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users, each of whom admitted their use of inhalants. Hartley had investigated hundreds of traffic accidents in his eight years as a police officer, and, based on this experience, concluded that Castaneda’s physical characteristics after the collision – including confusion, slurred speech, stumbling, and flushed complexions – were not caused by the accident and, instead, were consistent with inhalant use.” Trial court also had photographs and video of the scene, and video of officer’s interactions with defendant. Hazley v. State, 289 Ga.App. 558, 657 S.E.2d 628 (February 8, 2008). In DUI prosecution, trial court properly denied motion to suppress; officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. “It is uncontroverted in the record that Hazley’s arrest was occasioned by more than his refusal to submit to field sobriety testing. Officer Cox smelled the odor of alcohol on his breath, and Hazley admitted that he had been drinking. In light of the presence of the foregoing factors showing impairment, there was probable cause to arrest for DUI less safe.” Sultan v. State, 289 Ga.App. 405, 657 S.E.2d 311 (January 30, 2008). “Evidence shows that an experienced officer observed Sultan with slurred speech and red, watery eyes, that Sultan’s breath tested positive for the presence of alcohol, that Sultan admitted to drinking ‘a little’ alcohol, and that the officer smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Sultan’s vehicle. Sultan also failed the one leg stand field sobriety evaluation. Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the officer had probable cause to arrest Sultan for driving under the influence of alcohol.” Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga.App. 417, 650 S.E.2d 268 (June 25, 2007). “Given the evidence regarding the deputy sheriff’s specialized DUI training, Steinberg’s admission of ingesting alcohol, failure to maintain lane, bloodshot eyes, performances on several field sobriety tests, and the strong odor of alcohol emanating from Steinberg’s facial area, and we find no error in the trial court’s determination that the deputy sheriff had probable cause to arrest Steinberg. [Cits.]” Tune v. State, 286 Ga.App. 32, 648 S.E.2d 423 (June 20, 2007). Officer had probable cause to arrest for less-safe DUI: “[Deputy] Richie testified that when he arrived on the scene, he was advised by a fellow officer that Tune had been stopped for driving on the wrong side of the road and that she had been drinking. Prior to administering any field sobriety tests, Richie noticed that Tune was unsteady on her feet, was acting nervous, and smelled strongly of alcohol. Tune also admitted to Richie that she had consumed alcoholic beverages two or three hours before. In light of the information Richie was given by [Officer] Forrester and his own observations of Tune, we cannot say that the trial court erred by denying Tune’s motion to suppress.” Gregoire v. State, 285 Ga.App. 111, 645 S.E.2d 611 (April 16, 2007). “[T]he experienced officer’s undisputed testimony that Gregoire traveled at a high rate of speed, swerved in and out of his lane of travel at least five times, switched lanes by crossing over the gore area of the highway several times, had bloodshot eyes and slow, uncoordinated movements, smelled of alcohol, slurred his words, and was unsteady on his feet sufficed to create probable cause for his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.” Slayton v. State, 281 Ga.App. 650, 637 S.E.2d 67 (September 22, 2006). Evidence supported trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant contended that troopers lacked probable cause to arrest for DUI; in addition to smell of alcohol, positive alco-sensor reading, admission of drinking, “there was testimony about Slayton’s driving (abrupt lane change and car beginning to go out of control) as well as her appearance and demeanor,’” specifically flushed features, watery eyes, and demeanor described as “emotional” and “drowsy.” “[O]bservations about the suspect’s physical appearance, demeanor or behavior, as opposed to the mere presence of alcohol, can support a finding of impairment. Jones v. State, 273 Ga.App. 192, 194(1)(c) (614 S.E.2d 820) (2005). Sledge v. State, 264 Ga.App. 612, 615 (591 S.E.2d 479) (2003) and cites.” Distinguishing State v. Gray, 267 Ga.App. 753, 600 S.E.2d 626 (May 17, 2004) and Batty (February 4, 2003), below: trial court in both cases granted motions to suppress; there, like here, appellate court can’t substitute its own opinion for trial court’s findings of fact on contested issues. Accord, Schlanger v. State , 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008) ( Physical precedent only; likewise distinguishing Gray; trial court was not required to ascribe defendant’s slurred speech, unsteadiness and bloodshot eyes to fact that “he may have suffered a head injury in the accident”). State v. Sanders, 274 Ga.App. 393, 617 S.E.2d 633 (July 13, 2005). Trial court could find that no probable cause existed for arrest of defendant as a less-safe driver based on determination of credibility of officers who were sole witnesses at motion to suppress hearing, despite their testimony that defendant smelled of alcohol, had glassy eyes, tested positive on alcosensor, and admitted drinking, where there was no evidence of unsafe driving, no slurred speech, no trouble exiting vehicle. Field sobriety evaluations allegedly showed clues of intoxication, but officer also admitted that he had not