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into the oncoming lane when the collision occurred. Therefore, in light of the evidence that Wright had taken prescription medications that were still present in his blood at the time of the collision, and in light of evidence that Wright committed a traffic violation by unsafely crossing the center line of the roadway, [fn: See, e.g., OCGA § 40-6-40(a) (‘a vehicle shall be driven on the right half of the roadway’); OCGA § 40-6-45(a) (limitations on driving on left of center of roadway) ] the jury was authorized to find that Wright was impaired.” Duncan v. State, 305 Ga.App. 268, 699 S.E.2d 341 (June 28, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s DUI conviction based on alcohol, drugs, and the combined effect thereof. “Here, the evidence showed that Duncan, who did not have a current driver's license, was driving a truck with an expired tag without using his headlights and was weaving, according to Officer Segrest. Duncan also refused to submit to certain field sobriety tests and a blood test. Finally, Officer Segrest testified that he believed that Duncan was under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol to the extent it was less safe for Duncan to drive based on observations, including the odor of cologne and alcohol coming from Duncan, his glassy, bloodshot eyes which exhibited nystagmus, and his verbal aggression. Given the undisputed evidence, the jury was authorized to find Duncan guilty of the three DUI charges.” Head v. State, 303 Ga.App. 475, 693 S.E.2d 845 (March 18, 2010). Evidence insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for less-safe DUI based on drugs: “the state presented evidence that Head had alprazolam and a cocaine metabolite in his blood, and further presented the officer's opinion testimony that Head should have been able to avoid the collision, although the bus driver – not Head – was cited with the traffic infraction. But the record contains no evidence tending to explain the significance of the alprazolam and cocaine metabolite present in Head's blood, i.e., whether the quantity of the drugs was considered sizeable; whether the quantities indicated recent or merely past usage of the drugs; [fn] or what effect the level of drugs found in Head's blood would have on the average person, specifically whether those drugs would cause any physical and/or mental impairment. Significantly, Head elicited expert testimony that the presence of benzoylecgonine in one's blood ‘is not indicative of any impairment because it is the after-effect’ of cocaine.” Evidence supported (a)(6) conviction, however. Blankenship v. State, 301 Ga.App. 602, 688 S.E.2d 395 (December 14, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s less safe DUI conviction: “the experienced officer, who was trained in administering field sobriety tests, opined that Blankenship was impaired to the extent it was less safe for him to drive based on the officer's observations that (i) a strong odor of alcohol exuded from Blankenship's breath, (ii) Blankenship had watery, bloodshot eyes, (iii) Blankenship admitted to drinking beer recently, (iv) Blankenship was unsteady on his feet when he exited the vehicle, and (v) Blankenship failed all three field sobriety tests administered by the officer. Moreover, after proper notice, Blankenship declined the officer's request for state-administered chemical tests of his blood and breath.” Davis v. State, 301 Ga.App. 484, 687 S.E.2d 854 (November 13, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s less-safe DUI conviction. “‘In a less safe case, the [ s]tate must prove that the defendant had impaired driving ability as a result of drinking alcohol.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) State v. Ellison, 271 Ga.App. 898, 902(3)(b) (611 S.E.2d 129) (2005). DUI may be proved solely by circumstantial evidence. Pecina v. State, 274 Ga. 416, 419(2) (554 S.E.2d 167) (2001). Where, as here, ‘there is evidence that the defendant has been drinking, the manner of his driving may be considered on the question of whether he has been affected by alcohol to the extent that he is less safe to drive.’ (Citation omitted.) Id. In the case at bar, Davis's drinking was established by evidence that his blood-alcohol level was between .078 and .115 at the time of the incident. As to the manner of his driving, Davis drove his vehicle off the roadway, spun out of control, and struck an electrical pole that was located 26 feet from the edge of the asphalt. Davis drove with cruise control on although it was raining. Evidence indicated that the road was in good condition, despite Davis's testimony to the contrary. The manner in which Davis drove ‘suggest[s] the negative influence of intoxication on the operation of the vehicle.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Jones [ v. State, 273 Ga.App. 192(1) (614 S.E.2d 820) (2005)] (defendant pulled out of a parking lot without stopping and rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a traffic light). Additionally, this evidence supports his conviction of reckless driving. See OCGA § 40-6-390(a); Lesh v. State, 259 Ga.App. 325, 327 (577 S.E.2d 4) (2003). Furthermore, the deputies testified to Davis's slurred speech, stumbling gait, ‘glazy’ eyes and ‘pasty’ complexion; one of the deputies smelled alcohol coming from his person and vehicle. The experienced officers testified that, in their opinion, Davis was under the influence to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive.” Rice v. State, 297 Ga.App. 684, 677 S.E.2d 339 (May 5, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for DUI – drugs: “Rice was unsteady on her feet, she slurred her speech, she weaved between lanes while driving, she did not pass several field sobriety tests, she refused to submit to a test of her blood for drugs, methamphetamine and marijuana were