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obviously chose not to believe the officer's opinion, and we cannot second-guess the trial court or use the officer's opinion in our analysis of whether probable cause existed to arrest Damato. Id. Furthermore, while bloodshot eyes and slightly paled skin may support a finding of impairment, ‘such evidence does not require a finding of impairment.’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 904(6). The trial court specifically noted that it considered cases where we found sufficient evidence to support probable cause based, in part, on a defendant's bloodshot, watery, or glossy eyes, see Lenhardt v. State, 271 Ga.App. 453, 454(1) (610 S.E.2d 86) (2005); Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 690, 691 (478 S.E.2d 460) (1996), yet the court declined to accept the officer's testimony or adopt the officer's conclusion in this case.” See also Ellison (March 3, 2005), below, and cases collected there. Accord, Bostic (June 25, 2015), above. Harris v. State, 301 Ga.App. 775, 689 S.E.2d 91 (December 21, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s arrest for DUI: “an officer noticed Harris driving erratically, both officers smelled alcohol emanating from Harris, one of the officers noted that Harris' eyes were red and watery, when asked for his license Harris twice pulled out his debit or credit card rather than his driver's license, and Harris' alco-sensor test was positive.” State v, Carder, 301 Ga.App. 901, 689 S.E.2d 347 (December 11, 2009). In defendant’s prosecution for vehicular homicide, DUI, and related charges, trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s refusal of State blood test. Contrary to trial court’s finding, officer didn’t have probable cause for arrest for DUI merely based on his “knowledge that Carder was the driver of her vehicle, smelled of alcohol, and had recently consumed wine at lunch. The trial court's finding … is erroneous because the mere consumption of alcohol is insufficient to show probable cause for DUI-less safe. See [ State v. Rish, 295 'Ga.App. 815, 816-817 (673 S.E.2d 259) (2009)] (‘Because individual responses to alcohol vary, the presence of alcohol in a defendant's body, by itself, does not support an inference that the defendant was an impaired driver’); State v. Gray, 267 Ga.App. 753, 755(2) (600 S.E.2d 626) (2004) (in order to have probable cause for a DUI arrest, an officer must ‘have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information that a suspect was actually in physical control of a moving vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders him incapable of driving safely ’) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).” Subsequent reading of implied consent thus was not untimely. “[Officer] Shelton did not have probable cause to arrest Carder for DUI-less safe until he interviewed her in the trauma room, which was the next available opportunity he had to speak with her. During that conversation, Carder repeated questions to the officer and had a flushed face, glossy eyes, slurred speech, and a lingering odor of alcohol about her person. The fact that Carder was the only person in her vehicle at the accident scene and her admission that she had been drinking at that time, together with her physical manifestations at the hospital, provided Shelton with probable cause to believe that Carder had been driving under the influence.” Gray disapproved, Hughes v. State , 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (March 16, 2015). State v. Goode, 298 Ga.App. 749, 681 S.E.2d 199 (July 7, 2009). Physical precedent only. Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that officer arrested her “without probable cause to believe that she was an impaired driver.” Stop was based on suspended registration; officer acknowledged that defendant was “driving fine” as he followed her for one mile. Defendant exhibited strong odor of alcoholic beverage, admitted drinking “‘a little bit more than one’ glass of wine,” and had “glassy and watery eyes, although they were neither red nor bloodshot.” However, “the arresting officer provided other testimony supporting an inference that Goode was not an impaired driver, namely, her proper operation of her vehicle, her successful completion of the field sobriety tests, her coherent interaction with the officer, and her steadiness on her feet after exiting the vehicle. The officer also admitted that Goode's glassy and watery eyes were not bloodshot and could have been caused by any number of alternative factors. Finally, when the trial court viewed the videotape of the traffic stop, the court had the opportunity to observe Goode's speech, balance, and dexterity prior to her arrest. Given this record, we must conclude that there was evidence to support the trial court's finding that Goode was not an impaired driver.” Goode disapproved on these grounds, Hughes v. State , 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (March 16, 2015). Cash v. State, 299 Ga.App. 303, 682 S.E.2d 607 (July 2, 2009). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI: “The evidence shows that the officer detected the odor of alcohol when talking with Cash, observed that Cash's speech was mumbled and slow, and that his eyes were bloodshot. Cash also initially gave the officer a credit card instead of his license, admitted to having one or more drinks, and Cash's truck ran off the road and was involved in a one car accident.” Accord, Harris (December 1, 2009), above. Brown v. State, 299 Ga.App. 402, 683 S.E.2d 614 (July 1, 2009). Evidence supported probable cause for DUI arrest: “Deputy Shaw noted an alcohol odor on Brown, he believed her to be manifesting a state of being a ‘happy drunk,’ her eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and the result of the alco-sensor test was positive.”