’” Demurrer wasn’t “an improper speaking demurrer. See State v. Holmes, 142 Ga.App. 847, 848, 237 S.E.2d 406 (1977) (demurrer which seeks to add facts not on the face of the indictment fails as a speaking demurrer). Because Grube only challenges his indictment on the ground that the reference to the victim as ‘Tiffany’ fails to sufficiently identify the victim, the merits of Grube's challenge can be determined without reaching matters outside the four corners of the indictment.” 6. SPECIAL DEMURRERS Andemical v. State, A15A2362, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 871229 (March 8, 2016). Kidnapping with bodily injury and related convictions affirmed; even assuming error, no harm shown in overruling special demurrer. Defendant contends that the indictment failed to specify which of two incidents was the basis for the kidnapping charge; but “‘[Andemical] must show that he was prejudiced by being tried on a defective accusation; without harm, an erroneous overruling of a special demurrer is not a basis for reversal.’ Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 818, 819–820(1), 537 S.E.2d 327 (2000).” Lauderback v. State, 320 Ga.App. 649, 740 S.E.2d 377 (March 21, 2013). Reckless driving conviction affirmed; trial court properly found that defendant had waived challenges to the form of the accusation by waiting until after the jury was selected to make an oral special demurrer. “At trial, [defendant] asserted that the failure to charge the particular manner in which the crime was committed rendered the accusation fatally deficient. … [I]ndictments that do not allege a specific date on which the crime was committed are not perfect in form and are subject to a timely special demurrer. Hood, 307 Ga.App. at 441, 706 S.E.2d 566. Further, pursuant to OCGA § 17–7–110, special demurrers must be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court. Wilson, 318 Ga.App. at 92(1), 732 S.E.2d 330. E.g., Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180(2), 611 S.E.2d 52 (2005); Delaby v. State, 298 Ga.App. 723, 724, 681 S.E.2d 645 (2009). Thus, the trial court did not err by finding that Lauderback waived his right to challenge the indictment by failing to timely file a written special demurrer.” Accord, Jackson v. State , 334 Ga.App. 368, 779 S.E.2d 427 (November 10, 2015) (challenge to sufficiency of indictment charging witness intimidation was waived when not made until appeal). Green v. State, 292 Ga. 451, 738 S.E.2d 582 (February 18, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in murder prosecution; trial court properly denied special demurrer to indictment, based on erroneous filing date entered by clerk. “The grand jury returned the indictment in open court on May 17, 2011, but the court clerk entered March 17, 2011 as the date of return on the indictment and in the criminal docket book.” The offenses allegedly occurred on April 16, 2011 – before the date entered by the clerk. “At the hearing on the special demurrer, the clerk testified that she had made a mistake in recording the