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conducted the tests as instructed. “ If the members of this Court had been sitting as the trier of fact, we might well have found that the officers had probable cause to arrest based on several indicia of impairment. The officers testified that during the Romberg test, Sanders failed to follow instructions and swayed back and forth. Also, Sanders allegedly lost his balance during the walk and turn test. If believed by the trial court, the testimony of the officers would have been more than adequate to support a finding of probable cause. But the trial court apparently did not believe the officers or chose not to draw the inferences from the evidence which we might have drawn. A trial judge is not required to believe the testimony of a witness or to find probable cause automatically whenever certain words are spoken.” Moody v. State, 273 Ga.App. 670, 615 S.E.2d 803 (June 15, 2005). Speeding 56 in 35 zone, defendant’s statement that he was coming from bar where he had five drinks, bloodshot and watery eyes, slow speech, smell of alcohol, four of six clues on HGN, five of eight clues on walk and turn, four of four clues on one-leg stand, positive alcosensor supported trial court’s finding of probable cause for DUI arrest. Distinguishes Batty (February 4, 2003) , below. Accord, Jaffray v. State , 306 Ga.App. 469, 702 S.E.2d 742 (October 14, 2010) (“The evidence that Jaffray was speeding constituted evidence that his driving was impaired.”). State v. Ellison, 271 Ga.App. 898, 611 S.E.2d 129 (March 3, 2005). Trial court could find that defendant’s DUI arrest lacked probable cause, thus suppressing implied consent test results. Officer encountered defendant at roadblock in early morning hours. Officer described strong odor of alcohol, and “red, bloodshot, and watery” eyes. Defendant initially denied drinking, then admitted it. Defendant declined to perform field sobriety tests, saying “I’ve been arrested for DUI before, and I do not think I can do them.” Trial court found this statement to be ambiguous: “There are many reasons why Defendant would have refused such testing.” Trial court also found that “factors other than alcohol could have caused Defendant’s eyes to appear as they did. There was no evidence that the alcohol affected Defendant’s balance, speech, or other motor skills.” Court of Appeals: “We have previously found that bloodshot and watery eyes, as opposed to the mere presence of alcohol, can support a finding of impairment. [Cit.] However, such evidence does not require a finding of impairment. [Cit.]” See also Gray (May 17, 2004), and Batty (February 4, 2003), below; Damato (January 29, 2010), and Encinas (February 12, 2010), above. Lenhardt v. State, 271 Ga.App. 453, 610 S.E.2d 86 (January 7, 2005). “When the officer approached Lenhardt, he detected the odor of alcohol, and noticed that Lenhardt’s eyes were bloodshot and that he looked down throughout the encounter. Lenhardt eventually admitted that he had been drinking alcohol, and the alco-sensor test result was positive. Under the totality of circumstances, the officer had probable cause to arrest Lenhardt for DUI.” State v. Gray, 267 Ga.App. 753, 600 S.E.2d 626 (May 17, 2004). Trial court could find that officer lacked probable cause for DUI arrest where it found that “Gray’s unsteadiness, bloodshot eyes, and dazed appearance may have been caused by the accident and air bags, and that the officer did not necessarily follow all the required procedures in performing the HGN test, the results of which were questionable anyway because of the possible head trauma suffered by Gray. The court found as fact that the only credible evidence of Gray’s intoxication was the odor of alcohol, her admitting to drinking, and the alco-sensor results showing the presence of alcohol. Because none of these factors addressed whether Gray’s intoxication impaired her so that she was rendered a less safe driver, the court concluded that no probable cause supported the arrest and granted the motion.” Court’s factual findings were supported by “any evidence;” court’s determination of credibility was not “clearly erroneous.” “If the evidence shows only that the driver is intoxicated but does not show that such has impaired him, the evidence is insufficient to show probable cause for DUI…. [W]e have used the word intoxicated to refer to having consumed some alcohol, and the question is to what degree one is intoxicated. ‘Intoxicated’ alone does not mean that one is drunk or illegally impaired.” See also Ellison, above and cases there collected.. Distinguished in Jones v. State , 273 Ga.App. 192, 614 S.E.2d 820 (May 6, 2005) (“Jones cites to State v. Gray for the proposition that a driver involved in an accident where the air bags deploy may not be convicted of DUI based on his dazed, confused actions that could be attributed to the air bag deployment. But Gray only held that where the trier of fact finds that the air bag – not the intoxication – caused these actions, an appellate court must affirm where evidence supports that finding. See State v. Ellison [above]. Here, the jury found that the intoxication caused Jones’s appearance and bizarre actions; accordingly, as evidence supported such, we affirm.”). Accord with Gray, see Sanders (July 13, 2005), above. Gray disapproved on these grounds, Hughes v. State , 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (March 16, 2015). State v. Sledge, 264 Ga.App. 612, 591 S.E.2d 479 (December 10, 2003). Trial court’s finding that officer lacked probable cause to arrest for DUI based on following facts reversed: officer observed defendant driving recklessly (over 100 miles per hour in 45 zone, fishtailing), strong odor of alcohol on breath, eyes bloodshot and glassy, but no slurred speech, no unsteadiness on feet, no trouble producing license and insurance. Alco-sensor tested positive, but officer performed no