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indictment's return date and changed the date from March to May after she realized her mistake.” Held, the error was an immaterial defect, properly corrected by the clerk. “When a special demurrer points out an immaterial defect, the trial court need not dismiss the defective charge, but may strike out or correct the erroneous portion of the indictment. See Wagner v. State, 282 Ga. 149(1) (646 S.E.2d 676) (2007). Among the defects that we have previously found immaterial in an indictment are the misnaming of a code section, the misspelling of a drug or grand juror's name, and the omission of the defendant's middle initial. See id. at 151; Bailey v. State, 280 Ga. 884 (635 S.E.2d 137) (2006), overruled on other grounds by Wagner, 282 Ga. at 150; Harmon v. State, 235 Ga. 329(1) (219 S.E.2d 441) (1975); Veal v. State, 116 Ga. 589(4) (42 SE 705) (1902).” Follows Newham v. State, 35 Ga.App. 391(1) (133 SE 650) (1926) (similar facts to Green ). State v. Wilson, 318 Ga.App. 88, 732 S.E.2d 330 (September 25, 2012). In prosecution for aggravated assault on peace officer and related offenses, trial court erred in granting oral demurrer made after jury impaneled. Indictment set out facts sufficient to charge defendant with aggravated assault, but not on a police officer. “[A] challenge to an indictment that is based upon an alleged variance between the offense named in the indictment and the facts alleged in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment, so that such challenge must be brought by special demurrer. Jones v. State, [240 Ga.App. 484, 486(2) (523 S.E.2d 73) (1999)] (It is axiomatic that it is not the name given to a crime in the indictment, but the indictment's description of the facts that constituted the crime, that establishes the offense charged.); see Morris v. State, [310 Ga.App. 126, 131(3) (712 S.E.2d 130) (2011)] (‘It is immaterial what the offense is called in the indictment as long as the averments of the presentment are such as to describe an offense against the laws of the State.’) (citations and punctuation omitted); Hill v. State, 257 Ga.App. 82, 84(1) (570 S.E.2d 395) (2002) (“It is the description of the crime, rather than the description and number of the section under which it appears in the Code[,] which furnishes the criterion for determining whether the indictment is good.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). See, e.g., Doe v. State, [306 Ga.App. 348, 350(1) (702 S.E.2d 669) (2010)] (The indictment informed the defendant that he was accused of attempting ‘to influence the winning of Georgia Lottery prizes by tampering with lottery materials[,]’ and, thus, was sufficient to charge him under subsection ( b ) of OCGA § 50–27–27, even though the indictment referred to the offense of ‘falsely uttering’ a lottery ticket, which is a crime under subsection ( a ) of OCGA § 50–27–27 .).” As special demurrer must be made within 10 days of arraignment, defendant’s oral demurrer at trial was untimely. Brown v. State, 315 Ga.App. 115, 726 S.E.2d 612 (March 23, 2012). Rape and related convictions affirmed; no merit to defendant’s objection to jury charge, contending that it instructed the jury on possession of “a firearm and knife ‘during the commission of ... a felony,’ which the court went on to define as ‘any crime against the person of another, rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated child molestation.’ Brown contends that this was an erroneous charge requiring reversal of his conviction because he was only indicted for possessing a knife and firearm ‘while assaulting’ K.B., and the jury charge therefore allowed him to be convicted for crimes he was not indicted for committing. Brown's contention, however, amounts to a special demurrer to the indictment, which he did not file and has therefore waived the right to assert. See Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 309(2) (676 S.E.2d 181) (2009) (‘contention that the felony murder indictment was deficient because it did not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault is, in essence, a special demurrer seeking greater specificity with regard to the predicate felony’). The trial court's instructions, when taken as a whole, adequately charged the jury that they could only convict Brown of these counts if they determined that he possessed a knife or possessed a firearm while committing one of the previously defined predicate felony crimes against K.B. Thus, his argument is without merit.” Defendant here doesn’t seem to contend that the indictment fails to charge an offense (appropriate for a demurrer), but rather that the jury charge and evidence don’t fit the offense charged in the indictment (appropriate for an objection to the jury charge). Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived right to be tried on perfect accusation by failing to file special demurrer. “‘The right to be tried upon an accusation that is perfect in form and in substance is waived when a defendant fails to timely and properly challenge the accusation. Because [Sevostiyanova] failed to challenge the accusation by way of special demurrer or by filing a motion to quash before entering her guilty plea, she waived the right to a perfect accusation.’ Citation and punctuation omitted.) Beaver v. State, 308 Ga.App. 380, 381(1) (707 S.E.2d 590) (2011).” Accord, Jackson v. State , 316 Ga.App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (July 3, 2012) (defendant waived right to perfect indictment by failing to file timely special demurrer); Coleman v. State , 318 Ga.App. 478, 735 S.E.2d 788 (October 29, 2012). State v. Meeks, 309 Ga.App. 855, 711 S.E.2d 403 (June 9, 2011). 1. “‘In contrast [to a general demurrer], when determining whether an indictment [or accusation] is sufficient to withstand a special demurrer, the applicable standard is not whether the indictment [or accusation] could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the