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State v. Burke, 298 Ga.App. 621, 680 S.E.2d 658 (June 30, 2009). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause to arrest for DUI. “We hold that the trial court erred here in two respects. First, the court found, apparently as a matter of law, that the odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, and unsteadiness cannot support a finding of impairment. To the contrary, this court has held that similar evidence was sufficient to support such a finding,” citing Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 690 (478 S.E.2d 460) (1996). “[U]nder the combination of circumstances here, the evidence, including the officer's observation that Burke was unsteady on his feet, had bloodshot and watery eyes, exuded a strong odor of alcohol, and tested positive on the alco-sensor test, was sufficient to support a finding of impairment. See Cann-Hanson, supra; Frederick [ v. State, 270 Ga.App. 397, 397-398 (606 S.E.2d 615) (2004)]. We also disagree with the trial court's conclusion that there was ‘no testimony to suggest that the Defendant was a less safe driver.’ In addition to evidence presented of Burke's appearance, the officer testified that based on his observations and experience, he was of the opinion that Burke was a less safe driver. See Duren v. State, 252 Ga.App. 257, 260 (555 S.E.2d 913) (2001) (officer's testimony that defendant was less safe constitutes evidence).” Gilliam v. State, 295 Ga.App. 358, 671 S.E.2d 859 (December 19, 2008). Officers had probable cause for DUI arrest: “[n]ot only did the officer and the EMT treating Gilliam testify concerning the strong odor of alcohol emanating from Gilliam's body, but the trooper further testified that he had probable cause to believe Gilliam had been driving while under the influence of alcohol because Gilliam had caused the collision by his unsafe act of failing to yield to the oncoming vehicle.” Gilliam was unconscious at accident scene, so no field sobriety results, no admission of drinking. Distinguishing State v. Bass , 273 Ga.App. 540, 543(2) (615 S.E.2d 589) (2005): unconscious driver at accident scene, smell of alcohol, but no bad driving – accident caused by other driver. Baynes v. State, 294 Ga.App. 452, 669 S.E.2d 227 (November 7, 2008). DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. “During the authorized brief investigative inquiry, the officer observed that Baynes' eyes were ‘bloodshot red,’ he failed to comply with the officer's instruction to recite the alphabet from D to W (by continuing to Z), he swayed when he walked to the back of the patrol car, and he failed to comply with the officer's instruction to take nine heel-toe steps forward and nine steps back (but instead took 24 steps forward and 24 steps back). Based on these observations, the officer had probable cause to arrest Baynes for DUI, less safe. State v. Day, 237 Ga.App. 771, 773(2) (516 S.E.2d 822) (1999) (even if the field sobriety tests an officer administered to a driver were not accurate, the officer had probable cause to arrest the driver for DUI after the driver admitted recently drinking alcohol and the officer observed that the driver smelled of alcohol, excluded some letters when reciting the alphabet, failed to follow instructions in the walk-and-turn test, and was unsteady).” State v. Preston, 293 Ga.App. 94, 666 S.E.2d 417 (July 11, 2008). Grant of defendant’s motion to suppress reversed; officer had probable cause for DUI arrest, even though officer testified that he didn’t think he did. “[H]ere the undisputed evidence … showed that Preston exhibited four of six clues of impairment on the HGN test, which constitutes evidence of impairment under law enforcement guidelines. ‘Field sobriety tests are not designed to detect the mere presence of alcohol in a person's system, but to produce information on the question whether alcohol is present at an impairing level....” Sieveking v. State, 220 Ga.App. 218, 219(1) (469 S.E.2d 235) (1996) (citations omitted). Preston's performance on the HGN test, along with his admission of drinking, odor of alcohol, alco-sensor result, and bloodshot eyes gave the officer probable cause upon which to request a blood test under the implied consent statute. The fact that the officer did not believe he had probable cause to request the blood test does not require a different finding on whether the circumstances in fact gave rise to probable cause to support the request. The scope of a person's fourth amendment rights, including the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, is determined objectively, not by the subjective conclusions of a law enforcement officer. Autry v. State, 277 Ga.App. 305, 308 (626 S.E.2d 528) (2006); see also Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga.App. 33, 37(2) (645 S.E.2d 545) (2007) (‘The validity of the seizure depends not on the officer's actual state of mind but on an objective assessment of his actions in light of all the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.’) (punctuation and footnote omitted). Here, an objective assessment of the undisputed facts concerning Preston's condition demonstrated probable cause that he was driving under the influence, which satisfied the requirements of the implied consent statute.” Castaneda v. State, 292 Ga.App. 390, 664 S.E.2d 803 (July 2, 2008). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress; officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI: “[a]t the suppression hearing, Hartley testified that he was certified in field sobriety testing and had attended advanced drug and impaired driving programs. He had previous interactions with ‘an uncountable number of persons that have used inhalants,’ although he could only recall arresting ‘a few’ inhalant